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The Congress for Cultural Freedom, *Minerva*, and the Quest for Instituting "Science Studies" in the Age of Cold War

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Abstract The Congress for Cultural Freedom is remembered as a paramount example of the "cultural cold wars." In this paper, I discuss the ways in which this powerful transnational organization sought to promote "science studies" as a distinct – and politically relevant – area of expertise, and part of the CCF broader agenda to offer a renewed framework for liberalism. By means of its Study Groups, international conferences and its periodicals, such as *Minerva*, the Congress developed into an influential forum for examining the ways Big Science impacted the relations between science, society, and politics, thus constituting a semi-institutional niche for Science Studies before its professionalization within academia during the 1970s. I argue that the Congress contributed to the construction of public space in which the relations between science, society and politics were debated, and science was reconceptualized as a social activity. The vision of "science studies" the CCF-associated intellectuals promulgated was different from the science studies we know today. Yet, this alternative vision, in which the issues of science politics appeared inseparable from those of science policy, science organization, and science governance, constituted the "pre-history" of science studies today.

Keywords Cold War, The Congress for Cultural Freedom · Edward Shils · Michael Polanyi · Big Science · "End of ideology" · Science Studies

Once the war was over … even the spat that divided Marxists and non-Marxists … was momentarily suppressed, and soon a circle of figures, with commitments across the political spectrum, found itself united in promoting

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the history of science as a discipline encapsulating the goals of post-war reconstruction and reconciliation.[1]

The Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), an influential international association of elite American and European political and cultural intellectuals, is remembered as the spearhead of Cold War American cultural diplomacy. The CCF was established in 1950, with the aim to combat communist ideology and to secure the ideological and cultural-intellectual support for the Marshall Plan in the sphere of culture and ideas. The CCF's goals were to be achieved through its widely publicized conferences, cultural festivals and the CCF-affiliated periodicals, such as *Encounter*, *Preuves*, *Der Monat*, and, later, *Minerva*. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the CCF developed into an important center for prominent American and Western European intellectuals with an anti-communist stand, but in other respects very different in outlook and opinion.[2] The delegates to the Congress, convened in different Western European countries, included some of the most notorious thinkers and public intellectuals of the period: Arthur Koestler, Michael Polanyi, Raymond Aron, Hannah Arendt, Daniel Bell, Sidney Hook, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., among many others. No doubt, the financial generosity of the Congress contributed to its high profile status, and the source of its funding made it a paramount example of "the Cultural Cold Wars" (Coleman 1989, Saunders 1999). The organization, as it was revealed in 1967, had been covertly funded by the CIA, and its executive secretary Michael Josselson - "the Diaghilev" of the Congress as he was perceived by the CCF intellectuals - admitted that he had for seventeen years been channeling CIA money into the organization.

The revelation of covert CIA funding placed the question "who paid the piper" – to use the title of one of the books on the history of the CCF – at the center of its historiographical accounts. In the last years, however, there has been a gradual increase in studies that, in the words of historian David Engerman, followed "sponsors' money not just into scholars' bank accounts but into their publications," making use of European and American sources for a more in-depth look at the "tune" the "pipers" had produced - the big ideas, which dominated Cold War culture and in some crucial ways shaped the post-Cold War world (Engerman 2010). With this "cultural turn" in the Cold War studies, the CCF is attracting a renewed attention, as scholars are beginning to assess the intellectual and cultural legacy of the Congress, its publication activities, periodicals, and the set of new subjects it helped to promulgate in the age of Cold War.[3]

[1] Fox (2006, p. 420).

[2] See on the history of the CCF: Coleman (1989), Berghahn (2001), Saunders (1999), Scott-Smith (2002).

[3] On the "cultural turn" in Cold War historiography, see Scott-Smith and Krabbendam (2003). On the legacy of the CCF in literary studies, see Berghahn (2001), Scott-Smith (2002). Many recent studies of the CCF are focused on the Congress' legacy in promoting certain artistic forms and visions, in music, dance, and abstract painting (see, for example, recent studies focused on music: Wellens (2002), Shreffler (2005)). The intellectual legacy of the periodicals linked to the CCF is started to be assessed systematically, for example, Jason Harding is currently writing a history of the journal *Encounter*, Maren Roth is writing a biography of Melvin Lasky, the editor of *Encounter*.

This paper offers a closer look at the activities of the organization related to the promotion of the studies of science as a distinct – and politically relevant – area of expertise within the social and human sciences. The quest to promote "science studies" was part of the CCF's broader agenda to offer a renewed framework for liberalism – one of the big ideas that dominated Cold War intellectual culture and in some crucial ways shaped the post-Cold War world. As a transnational organization, the CCF embedded the goals of negotiation and reconciliation across political divides, both in its "ideology," epitomized in two twin concepts the CCF had promoted - the "end of ideology" and the theory of "post-industrial society" - and in its transatlantic institutional structure. The "end of ideology" was as much a normative position as it was an attempt to secure, in Michael Polanyi's words, "a post-Marxian basis for liberalism" – an umbrella term for various reconciliations of *free market* (a cherished ideal of capitalist system) and *centralized planning* (firmly associated with Soviet economic system), in the political economy of the post-WWII world shaped by dramatically increased role of science and technology. With its emphasis on "sober," sophisticated and dispassionate socio-economic analysis of modern industrial (or, in fact, "post-industrial") societies and their political systems, the "end of ideology" turned the studies of science, its organization and its politics, into the topic of central concern. Science, or, more specifically, Big Science - a new mode of scientific research promulgated in the aftermath of WWII - and its changing relation to the state and politics, which apparently reconciled conflicting claims for *planning* and *laissez-faire*, needed to be assessed by social analysts, especially with regard to its implications for democracy, liberalism, individualism and freedom.

The CCF intellectuals sought to offer such an assessment, and they did this in a big way. As a transnational organization with considerable structural power, the CCF with its seminars, conferences and scholarly journals, such as *Minerva*, provided a "semi-institutional" niche for the meta-studies of science broadly construed and helped to legitimate the disciplinary identity of science studies as a distinct - and politically relevant - area of expertise. The vision of "science studies" the CCF-associated intellectuals were promoting was different from the science studies as we have it today. Yet, this alternative vision, in which the issues of science politics were intrinsically linked to science policy, organization of science and science governance, constituted the pre-history of science studies as the field we know today.[4]

The CCF "Ideology": The "End of Ideology" in the Age of Cold War

As an organization, the CCF started in June 1950 with the inaugural conference held in West Berlin, an outpost of Western power in communist East Europe. The Congress was inaugurated with the *Freedom Manifesto*, written by Arthur Koestler, a Hungarian émigré whose influential anti-communist novels denounced

[4] Aant Elzinga pointed out in his several publications that the STS began with "science policy studies" later marginalized within the science studies project (Elzinga 1995, 1997, in press).

totalitarianism and called to arms to defend freedom and oppose Stalinism. In his passionate speech at the opening ceremony of the Congress, Koestler called to arms to fight the communism - through a worldwide network of magazines, national committees, and cultural programs. Koestler expressed these ideas in the combative, uncompromising style of his sharp prose. Addressing his "friends, fellow-sufferers, fellow-fighters," Koestler spoke with force and passion:

> Since the earliest days, the teachers of mankind have recommended two diametrically opposed methods of action. The first demands that we should refuse to see the world divided into black and white, heroes and villains, friends and foes; that we should distinguish nuances, and strive for synthesis or at least compromise; it tells us that in nearly all seemingly inescapable dilemmas there exists a third alternative which patient search may discover. In short, we should refuse the choice between Scylla and Charybdis and rather navigate like Odysseus of the nimble wits. … The second, opposite advice was summed up two thousand years ago in one single phrase: "Let your communication be, Yea, yea, Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these, comes from evil."[5]

Koestler berated his fellow-intellectuals for refusing to see that "in vital emergencies like the present, when man stands at a crossroads which only leaves the choice of this way or that, the difference between the very clever and the simple in mind narrows almost to vanishing point or even turns to the latter's advantage" (Coleman 2005, p. 184).

Koestler's words were met with applause but his messianic style provoked growing opposition within the CCF. The French Leftist Catholic *Esprit* warned the Congress soon after the Berlin Congress: *"Ne koestlerisons pas!"*(Coleman 2005). To "Koestlerize" meant to attack contemptuously and uncompromisingly the fellow-travelers, whom Koestler regarded as - literally - neurotics, "victims of professional disease," as he diagnosed the intellectuals' estrangement from reality and their adherence to the mental habits of looking for synthesis, compromise, and middle-ground. These "mental habits" made those among them who refused to join a rhetorical crusade against communism the "imbeciles," in Koestler's words twice in one speech at Berlin (see Koestler 1983). Koestler's "liberalism" was "militant," indeed.

By 1952, Koestler was marginalized within the Congress and lost his influence among its leaders, who, in the words of Nicolas Nabokov, a composer and the Secretary General of CCF, by that time were striving to establish "the Congress [for Cultural Freedom] in the minds of the European intellectuals as a positive, and not only as a political, organization" (Coleman 1989, p. 56). After Stalin's death in 1953 it became even more obvious that the Koestlerian "simple" message of "anti-communism" and the uncompromising combat against totalitarianisim was not enough to sustain appeal among the European and American intellectual elite.[6]

[5] Cit. in Coleman (2005, p. 184).

[6] See discussion of marginalization of Koestler's "hard-line" within the CCF in Berghahn (2001) and Scott-Smith (2002).

The CCF lost no time in establishing a "positive program," which emerged in the mid-1950s from the combined work of the CCF network of intellectuals, most prominently Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell and Edward Shils. Their "positive program" was encapsulated in the "end of ideology" rhetoric, which found its sharpest articulation in Daniel Bell's classic *The End of Ideology*, first published in 1960. Since the 1955 Congress in Milan, attended by the most prominent intellectuals of the time (Hannah Arendt, Milton Friedman, Raymond Aron, Michael Polanyi, Mircea Eliade, Ernst Nagel, Joseph Needham, Peter Winch, among many others), the "End of Ideology slogan" became, in the words of Michael Polanyi, "an expression of [the CCF] predominant aims [and] our official pronouncement."[7]

Michael Polanyi, a Hungarian émigré and a "philosophical chemist," who is now recognized as one of the most important thinkers on the nature of scientific knowledge and the social order of science, contributed to the fundamental revision of the image of science, its theory, method and practice in the 1960s and 1970s. Polanyi's philosophy of science was tightly connected to his thinking in economics and politics, and his life-long defense of the market model of the social order of science.[8] Polanyi became an active member of the CCF in 1953, persuaded by physicist Alexander Weissberg, who asked him to chair the CCF's Committee on Science and Freedom and help organize its meeting in Hamburg (Nye 2011). Polanyi, in turn, persuaded Chicago sociologist Edward Shils to join the Congress in the same year (Scott-Smith, 2002). Polanyi was the source of Shils' perhaps deepest intellectual relationship, which, as Stephen Turner put it, "cannot be reduced to a model of 'influence.'… [Rather,] it amounted in a way to a kind of dialectical partnership that stimulated Shils' thought and Polanyi's as well" (Turner 1996).[9] Both had the greatest impact in making the "end of ideology" discourse the semi-official outlook of the Congress.

In Polanyi's words, the "end of ideology" was a "distinctive, passionately sober approach to culture and politics," the approach which encouraged the factual and calm examination of political systems and contemporary societal phenomena, rather than mere denunciation of totalitarian regimes and communism.[10] This rhetoric sought to shift the focus of the debate away from simplistic early Cold War dichotomies of East-West competition, thereby claiming greater scholarly merit and possibility to reach for a wider audience. The "end of ideology" rhetoric signified an important shift within the CCF's self-perception that occurred in the mid-1950s, "from an instrument of struggle against totalitarianism to an international forum for debate" (Scott-Smith 2002, p. 139).

All CCF-associated intellectuals had a long trajectory of political activism and engagement, and regarded their activities within the Congress as the forefront of political debate. These were the intellectuals looking for reconciliations and

[7] Michael Polanyi to V. B. Karnik, 11 Jan 1961, Michael Polanyi Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago (**Thereafter MPP**), box 6, folder 1.

[8] See discussion in Nye (2011), Thorpe (2009). See also Aronova (2009).

[9] See also Swartz (1998).

[10] Michael Polanyi, "CCF, Memo" 19 Nov 1961. MPP, box 6, folder 6.

middle-ground positions, achieved through a mix of political analysis, to ensure a broader public appeal. The CCF publications were marked by a characteristic tone of ultra-sophistication, as the CCF-associated intellectuals prided themselves on their scholarly detachment. Their "end of ideology" position implied that politics should no longer be defined as a contest, a fight between rivaling ideological movements of the right or the left. Instead, the common forces resulting from the dramatic advances of science and technology were causing both democratic capitalist and authoritarian socialist and collectivist systems to adopt similar methods of socio-economic management. In the words of Konstantin Jelenski, a Polish émigré writer who led the Eastern European division of the CCF, it was the "growing realization that the realities of industrialism are perhaps a more important determining factor socially than political systems, whatever their ideological origin" (Jelenski 1962, p. 1).

The "end of ideology" was not only a normative position; it also sought to offer a substantial reformulation of the ideals and goals of classical liberalism. The post-war world saw the rise of welfare-state capitalism and the growing recognition of the role of the state in regulating and managing economy in order to overcome the instabilities of the free market. These post-WWII realities had shaken the belief in an unregulated free market system and *laissez-faire*. The "end of ideology" sought to offer a renewed defense of capitalist "free society," with its central ideals of the "free market" and *laissez-faire* economics to be attuned to the realities of the post-WWII politico-economic conditions and to the subtleties and compromises of the Cold War with its post-war coalitions. In this way, as Polanyi contended, the "end of ideology" sought to "secure a post-Marxian basis for liberalism throughout the world."[11]

The "end of ideology" also turned the studies of science into the topic of central concern. With the emphasis on "sober," sophisticated and dispassionate socio-economic analysis of modern industrial societies and their political systems, it promoted the view that dramatically increased role of science in the realm of public affairs and politics delimited a new phase in the development of Western liberal democracies. Science, its history and its politics needed to be assessed, especially in terms of their implications for democracy, liberalism, and freedom. The CCF intellectuals sought to offer such an assessment, and they did this in a big way.

The CCF Methodology: CCF Study Groups and its Seminar Program

As Rebecca Lemov pointed out, during the Cold War era "methodological thought" was a preeminent concern (Lemov 2010). Indeed, within the CCF, with its "end of ideology" rhetoric calling for a non-ideological "sober" research based on facts, rational method and science, rather than ideological conceptions and "messianic claims," the concern for a "proper method" loomed large. The CCF encouraged the application of scientific methods to social problems. A model singled out in the

[11] Memo "Study Group of the Committee for Science and Freedom held in Paris 29 August to 1 September 1956." MPP, box 33, folder 10.

organization's internal correspondence was the Committee for Economic Development (CED), as the organization that had an important impact on the Marshall Plan, and as an organization that developed sophisticated methods of collecting, processing and analyzing vast amounts of social data.[12] The "Explanatory memorandum" of the CCF Seminar Program elaborated on this:

> The Congress would do well to adopt this CED technique or some appropriate variant of it whereby data which has been collected by specialized institutions on different topics of general importance would be submitted to a small study group of the Congress which would prepare on the basis of the detailed examination of the available data, recommendations for a special international policy statements, to be issued on the name of the Congress. Such statements … could conceivably have a beneficial influence on the policies of other organizations, of foundations, and even of governments.[13]

The CED model was never implemented in practice at the CCF. The main form of the CCF activities was its Seminar Program, conceived as an innovative form of interdisciplinary contact, a method of "intellectual confrontation" in which critical discussion was methodically staged. As one of the CCF officers noted, "the seminar concept … provides the most adequate form for the treatment of many issues … stimulating thinking and discussion about …new ways of organizing intellectual confrontation."[14] To achieve this healthy "intellectual confrontation," the CCF seminars and study groups adopted the practice of commissioning two or more position papers that would present opposing views "on a critical contemporary problem" (such as, for example, "an optimistic and pessimistic view of the quality of life in industrial society"), and submitting them for discussion in small groups.

The CCF Seminar Program comprised both international seminars and a large number of local meetings. The topics ranged from the issues of race to the role of university, mass culture, religion, and science in the changing world.[15] The unstated goal of the CCF seminars was to develop it into a clearing house of independent expertise on the pressing issues of the day, with the view in mind that eventually it will be used to advise government policymakers. These discussions, fully transcribed and edited, ultimately were intended to be published in the special Congress series devoted to "major present preoccupations of the intellectual world."[16]

One of the chief designers of the CCF's seminar program was Edward Shils, who also helped to introduce another form of "semi-institutionalized" CCF activities - its "Study Groups." CCF study groups were modeled after the "Study Group on Science and Freedom," started by Michael Polanyi at the 1953 Hamburg Congress,

[12] "Memorandum," (n/d), International Association for Cultural Freedom Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago (**Thereafter: IACFP**), Series III, box 99, folder 1.

[13] ibid.

[14] ibid.

[15] CCF Study Groups, IACFP.

[16] "Memorandum," (n/d), IACFP, Series III, box 99, folder 1.

as a continuation of the activities of the Society for Freedom in Science that he had initiated in the 1940s.[17] Polanyi, as one of the main organizers of the 1953 Congress in Hamburg, presented the opening address, where he spoke about the system of the organization of science, as it had developed since the Scientific Revolution, as a resource for liberal capitalist democracy. An avid defender of the notion of "free enterprise" in science, Polanyi likened the functioning of the scientific world to that of the free market: "individual, independent research is … coordinated by a common medium which fulfils in the realm of science the same function as does the market for a system of free enterprise."[18] Shils commented at length on Polanyi's "free market" analogy and shared many of Polanyi's ideas and concerns. At the same time, Shils noted in his comments that Polanyi's discussion did not particularly sharpen the picture of the proper relations of science and the state. In particular, as he pointed out, no satisfactory method of the governmental support of science and related policies had been discovered at the Hamburg Congress.[19] The set of issues related to science policy will later become the focus of discussions, workshops and publications initiated by Shils under the auspices of CCF.

At the next Congress, held in Milan in 1955, Shils suggested to extend the Study Group into a "future Congress on Science and Freedom," as a permanent organization like the CCF itself but focused exclusively on the "impact on the academic community of the great historical changes of the past two decades, and particularly of the greatly increased need for finance from outside sources, and the invasion of practical and technical tasks in the academic sphere, with all its resulting social, political and intellectual problems."[20] The envisioned "Congress on Science and Freedom" took place in 1959, in form of the CCF General Conference entirely devoted to the discussion of the dramatic changes in the role of technology and science came to play in the post-WWII world, profoundly altering the structure of Western society. The long-term aspiration was to produce a comprehensive account of the "Technical Age," into which both Western and non-Western societies had entered in the aftermath of WWII.[21] However, the topic was obviously too grandiose and too important to be limited to one meeting. As a solution, Shils suggested to divide it between several Study Groups, and making these a permanent form of CCF activities. The CCF adopted Shils' proposal, and six Study Groups were inaugurated, each having its own program within the general theme outlined in

[17] "Committee on Science and Freedom. Report on the First Year's Activities: July 1954-August 1955." Committee on Science and Freedom Study Group, Agenda (Paris, 1956). IACFP, Series III, Box 12, folder 4. See on Polanyi's Society for Freedom in Science: Nye (2011).

[18] Michael Polanyi, "Pure and Applied Science and their Appropriate Form of Organization," Science and Freedom Congress, Hamburg 1953, IACFP, box 5, folder 7.

[19] "Shils Comments on Polanyi," Science and Freedom Congress, Hamburg 1953, IACFP, box 5, folder 2.

[20] Committee on Science and Freedom Study Group, Agenda (Paris, 1956). IACFP, Series III, box 12, folder 4.

[21] Edward Shils, "Outline of the General Conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom," Apr 1959, International Association for Cultural Freedom/Congress for Cultural Freedom/ International Council on the Future of the University Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago (**Thereafter IACF/ICFUP**), box 1.

the conference proposal. With different levels of success and productivity, the CCF "study groups" continued to function after the conference, organizing follow-up meetings and publishing its proceedings.

The first Study Group, headed by Shils himself, was framed explicitly in terms of the "end of ideology" discourse, focusing on the political aspects of the "Technical Age" dealing with the "decline of ideologies" in Western societies as the result of the rise of technical and scientific expertise and their growing role in the realm of public affairs. The second and third groups were concerned with the features, both positive and negative, of modern industrial and mass society, with one group focusing on the features of society while the other focused on the individual's relation to culture and society in the "Technical Age." The fourth and fifth groups focused on the role of the "vast class of intellectuals" – artists, scientists, and academics of all kind – in the contemporary world divided by the Cold War. Finally, the sixth group proclaimed as its aim the study of "the signs already visible of affirmation in the Communist world itself of those values which we hold dear. It will seek to pinpoint indications that such values do provide a point of convergence for various contrasting historical developments." [22] In subsequent years, the topics of Study Groups changed, although they kept the continuity in their themes: Shils, as a Study Group leader, was interested in science policy and science politics, Polanyi was concerned with the relationship of thought, mentalities, and contemporary politics, Raymond Aron focused his group's discussions on the conditions of stability in democratic and authoritarian societies, while Nicolas Nabokov's group focused on the role of art in the post-WWII world.[23]

Science in relation to social and political order was the major focus of discussions in two groups led by Shils and Polanyi. Polanyi's major philosophy of science book, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (based on his Gifford Lectures of 1951–52), was conceived before he joined the CCF, but the ideas in *Personal Knowledge* were elaborated within the CCF study groups. Polanyi is mostly remembered for his development of the notion of scientific community and his concept of "tacit knowledge," which articulated the view of science that appreciated the role of craftsmanship, apprenticeship, and authority in scientific research (Nye 2007, 2011). Thomas Kuhn acknowledged Polanyi's influence on his own ideas on scientific community. At the same time, Kuhn and other post-positivist philosophers of science read Polanyi selectively. The major component of Polanyi's philosophy of science, his "theory of commitment," in which he sought to rehabilitate emotions as a legitimate object of sustained epistemological inquiry, did not evoke much interest on the part of philosophers and historians of science in the 1960s and 1970s (Nye 2011).[24] Polanyi's ideas on the epistemological and political relevance of emotions, passions, and motives – all these marginalized subjects both in traditional philosophy of science as well as within its post-positivist developments – were thoroughly discussed, however, at the CCF Study Groups meetings.

[22] ibid.

[23] CCF Study Groups, IACFP, Series III, box 27–29.

[24] See Aronova (2009) for the discussion of how philosophers who turned to medical ethicists in the 1970s appropriated Polanyi's theory of emotions and passions in science.

Shils' Study Group, on the other hand, was focused on "Scientific Policy – the Cooperation of Government, Economy and the Universities in the Development and Application of Scientific Research."[25] In 1960 and 1961, Shils contacted and invited leading academics and scientists to take part in discussions, or to contribute a paper or a text for the study group discussions. As he explained to Robert Oppenheimer in 1960, "The kind of persons we wish for are scientists concerned with problems of scientific policy, 'scientific administrators,' civil servants and politicians especially concerned with the development of science and other aspects of the application of scientific knowledge."[26] Shils was involved in the atomic scientists' movement since the decade following Hiroshima as one of the founders, editors and reporters of the journal *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* since its inception in 1945, and a long-term vice-director of the University of Chicago's Office of Enquiry into the Social Aspects of Atomic Energy, which he and Chicago anthropologist Robert Redfield established in 1945. As a "director" of the CCF Study Group, Shils now capitalized on this network trying to enlist atomic scientists in a more general and theoretical discussion of the science policy issues.

The Study Groups were targeting the intellectual elite, the major "target" of all CCF activities. Shils, however, moved his Study Group's discussions in the public realm. In 1962, Shils established the journal *Minerva*. *Minerva* was conceived as a public forum for the discussion of the issues Shils started to discuss within his Study Group, intended to reach out not only the broader academic community, but also the government policymakers, by developing independent expertise on the pressing issues of science policy in contemporary America and in major industrialized countries.

The "*Minerva* Debate": Social and Political Implications of Big Science

In his opening editorial address in the first issue of *Minerva*, Shils stated that *Minerva* will be dealing with the issues surrounding what he called "governmentalisation" of science:

> The governmentalisation of science and scholarship is, in part, a product of intellectual development and its changed relationship to technology, which entails costs which can only be borne by government, and returns, in which governments, even in capitalistic societies, have a great and appropriate interest. The governmentalisation of science in the past decade and a half is also, in part, a result of the Cold War – as are also, to some extent, the political embarrassments and concerns of science. *Minerva* will be concerned with the indirect as well as the direct influence of the Cold War on the role of science and scholarship and on the performance of their true calling.[27]

[25] Edward Shils to A.K. Brohi, 11 Apr 1960, IACF/ICFUP, box 1.

[26] Edward Shils to Robert Oppenheimer, 12 Jul 1960, IACF/ICFUP, box 1.

[27] Shils (1962, p. 16).

The critical effect of the Cold War was that "scientists have become politicians" (Shils 1962, p. 9). Politics was always part of science, but now, Shils pointed out, the relationship between politics and science had become more explicit and prominent. The 'governmentalisation' of science, in Shils' opinion, delineated the beginning of a new era in the relations between American scientists and the federal government. *Minerva* sought to create a forum to discuss, describe, document, and examine these recent changes, and their impact on the relations between science and politics.

During the 1960s, the journal established itself as such a forum, focusing particularly on national policy debates in the U.S. The first and most prominent topic of the newly founded journal, which became the continuing theme on the pages of *Minerva* from 1962 to 1967, was the discussion of the phenomenon of Big Science and its social and political implications. In the early 1960s, the term "Big Science" was coined, and the discussion of this phenomenon was framed by two physicists - director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Alvin Weinberg and physicist-turned-historian Derek de Solla Price.[28] In his influential essay on the phenomenon that he called Big Science (always in capital letters), published in *Science* in 1961, Weinberg argued that the large-scale, centralized scientific operations exemplified by gigantic National Laboratories like Oak Ridge – which required big facilities, big budgets, and big publicity – had drastically changed the major features and societal relations of science in the post-WWII era. Despite the fact that Weinberg was the head of the paradigmatic Big Science facility, he held an ambivalent view on Big Science, arguing that it should be "contained" within the walls of few National Laboratories, "to prevent the contagion of Big Science from spreading to the universities" (Weinberg 1961, p. 162). Pointing out that "Big Science is here to stay," Weinberg called for a systematic characterization of this phenomenon and its social and political implications. "These questions" of the cultural, social, and political implications of Big Science, Weinberg noted, "…. are so broad, and so difficult, that I cannot do more than raise them here" (Weinberg 1961, p. 161).

The questions that Weinberg raised in his short 1961 *Science* essay became the primary concern of the newly founded journal *Minerva*. While planning the first issue of the journal in May of 1962, Shils contacted Weinberg inviting him to contribute a paper for the opening issue of *Minerva*, expanding on some of the themes Weinberg raised in his *Science* essay.[29] Weinberg apparently did not react immediately, but he responded to Shils' second call several months later, and sent Shils his manuscript that he wrote when he was a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and that he presented at the meeting of the local engineering society of the University of Tennessee earlier that year.[30] Shils reacted

[28] See Weinberg (1961), Price (1961).

[29] As referred in the letter: Edward Shils to Alvin Weinberg, 2 Nov 1962, Minerva Records, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago (**Thereafter: MR**), box 1, folder 12.

[30] Alvin Weinberg to Edward Shils, 15 Nov 1962, MR, box 1, folder 12.

enthusiastically and suggested to publish this essay with minimal changes in the second issue of Minerva, since the opening issue was already in press.[31]

Weinberg's article, entitled, at Shils' suggestion, "Criteria for Scientific Choice," was focused on the question of how funding for Big Science should be allocated in a democratic society. At the same time, it framed a set of more general themes. In Weinberg's view, when science achieved the size and complexity of Big Science operations, all of which were embroiled in institutional, bureaucratic, and national as well as international, politics, the qualitative change had occurred in the relation between science and the state, as well as in the ways scientists and the public had come to understand the relationship between science and politics. The distinctive feature of Big Science was its explicit political character. Big Science implied czar-like control and promulgated hierarchies in scientific life. Moreover, it was the Cold War that stimulated the adoption of Big Science as the new agenda for post-WWII science, in order to maintain the nation's superiority in the high-technology post-war economy. Weinberg argued that scientists and the general public have no choice other than to accept Big Science, but recommended an institutional pluralism, with the Big Science restricted to the National Laboratories, while traditional "Little Science" and middle-range science were preserved in self-governing universities.

Weinberg's essay opened the discussion on the social and political implications of Big Science on the pages of *Minerva.* Shils carefully planned the debate, transferring the approaches and formats of the CCF Study Groups to this forum. In line with the CCF's "method of intellectual confrontation," Shils commissioned two opposing "position papers" to frame the discussion of Big Science in the opening issues of *Minerva*. The opposite view on Big Science came from Michael Polanyi, whom Shils asked to write a paper in the new journal. Polanyi was an enthusiastic supporter of Shil's initiative, praising Shils for the "great achievement" of his "enterprise in bringing out the first issue of *Minerva*" and affirming Shils that he "subscribed to everything you say in the editorial introduction."[32] As Shils later admitted, Polanyi became less interested in the journal when it became focused on "science-policy" (Shils 1976). Nevertheless, Polanyi wrote an essay for the opening issue of *Minerva*, the famous "The Republic of Science," which contributed, in Shils' words, to the "fundamental theme of *Minerva*," while presenting a point of view quite different from the one advocated by Weinberg (Shils 1976).

In this essay, Polanyi restated his long-held views on science and its governance, arguing that the social order of science, as self-perpetuating and self-governing community of scholars-citizens, with no central authority, and internally coordinated "by mutual adjustment of independent initiatives," is, at the same time, a system that "works according to economic principles similar to those by which the production of material goods is regulated" (Polanyi 1962).[33] As he put it, "in the free cooperation of independent scientists we shall find a highly simplified model of a free society" (Polanyi 1962, p. 54). Polanyi contended that governmental support

[31] Edward Shils to Alvin Weinberg, 28 Nov 1962, MR, box 1, folder 12.

[32] Michael Polanyi to Edward Shils, 15 Nov 1962, MR, box 1, folder 4.

[33] On Polanyi's political philosophy, see Nye (2011).

of science, though welcomed, should not imply any control of scientific enterprise, either in the form of planning or regulation, since this would undermine the ideal of autonomy of the self-governing scientific community. Referring to the movement of left-wing British scientists, most prominently to Marxist John D. Bernal's plea in support of planning science in Britain, and mentioning in passing the "reports from Soviet Russia," Polanyi stated:

> We may sum up by saying that the movements for guiding science towards a more direct service of the public interest, as well as for coordinating the pursuit of science more effectively from the centre, have all petered out. Science continues to be conducted in British universities as was done before the movement for the social guidance of science ever started. And I believe that all scientific progress achieved in the Soviet Union was also due – as everywhere else – to the initiative of original minds, choosing their own problems and carrying out their investigation, according to their own lights.[34]

Science, according to Polanyi, should maintain its traditional – "Little Science" – mode of organization and governance, functioning as a decentralized network of independent self-coordinated initiatives. This mode of organization, he argued, provided science with its crucial strength and should be maintained even when scientific enterprises take advantage of government subsidies and support.[35]

The views expressed in the two 'position papers' written by Polanyi and Weinberg framed the discussion in the subsequent issues of *Minerva* – "the *Minerva* debate on scientific choice," as one of the participants, philosopher Stephen Toulmin, called it (Toulmin 1964). Shils commissioned papers from scientists and social theorists suggesting that they respond to and comment upon the views expressed by Weinberg and Polanyi.

One of the first contributors to "the *Minerva* debate" was John Maddox, British physicist-turned-science writer and soon-to-become the editor of *Nature*. Maddox argued for moderate planning of science, citing as an example British Biological Research Committee of the Royal Society established in 1961 in order to plan more generous support for biological sciences in Britain (Maddox 1964, p. 142). While Polanyi referred to British Leftist scientists' movement of the 1930s, Maddox related his discussion to the plea for the accountability of science voiced largely by conservative British scientists, who, similarly to British Marxist scientists of the 1930s, supported control and regulation of science from the outside. Thus, the organized planning and control of science, Maddox's argued, might go well enough without transforming the scientists into socialist sympathizers.

The recognition of the fact that the political realities of post-WWII years have increasingly turned science into a cultural weapon and, as Maddox put it, into "the harbinger of success in the Cold War," became another concurrent theme in the discussion of Big Science and its implications on the pages of *Minerva*. As Toulmin

[34] Polanyi (1962, p. 66).

[35] As Mary Jo Nye had argued, these views were rooted in Polanyi's career and experiences he had in the 1920s and early 1930s as a physical chemist in the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft Institutes in Berlin-Dahlem– the institutions that enjoyed the government support while at the same time not limiting the scientists' autonomy (Nye 2007).

argued, science, simultaneously with becoming "Big," was also becoming a "political constituency": such exemplary Big Science operations as NASA, for example, "instead of being a purely administrative agency, … is … a political agency taking political decisions: 'a state within a state,' to which Congress has delegated some of its powers under the Constitution" (Toulmin 1964, p. 355).

Big Science clearly distorted the Polanyian image of science as spontaneous pursuit of knowledge by scientists-citizens living in a self-governed republic of science free of control and regulation. It was obvious that the long-cherished ideal of the self-governing autonomy of science was in conflict with the Big Science realities of the day. In his review summarizing the "*Minerva* debate," Toulmin concluded that Polanyi's image of the "republic of science" was perhaps out-of-date:

> In real life, the republic of science cannot stand apart from the general commonwealth. Back in the 1930s, Polanyi's campaign to defend the autonomy of science against < … > state centralism had a real point. By the 1960s, the need for academic science to be self-governing seems to be being conceded even in Russia and Polanyi's protestations are – surely – more insistent than they need be. As the social sciences too approach their coming-of-age, his distinction between the republic of science and the rest of the community becomes excessively disjunctive. The urgent question today is, rather, how the self-governing republic of science is to be integrated, not only into the broader academic confederation, but into the whole community of citizens.[36]

Weinberg added another twist to the "*Minerva* debate." Big Science, in Weinberg's view, required what might be called "Big Science Studies" – an independent and decentralized expertise which would provide a systematic study of Big Science mode of research and advise the government accordingly (Weinberg 1963, p. 160). The choices rationalizing decisions for the allocation of funds for Big Science projects, Weinberg argued, should be made not by politicians but by "some well-informed observers" – experts not in sciences *per se* but rather in the *studies of science* as a social and political institution. "For this reason alone philosophic debate on the problems of scientific choice should lead to a more rational allocation of funds" (Weinberg 1963, p. 160). As Weinberg jokingly remarked in retrospective, his papers in *Minerva* launched his own "career as a moonlight philosopher of scientific administration" while the "*Minerva* debate" contributed to the recognition of "the importance of philosophic examination of the sanctions for public support of science" and stimulated "something of a cottage industry in the philosophy of science policy" in the 1960s (Weinberg 1996, p. 42).

Overall, during the 1960s, the CCF sponsored a network of influential magazines, organized large and small international conferences and seminars on a wide range of topics, including those on science and its role in broader culture, society and contemporary politics. By the mid-1960s, the CCF was regarded as a big success. The moment of rupture came in 1967, when a series of publications in the U.S.

[36] Toulmin (1964, p. 354).

media exposed the close linkage between the CCF and the CIA. The CIA connection presented an ultimate - and very sensible - test for the theoretical discussion of the societal effects of the "governmentalisation of science" and the consequences of governmental – statist or political – interference with science's affairs. During the 1960s, the revelations and the criticism of the CIA's covert apparatus and coercive measures exacerbated to the extent unknown during the 1950s.[37] The CIA's infamous involvement in the operations in Iran and Guatemala in the 1950s, and Cuba and Vietnam in the 1960s, made the question of "governmentalisation of science" and the issue of "the indirect as well as the direct influence of the Cold War on the role of science and scholarship" (to quote Shils' editorial) as much a moral as an epistemological one for the CCF-associated intellectuals.

"Who Paid the Piper": The CIA Connection and the Moral Crusade of the CCF in 1967

The explosive news erupted in 1967, when the *New York Times* published a series of articles on the CIA covert activities, which included references to the CIA's close links to the intellectuals' organizations, including the CCF.[38] The journalists' investigations were seconded by the public revelations of the man who supervised the cultural activities of the CIA, Thomas Braden.[39] As Braden revealed, the CIA "placed one agent in a Europe-based organization of intellectuals called the Congress for Cultural Freedom … and another agent became an editor of *Encounter*" (Braden 1967).

The revelation caused public outrage. Not only has the role of the CIA been to finance the CCF, its agents were incorporated within the cultural organization with the explicit aim to promote "anti-communist programs" within the Congress. What can a "free thinker" say about "freedom," asked the *Sunday Times* of London in May 1967, "when he finds out that his free thought has been subsidized by a

[37] See the discussion of the CIA and its broad albeit clandestine involvement in funding scientific research in various fields, and scientists' general willingness to aid the CIA in providing scientific intelligence on atomic, biological, chemical weapons as well as basic science fields in the 1950s in Doel and Needell (1997). Discussing the ways different scientists involved in intelligence gathering had tried to negotiate, reconcile and/or in various ways struggled with fundamental differences between the "ideals and values" of intelligence gathering and those of science, Doel and Needell argued that these experiences "have profoundly altered the image and practice of science in postwar America."

[38] As the *New York Times* reported in May 1969, the CIA funded a bunch of "anti-Communist, but liberal organizations of intellectuals such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and some of their newspapers and magazines. *Encounter* magazine, a well-known anti-Communist intellectual monthly with editions in Spanish and German, as well as in English, was for a long time - though it is not now - one of the indirect beneficiaries of CIA funds through the arrangements that have never been publicly explained" (Lasch 1969).

[39] Braden represented a new type of bureaucrat, equally at home in government and in academic circles. Before joining the CIA in 1950, he was an executive secretary of the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA); later he became president of the California Board of Education, where he defended a liberal view of academic freedom against those who wished to ban J.D.Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye* from schools' libraries (See on Branden and his revelations Lasch (1969)).

ruthlessly aggressive intelligence agency as part of the international cold war?"[40] Another journalist similarly pointed out that the fact that the intellectuals employed by the CIA with or without their knowledge were "being used for concealed government propaganda," made a "mockery" of intellectual freedom.[41] As Christopher Lasch, the author of the first comprehensive account of the CCF history, put it, "the whole wretched business seemed inescapably to point to the conclusion that cultural freedom had been consistently confused with American propaganda, and that 'cultural freedom,' as defined by its leading defenders, was – to put it bluntly – a hoax" (Lasch 1969, pp. 104–105).

For most of the CCF associates the revelation about the Congress' direct link to the CIA did not come as a surprise. As Sidney Hook admitted in his autobiography, "I have heard, like almost everyone else, that in some way the CIA was involved in funding the Congress. Everyone mentioned it, even though no one had any hard evidence. … In my own mind I had no doubt that the CIA was making some contribution to the financing of the Congress. … Everyone involved in the activities of the Congress had heard rumors of covert CIA support" (Hook 1987, p. 451). Most of the Congress members did not discontinue their membership when they became aware or suspicious of the CIA funding of the CCF activities, assuming that as long as they are not dictated or controlled in their intellectual activity they can claim their intellectual independence and integrity.

The general line of defense taken by the CCF intellectuals was expressed in a response of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to the CCF crusaders. As he argued in his open letter published in *Book Week* in September 1966, the attack on the CCF was ill-conceived, based on the "apparent inability [of accusers] to conceive any reason for opposition to communism except bribery by the CIA" (Lasch 1969, p. 106). Within few days following the revelations publicized by the *New York Times*, several distinguished CCF associates - John K. Galbraith, George Kennan, Robert Oppenheimer and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. - sent the letter to the editors of the *New York Times,* stating that "on the basis of our own experiences with the Congress over the past 16 years – with its seminars, its artistic festivals, its magazines, its staff – we can say categorically that we have no question regarding the independence of its policy, the integrity of its officials, or the value of its contribution. In our experience the Congress … has been an entirely free body, responsive only to the wishes of its members and collaborators…"[42]

Neither *Minerva* nor its editor was directly attacked in the press, but Edward Shils felt as disturbed as others by seeing that their valuable enterprise was being discredited. Like other CCF associated intellectuals, he insisted that at no point of its history his journal's editorial independence was corrupted and that the CCF associates had loyalty only to the "commitment to cultural freedom." Shils went so far as claiming that the CCF was not "political." Writing to Crawford Goodwin, professor of economics at Duke University and program officer in charge of

[40] Cit. in Lasch (1969).

[41] *The New York Times*, 27 Mar 1967 (cit. in Lasch 1969).

[42] "Copy of the text of the letter sent on May 4th to the Editor of the New York Times by John Kenneth Galbraith, George Kennan, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr." [1967], IACF/ICFUP, box 1.

European and International Affairs at the Ford Foundation, Shils stated: "it might be reasonably claimed that the Congress … was not political. It sought to promote the understanding and solution of fundamental problems which concern serious intellectuals … cutting across the boundaries of nationality, party, intellectual field and discipline. …It created and fostered a sense of affinity among these intellectuals in a way which is, I think, unique in the history of the present century."[43]

This line of defense flawed, however, in view of Braden's revelations. The independence and autonomy of an organization was the provision of the CIA involvement, Braden explained, because the independence, not just the semblance of it, was expected to give the greatest credence to the organizations "co-opted" by the CIA. As Braden described the rules that guided the international organization of the CIA: "Use legitimate, existing organizations; disguise the extent of American interest; protect the integrity of the organization by not requiring it to support every aspect of official American policy…" (Braden 1967, p. 14). As Lasch aptly noted, no matter how the intellectuals perceived their sense of freedom and control over their scholarship, the CIA regarded them as instruments of its own purpose (Lasch 1969).

The CCF leaders should have felt being between a rock and a hard place. The complexities of the interrelation between politics and science that they have been discussing at length in the seminars and study groups, now appeared to be part and parcel of their personal experience with the CCF. In some ways, the CCF intellectuals were reasoning according to the very logic of "Big Science" that they were disentangling, accepting the fact, with Weinberg, that Big Science had not only changed science, but also the way the relation between science and the state is understood. If Big Science was political, then "Big Scientists" - those who live in the world of Big Science - could only be relative in their perception of their freedom.

The positions taken in the "*Minerva* debate" continued to resurface, now on the "moral plane." The "intellectual confrontation" staged by Shils on the pages of *Minerva* resurfaced as a "moral confrontation" among the CCF associates now facing the moral conundrum. Polanyi, once again, presented a "dissenting" view. Reasoning consistently with his theoretical defense of "Little Science," Polanyi's major concern was with a "little person" – Michael Josselson, the dedicated driving force behind the Congress' activities who, after he had been revealed to be a CIA officer, was ostracized by other CCF leaders. Polanyi called the Assembly's decision to "eliminate" Josselson "another darkness at noon" alluding to Arthur Koestler's novel and the ex-communist's disillusionment in the communist cause as, first of all, morally wrong. Moreover, it was not "rational" either: the "elimination"

[43] Edward Shils to Crawford Goodwin, n/d. IACF/ICFUP, box 1, folder 12. As a counter-measure against the accusations thrown by the press, Shils suggested to launch a project aiming at producing a well-documented history of the CCF, which would imply the organization of the archive of the CCF records documenting its activities and the oral history interviews with the "intellectual figures who played leading roles in the history of the Congress," such as Michael Polanyi, Raymond Aron, Arthur Koestler, Willy Brandt, George Kennan, Daniel Bell, as well as with the members of the CCF executive staff – Michael Josselson, Nicolas Nabokov, Francois Bondy, Konstantin (Cot) Jelenski, Pierre Emmanuel, and Melvin Lasky (IACF/ICFUP, box 1, folder 12.)

of Josselson did not resolve the moral conundrum; it was only a way to claim the unawareness about the CCF connection to the CIA, a position that Polanyi found neither moral nor rational to hold. In his letter to Raymond Aron, Polanyi asked: "What kind of figure are we going to cut? Are men like you or me … going to declare that in 15 years we did not notice that we were being manipulated to serve sinister purposes? Are we going to proclaim our awakening, a new version of The God that Failed?"[44]

The fate of their "valuable enterprise," in Polanyi's view, was inseparable from the fate of its "little" leader, even though it would imply to "lose face" and to admit the awareness about the connection between the CCF and CIA. Appealing to the Congress' support "for saving Mike [Josselson], the Congress, and our honour," Polanyi took his defense to the end, stating:

> I would have served the C.I.A. (had I known of its existence) in the years following the war, with pleasure. We were faced with an ubiquitous madness, supported by an empire and organized on conspiratorial lines. … In the years after 1950 we battled against a phalanx of Stalinist or Stalinisant intellectuals throughout Europe, for the vindication of free thought, which was despised and ridiculed by those who are now forcing us to dismiss Mike Josselson, because he had accepted the support of like-minded American officials, who appreciated the ideals he was fighting for.[45]

In the end, it was the forced resignation of Josselson rather than the revelation of the CIA funding that compelled Polanyi to resign from the CCF.[46]

The revelation of the CIA connection, although it caused a public outrage, did not lead to the demolition of the organization. In the same year, the CCF was quietly resurrected under a different name - the International Association for Cultural Freedom (IACF) - with the funding secured by the grant from the Ford Foundation.[47] Pierre Emmanuel, French poet and essayist and a long-time CCF associate, was elected the Director of the Association, while Shepard Stone, the Ford Foundation President and Chief Executive, became the reorganized Congress' President. The resolution of the last CCF conference in September 1967, announcing the reorganization of the organization, stated: "the Association … emphasizes the non-partisan, critical spirit and rational approaches to problems."[48] With the exception of few resignations, the reorganized Congress continued to rely on old networks. IACF also "inherited" from the Congress its magazines and continued its practice of the international seminars and workshops.

[44] Michael Polanyi to Pierre Emmanuel, 9 Apr 1968. MPP, box 6, folder 13.

[45] Michael Polanyi to Raymond Aron, 9 May 1967, MPP, box 6, folder 10.

[46] As Polanyi wrote to Pierre Emmanuel announcing his decision, "I expressed the feeling that I could not remain connected with our organization, if we decided to eliminate Michael Josselson from it. … I beg you, therefore, to accept my resignation from the community to which I have so long adhered." (Michael Polanyi to Pierre Emmanuel, 9 Apr 1968. MPP, box 6, folder 13).

[47] "Press Release. Monday, 2 Oct 1967." MPP, box 6, folder 10.

[48] "Some facts about IACF," 1970. IACFP, Series III, box 80, folder 6.

A more subtle change involved refurbishing the Congress' conceptual framework. The revelation of the CIA connection and a heated public debate it unleashed did not resonate with the "end of ideology" rhetoric with its resentment and explicit avoidance of "emotion in politics, and of politics of passions and hatreds," as Daniel Bell put it in his classic *The End of Ideology* (Bell [1960]/1988, p. 415). The "end of ideology" as the official slogan of the CCF did not continue into the late 1960s and 1970s. Instead, a twin concept had taken roots within the reorganized Congress: the "theory of post-industrial society." It was mostly a change in the rhetoric rather than in the content, as the two concepts were as closely interconnected as the individuals who framed them.

A Refurbished Intellectual Framework of the Congress in the 1970s: The Theory of Post-Industrial Society

The discussion of the social and political consequences of Big Science articulated awareness that the growth of science, for better or for worse, had significant implications for modern society. By the 1970s it was a widely held view, expressed by social theorists such as Jacques Barzun, Spencer Klaw, Edward Shils, and John Galbraith, who all argued in different way that access to the power of the atom, the computer revolution, the exploration of the cosmos, and the great cultural, social, economic, and political significance that science had come to hold in Western societies, were opening a new phase in the history of mankind. The theory of post-industrial society was conceived as the descriptor of this new post-WWII social structure, which attributed the major role to the advanced science and technology, and offered new visions of social change and social structure.

The theory of post-industrial society had achieved wide circulation in the 1970s, especially following Daniel Bell's renowned 1973 book, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture of Social Forecasting,* the standard reference for this concept (see Brick 1992). Like its predecessor, the "end of ideology," the post-industrial society theory was conceived within the CCF network of intellectuals. It was first presented by Bell in 1967 in his "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society" published in the journal *The Public Interest.* Within the CCF network, the concept was formulated and circulated since the mid-1960s, within the CCF Study Group led by Bell.[49]

In the 1970s, the IACF organized a series of seminars devoted to "post-industrial society." The first in this series was organized by Bell in Zurich in June 1970.[50] Invited participants at the Zurich meeting included old-time CCF associates: Shils, Lipset, Aron,Galbraith and Jelenski, along with few Soviet and Eastern European specialists (Cyril E. Black and Martin Malia), as well as Polish sociologists Zygmunt Bauman and Leszek Kołakowski. Bell also invited British moral and

[49] At the CCF Study Group meeting in 1965, Bell already was using the wording "post-industrial society" ("Memorandum," n/d, IACFP, Series III, box 99, folder 1). For the discussion of the origin of the "post-industrial society" concept, see Brick (1992), especially p. 351.

[50] "Draft of Press Release," IACFP, Series III, box 79, folder 6.

political philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, known for his influential critique of both Marxism and right-wing liberalism, to whom Bell described the agenda of the meeting: "The group we are bringing together is composed primarily of sociologists and political scientists who have been working on the common theme of the relationship of social structure to culture. We all know that in recent years there have been some questions about the convergence of advanced industrial societies. … We feel that an exploration of the questions will provide some answers to some of the most interesting theoretical questions in contemporary sociology."[51]

Indeed, the post-industrial society implied a new ("post-Marxist," in Polanyi's words) vision of social change and social transformation, which presupposed not conflict and a revolutionary reorganization of society, but an evolutionary drift towards modernity in a scientifically and technologically manipulated world. Not only "interesting" theoretically, this framework turned the discussion of social change into a civilized, "non-ideological" discussion of economic development – a gratifying experience for the theorists of the "end of ideology."

The "post-industrial society" rhetoric fitted well in the changing context of the Cold War politics. By the late 1960s a partial *détente* with the Soviet Union and the "communist" countries in Europe made the anticommunist rhetoric of the 1950s obsolete, although it, of course, did not make anticommunism obsolete. The anticommunism of the late 1960s – 1970s required a new rhetoric, and the "post-industrial society theory" supplied exactly what was needed, presenting the images of the emergence of a unitary "post-industrial society" in both mature capitalist and socialist "techno-structures" – the so-called "convergence theories," widely promulgated throughout the 1970s. The major idea behind the "convergence" theory was the agreement that scientific and technological performance and, by extension, economic performance were the defining elements of modern life and a measure of success in the Cold War. As Bell affirmed, behind the argument about convergence lay the recognition of the fact that, in Bell's words, "market was rediscovered in the Communist socialist world, and the market was losing its importance in the Western economies."[52]

The theory of "post-industrial society" preserved the zeal of the "end of ideology" normative stance. Encouraging and promoting a sophisticated discussion of the politics of science, the "post-industrial society" framework turned science, its history and its politics into a central topic, indeed *the* topic. The rhetoric of post-industrial society emphasized the linkage of knowledge and power in a society where the intellectual played the central role. This linkage did not imply that the intellectuals became the new ruling class within the post-industrial society, but rather suggested that the expanded social functions of science, the development of computer-based technologies and the growth of both public and private funding for science made intellectuals themselves and the intellectual institutions (most notably the universities) socially central in contemporary society, in ways that tied academic

[51] Daniel Bell to Alasdair MacIntyre, 26 Jan 1970. IACFP, Series III, box 79, folder 7.

[52] Transcript of Proceedings of the conference "Post-Industrial Society and Cultural Diversity," 12–14 Jun 1970. IACFP, Series III, box 80, folder 3.

institutions and centers of political power far more intimately than it had been in earlier academic institutions.

Within this framework such themes as the relation of science and society, political role of science and technology in modern society, and, more generally, the relation between knowledge and power, moved to the very center of the IACF agenda. During the 1970s, the issues on the nexus of science-society-politics became main topics of the conferences organized by IACF: "structure of knowledge," "social goals of technology," "history and its politics," "knowledge and beliefs" were the concurrent themes in the IACF seminars' outlines and proposals. The network of participants of the meetings sponsored by the IACF also expanded, to include or to seek the participation of scholars who later became associated with the conceptual core of the field of science studies: Thomas Kuhn, Everett Mendelsohn, Joseph Ben-David, Stephen Toulmin, Gerald Holton, Yehuda Elkana, Mary Hesse, Jürgen Habermas, and Jacques Ellul were on the top of IACF's lists of "proposed participants."

IACF Conferences on Science and Politics: An Institutional Rival with Science Studies

1970 marked the twentieth anniversary of the CCF. The anniversary was not emphasized as such but was quietly 'celebrated' by a series of international meetings organized under the auspices of the reorganized Congress in the anniversary year: the meeting on "post-industrial society" was held in Zurich in June, the conference on "technology and its social role" took place in Aspen, Colorado, in late August – early September, and the smaller conference on "Creative Imagination" was held in Poigny la Foret (France) in October.[53]

The conferences organized by the IACF in the 1970s expressed a founding set of anxieties for what soon became the academic field of Science Studies. Jelenski outlined this set of framing issues in his 1969 proposal for the "major Congress seminar" in Aspen, Colorado, in 1970.[54] His proposal, aptly entitled "IACF and the Crisis of Advanced Industrial Societies," encapsulated all the major preoccupations of the relativist turn. As Jenenski stressed, the transition to post-industrial society was occurring in the period of "crisis," which encompassed an environmental crisis resulting from the realization of the widespread 'side-effects' of technological

[53] IACFP, Series III.43, box 79-84. The "legitimation crisis" of 1967 did not stop the Congress' colloquia and conferences, which continued almost without any interruption. As Jelenski noted in the 1969 memo, "The IACF Seminar Program has been concerned, ever since late 1967, with problem of man and his environment in advanced industrialized societies: the IACF conference on Mass-media and Cultural Creation (Venice, 1967), The United States: Its role and its Impact in the World (Princeton, 1968), The Student Rebellion and the Future of Advanced Industrial Societies (Alghero, 1969), Pacifism and Violence: Their Uses and Limitations as Instruments of Reform (Bergneustadt, 1969) … In June 1969, the IACF will hold a conference in Konstanz on 'Post-Industrial Society and National Variations' (K.A. Jelenski, "IACF and the Crisis of Advanced Industrial Societies," 16 Nov 1969. IACFP, Series III, box 80, folder 6, on p. 3).

[54] "Technological Change and Cultural Options," outline of the conference, n/d. IACFP, Series III, box 80, folder 6.

developments; a cultural crisis, as a result of the "counter culture" movement; and a crisis in philosophy, the result of the failures of reductionism and, more generally, of positivist philosophy. The symptomatic examples of the "crisis in philosophy" included Karl Popper's critique of positivism, Michael Polanyi's conception of "Personal Knowledge" as a reaction against reductionism, Arthur Koestler's "fight against reductionism," as well as the revisionist trends within Marxism coming along with the rediscovery of young "Hegelian" Marx, both in the West and in the Communist countries.[55] As Jelenski concluded, "the justification for the IACF choosing this theme for its major seminar in 1970 is that [the post-industrial society] does have these philosophical and cultural implications and that, to a certain extent, it is at the heart of the new ideological divisions in Western industrial societies."[56]

In view of the organizers of the Aspen meeting, the IACF was "in a particularly favorable position to provide a bridge and a platform" to bring these diverse themes together, focusing on the problem "of the implications of technological development for politics."[57] Not only IACF, as the CCF's successor, helped to establish a network of intellectuals and leading scientists from Western Europe and the United States across the disciplinary and national frontiers, it institutionalized this network in the form of regular seminars and study groups. In this way, Jelenski pointed out, it helped to articulate the issues and to create a public space for the discussion of how scientific rationality and decision-making in post-industrial society is intertwined with significant transformations in the realm of politics and political theory. The relation between these two areas of concern was almost inexistent outside the CCF network, conference organizers emphasized: with the exception of the Frankfurt School and, more specifically, Jürgen Habermas with his influential text "Technology and Science as Ideology" (1970) and Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimentional Man*, liberal political philosophy of the late 20th century was marked either by striking absence of any discussion of the role of science and technology, or by turning technology "into a scape-goat, perceived as having become an end in itself."

> At a risk of simplification, it could be said that research stressing the technological and environmental aspects [of the crisis] tends to be future-oriented, optimistic, more interested in the 'progress' of civilization than in its 'discontents.' The cultural analysts, on the other hand, tend to be pessimistic and nostalgic, fascinated by the past. We do not wish to imply that everything is polarized between the euphoric extrapolation of GNP curves, and the pessimism of Marcusian prophecy, but we can safely say there is little continuous effort of bridging the technological and the cultural aspects of contemporary crisis.[58]

[55] K.A. Jelenski, "IACF and the Crisis of Advanced Industrial Societies," 16 Nov 1969. IACFP, Series III, box 80, folder 6, on p. 3.

[56] Technological Change and Cultural Options," outline of the conference, n/d. IACFP, Series III, box 80, folder 6.

[57] K.A. Jelenski, "IACF and the Crisis of Advanced Industrial Societies," 16 Nov 1969. IACFP, Series III, box 80, folder 6, on p. 3.

[58] ibid.

Building on the previous CCF experience of "bridge-building" the Aspen meeting would contribute to the reconciliations among these "camps," Jelenski concluded.

IACF not only relied on the old CCF network of intellectuals, but also sought to expand it. Thomas Kuhn was on the top of the list of invited participants of the 1970 Aspen seminar.[59] Thomas Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) came out in the midst of the discussion of the social and political consequences of Big Science on the pages of *Minerva*. The connotations to Big Science were only implicit in Kuhn's work, although his commentary on Big Science can be read between the lines of his book. As a physicist-turned-historian, Kuhn depicted the world he knew best – the practices and the political economy of physical science that went through the revolutionary changes in the wake of WWII. Kuhn's scientists were team workers, who followed instructions and defended their "paradigms" – these were the scientists of Big Science, not "little science." Not surprisingly, Shils considered publishing a review of Kuhn's *Structure* in *Minerva*, commissioning it from Toulmin. Shils wanted the review doing some "translation work" for Kuhn's *Structure*, relating it to the discussion of science policy and science politics: "…the main point about Kuhn is that it should be centered around the implication of Kuhn's conception of scientific development for the planning and administration of science – not an easy task!"[60] The review of Kuhn's *Structure* never appeared in *Minerva*: the *Structure* appeared too "apolitical" to contribute to the ongoing discussion of Big Science.[61]

Few years after "the *Minerva* debate" on Big Science, Kuhn's *Structure* was seen by the Aspen conference organizers as an articulation of the belief that fundamental science is not amenable to forecasting and planning: "Kuhn's basic position is that fundamental science can only deteriorate by contact with society and social needs. …Any attempt to introduce stimulation or focus from outside can be only harmful according to the author."[62] In view of the organizers, Alvin Weinberg, on the other hand, suggested the view on the role of science in society that was more concrete, less sociological and more political than the one presented in *Structure*. No wonder that Weinberg, as the author of the essays in *Minerva* on social and political implications of post-industrial society and its major feature, Big Science, was also among welcomed candidates for the Aspen conference.[63]

[59] "Material and possible participants for the Social Control of Technology Seminar," n/d. IACFP, Series III, box 81, folder 1.

[60] Edward Shils to Stephen Toulmin, 19 Feb 1964, MR, box 3, folder 10.

[61] Somewhat ironically, while Kuhn was found too "apolitical" to be reviewed on the pages of *Minerva*, Kuhn himself returned the same argument in his review of Toulmin's work, writing about Toulmin's and June Goodfield's co-authored account of the history of the concept of time from classical antiquity to the 20th century, *The Discovery of Time:* "The development of mining and geological mapping, of plant and animal breeding, all contributed significantly to the evolution of the ideas with which this volume deals. And so, I presume, did the political and institutional development of the countries within which the ideas evolved. Though the authors have brilliantly described the main stages in the development of man's sense of historical change, they have not always seen with clarity the processes that connect those stages" (Kuhn 1967).

[62] "Material and possible participants for the Social Control of Technology Seminar," n/d. IACFP, Series III, box 81, folder 1.

[63] ibid.

Neither Kuhn nor Weinberg made it to the Aspen meeting. Overall, although the meeting generated much interest at the preparatory stages, it was not realized as planned. From the point of view of at least some of the participants, the meeting failed to live up to the original expectations. John Maddox in his report on the Aspen conference noted that in the end it appeared impossible for the participants to come up with any "unified view … about the relationship between technology and the rest of society" (Maddox 1970, p. 1003). Maddox's report was aptly entitled "Intellectuals of the World Disunite" and presented the picture of the conference that "seemed to begin well enough, but in the end the hundred or so participants had little to say except that they have no single view about the place of technology in the modern world" (Maddox 1970, p. 1003). Likewise, another participant, science journalist Maurice Goldsmith, described the conference in the similar tonality: "…we were bound to find difficulty in securing a common denominator. There was little agreement, for example, on the nature of 'the crisis' that faces us … there was ignorance about what was meant by 'technology' … there were too many participants, with ill-formulated terms of reference, to secure a unanimously approved statement…." (Goldsmith 1970, p. 28).

During the 1970s, the IACF agenda was more and more overlapping with the new professional community – the science studies scholars and professional historians and philosophers of science. The illustrative example is the IACF seminar "The Basic Structure of Knowledge or What we May no Longer Take for Granted: The Critique of Science," held at the Aspen Institute in Berlin from September 4–9, 1975. The aspiration behind this meeting was, as Jelenski put it, to assemble "some of the most authoritative voices in this field. … This alone allows us to expect a hearing which could not be expected otherwise."[64] The towering "authoritative voice" was Daniel Bell. However, this time, as IACF officers Jelenski and Adam Watson suggested, the IACF would organize it "with one difference: while the participants of the Zurich seminar were chosen among scholars who largely shared Daniel Bell's conception of post-industrial society, I thought we should, this time, invite intellectuals representing different points of view."[65]

"Different points of view" that the organizers sought to have represented at the meeting included Thomas Kuhn, Gerald Holton, Karl Popper, Richard Lewontin, Robert Young, William Provine, Mary Hesse, Hilary Putnam, Marjorie Green, Paul Feyerabend, and Willard Quine, among other luminaries who were invited to participate. Under the general title "Reexaminations: A Critical Review of Contemporary Conditions in Science, Philosophy, and Culture," and with the matching grant from the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, the IACF proposed to organize three consecutive seminars, focused respectively on critique of science, critique of philosophy, and critique of culture.[66] Three seminars were designed to bring together twenty to twenty-two participants chosen among leading scholars in each

[64] K.A. Jelenski, "Culture and its Discontents in Post-Industrial Society (An IACF project)," 6 May 1974. IACFP, Series III. 49a, box 93a, folder 2.

[65] ibid.

[66] "Reexaminations. A Critical Review of Contemporary Conditions in Science, Philosophy, and Culture." IACFP, Series III. 49a, box 93a, folder 2.

field, with a small "core group" of participants, which originally included Daniel Bell, Pierre Emmanuel, Jürgen Habermas, Leszek Kołakowski, Jacques Ellul, Edward Shils and Stephen Toulmin, who were expected to be present at all three seminars, thus ensuring the continuity of the project.[67]

As the organizers admitted, the topic of the conference was "the 'tarte a la crème' of contemporary intellectual journalism," in the sense that it has been discussed "at dozens of conferences organized by the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Nobel Symposium, and innumerable American and European foundations and private organizations, including our own conference on *Technology, Social Goals and Cultural Options* at Aspen in 1970."[68] What made the organizers think they can make a distinct contribution was the fact, as Jelenski stressed, that "the CCF played the role of a forerunner in this discussion" with its engagement in the topic going back to the CCF Conference on Progress in Freedom in Berlin in 1960.[69] Like the meeting in Colorado's Aspen Institute in 1970, the conference in Berlin's Aspen Institute in 1975 was not realized as planned. Some of those who initially expressed interest finally did not come. Both Thomas Kuhn and Stephen Toulmin, who were regarded as key participants by the organizers, cited professional meeting of philosophers of science as the major reason of their decline of the invitation to take part in the conference.[70]

This conference marked the general decline of the Congress activities, by this time largely focused on science in its relation to societal issues. One of the obvious reasons of the decline of the IACF, which never recovered the level and the success the Congress enjoyed throughout the 1960s, was the public revelation of the CIA connection and the "moral crusade" of the Congress in 1967. At the same time, the IACF was by no means ostracized in the 1970s. The "death blow" to the Congress was as much the revelation of its connection to the CIA, as a more prosaic force: the professionalization of science studies within academia during the 1970s, which successfully marginalized the early, semi-institutional niches for science studies. By the mid-1970s, the Congress had a rival in the emerging field that Roy MacLeod characterized as a "new field, fashionably called 'liberal studies of science'" (MacLeod 2003). In some sense, the Congress became a victim of its own success. While in the 1960s the Congress' seminars and its network of scholars and scientists helped to create a semi-institutionalized niche for what later became "science studies," in the 1970s it became marginalized because of the institutionalization and professionalization of that very field they aspired to establish. The self-dissolution

[67] ibid.

[68] K.A. Jelenski, "Culture and its Discontents in Post-Industrial Society (An IACF project)," 6 May 1974. IACFP, Series III. 49a, box 93a, folder 2.

[69] K.A. Jelenski, "Culture and its Discontents in Post-Industrial Society (An IACF project)," 6 May 1974. IACFP, Series III. 49a, box 93a, folder 2.

[70] As Thomas Kuhn explained to Shepard Stone, "the seminar to be held by Aspen Berlin … unfortunately …overlaps …with the forthcoming meeting [of] the International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, to which I and probably others of interest to you are already committed. Though your topic attracts me very much, there is no way in which I can arrange to be with you." Thomas Kuhn to Shepard Stone, 14 May 1975, IACFP, Series III.49a, box 93a, folder 6.

of IACF was a question of time under the circumstances, and indeed in 1979 the organization quietly dissolved itself.

Concluding Remarks

Oxford historian of science, Robert Fox, commenting on the current generation of Oxford postgraduate students many of whom "see the academic history of science of today as born with Kuhn," noted that "their perception seems to overstate the influence that *Structure* has had on the practices of today's historians … < carrying > with it the risk of undervaluing currents that not only throw the light on Kuhn's questions, but also pose new ones" (Fox 2006, pp. 410, 427).[71] Against this background, Fox argues that the roots of history of science and science studies as an academic discipline are rather to be found in the post-WWII "political context of great complexity," within which "even the spat that divided Marxists and non-Marxists … was momentarily suppressed, and soon a circle of figures, with commitments across the political spectrum, found itself united in promoting the history of science *as a discipline encapsulating the goals of post-war reconstruction and reconciliation*."[72] The case of the Congress for Cultural Freedom extends and substantiates Fox's observation, illustrating the distinct way(s) the CCF-associated intellectuals understood, articulated and rationalized what Fox called "the political context of great complexity," and showing that the studies of science emerged in this context not merely as part of this articulation and rationalization but at the very center of it.

As the history of the "*Minerva* Debate" demonstrates, the CCF-initiated discussion of the social and political consequences of Big Science and, more generally, of the relation between science and politics, had been part of what cultural historian David Hollinger characterized as "a watershed in the history of discourse about science," and what another historian, Peter Novick, called "the epistemological revolution" of the 1960s (Hollinger 1995, Novick 1988). At the center of this revolution, in the words of Mark Solovey, was "a multi-faceted scholarly challenge to the dominant post-WWII model of social science inquiry based upon an idealized positivist and empiricist image of the natural sciences – an image that posited an objective, value-neutral scholarly enterprise whose intellectual practices and products were well insulated from 'extra-scientific' or 'external' social influences" (Solovey 2001, p. 172). In the last years there have been several groundbreaking works that placed the post-war developments in history and

[71] Resonating with Fox, historian of science Nathan Reingold, reflecting on the history of history of science as a discipline in America, noted that much of the developments that were decisive for forming the history of science community in the United States "occurred outside of history of science programs; < with > key works and trends antedated the writings of T.S. Kuhn which are often credited with producing the development of more socially attuned history of science. … Individual historians like myself and others … bridled at the implication that our mind-sets derived from Kuhn. Our concerns antedated his writings and had other roots" (Reingold 1996, pp. 115, 117).

[72] Fox (2006, p. 420) (emphasis added – EA). See also Robert Fox Oral History interview, transcript, British Society for the History of Science Oral History Project "The history of science in Britain, 1945–1965," Brotherton Library, University of Leeds (**Thereafter BSHSOHP**), BSHS 10/8/9.

philosophy of science, as well as "the epistemological revolution of the 1960s" at large, into a historical perspective.[73] These works begin to disentangle the ways in which historians' and other social scientists' analytical tools and categories were informed, shaped and conditioned, in varied and often unexpected ways, by the concerns and the general climate of the Cold War. Among these studies are those by David Hollinger, George Reisch, Steve Fuller and Mary Jo Nye, who examined the ways in which the scientific and political philosophies of Thomas Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, and Karl Popper were shaped by and embedded in the political ideology and political culture of Cold War America (Hollinger 1995; Reisch 2005; Fuller 2005; Nye 2011).

In that vein, the history of the activities of the CCF in promoting "science studies" highlights some of the Cold War politics and contexts of Science Studies as a political, not merely intellectual, project. Before Science Studies became a predominantly intellectual project, the political developments and political concerns had a central role to play in legitimizing studies of science as a distinct and politically relevant area of expertise in the age of Cold War. With the changes in the political economy of science that occurred during WWII, especially in the physical sciences in the wake of the Manhattan Project, associated with science's dramatically raised level of economic dependence on public resources and the military patronage, the conventions for representing scientific enterprise have also changed. Beginning in the early 1960s, scientists and social analysts responded to the political challenges of the time by promulgating the image of science as a concrete, historical, and interacting community of scientists-citizens rather than timeless and universal "science" with no national or political affiliations (Hollinger 1996, p. 101). The CCF greatly contributed to this "watershed" change in the perception of science, which shifted the focus from science method, as traditional concern of philosophy of science, and intellectual history, as foremost preoccupation of history of science, to social, political and economic contexts and aspects of science. The loosely connected network of intellectuals associated with the CCF helped to construct public space in which the relations between science and politics were debated and discussed. In the process of these discussions, they helped to invent a new subject, or set of subjects, in the 1950s and 1960s, reconceptualizing science as a social and political activity, promulgating the view that science is inseparable from politics, and in various ways exploring the science-society-politics nexus. In this way, I argue, rather than being a moment of rupture, Science Studies grew out of these early projects and intellectual programs driven by political developments and political concerns.

The history of the CCF-affiliated journal *Minerva* also points to the roots of "science studies" outside academia and, initially, within the set of issues dealing with science policy, the organization of science and planning of science, at least during the 1960s. By the 1970s, however, the Congress was covering a broad set of issues on the nexus science-society-politics increasingly rivaling with a new professional community – science studies scholars and professional historians and philosophers of science. The establishment of the journal *Science Studies* in 1970

[73] See Engerman (2004, 2010), Isaac (2007), Solovey (2001), Solovey and Cravens (2012).

became a blow in the face of the CCF-associated "science studiers." Perhaps the founders of *Science Studies* did not fully realize the extent to which the launch of this journal put an end to the earlier enterprises. Roy MacLeod and David Edge, who founded the journal *Science Studies* (later renamed *Social Studies of Science*) in 1970, both recorded the moment of the creation of the journal in their recollections. As David Edge recollected in his oral history interview, while John Maddox, then the head of the Journals Division of Macmillan publishing housing, was enthusiastic about the idea to establish a new quarterly journal called *Science Studies* (even hoping that it would become a weekly), Edward Shils, in Edge's words, "wanted to sabotage us, [saying] that we were committing academic suicide … He wanted to stop us. … He did not stop us, but he kept treating us like we were … I don't know … just nuts."[74] MacLeod gave a more polite version of the same story in his published memoir: "Edward Shils cordially discouraged me from doing anything of the sort. There was simply not enough good material, he said, with the implication that anything 'good' he would publish in *Minerva* himself" (MacLeod 2003). Shils, however, gave his own account of this moment in his letter to Shepard Stone immediately after the journal *Science Studies* was launched in 1970: "He [John Maddox] undertakes to establish another periodical on more or less the same subject as *Minerva* … and he had one of his handy-girls prepare a promotional letter for this journal (it is called, I think, *Science Studies*) in which it is alleged that there is no competition between the magazines because *Minerva* deals only with relations between science and government. This is, of course, a caricature of the wide range of subjects treated by *Minerva*."[75]

Overall, the case of the CCF and its quest for "science studies," as part of their broader agenda to offer a renewed framework for liberalism, is suggestive of a more complex picture of the Cold War legacy (or legacies) in our profession than it is usually argued. The histories that trace the developments in history of science during the Cold War usually highlight the turn to internalist history (or intellectual history), coupled with the concern for disengagement from politics and ideology.[76] Indeed, one of the prominent symptoms of the Cold War university was depoliticization of social and human sciences (Engerman 2003). Outside academia, however, the picture was different. The CCF, as a transnational and overtly political organization, promulgated the view that science is inseparable from politics, and in various ways promoted the studies of political and social-economic dimension of science, through its conferences, workshops and seminars devoted to the discussion of science as a social and political institution. I argue that the promotion of studies

[74] David Edge Oral History interview, transcript, BSHSOHP, BSHS 10/8/7, on p. 52.

[75] Edward Shils to Shepard Stone, 6 Oct 1970, IACF/ICFUP, box 1, folder 16.

[76] As Anna Mayer, for example, showed in her groundbreaking work on the history of history of science profession in Cambridge, anti-Marxism became the defining feature of the professional identity that formed the intellectual agenda of the Department of History of Philosophy of Science in Cambridge in the early Cold War years, which promoted the image of scientific work as a disinterested journey of the mind, and institutionalized this image through its appointments policy in this period (see Mayer 2000). Many other historical accounts of the development of history of science in the Cold War have demonstrated, likewise, that the politics of representing science as an impartial neutral and apolitical affair was part of the cultural narrative of the Cold War, coupled with historians of science concern for constructing the disciplinary identity for themselves (see, for example, Enebakk 2009, Porter 1990).

of science as a politically relevant area of expertise helped to legitimize the disciplinary identity of Science Studies and provided it with a semi-institutional niche before Science Studies were institutionalized within academia in the 1970s.

The case of the CCF may also illustrate the complexities and ambiguities of what came to be known as "cultural cold wars" and its legacy(ies). The outcomes of discussions on science initiated under the auspices of the CCF were *shaped* by the organization's explicit political agenda but not *determined* by the political demands. Although the studies of science during the Cold War encapsulated the political concerns and anxieties of the time, there was no single Cold War "party line." In this regard, the CCF and its engagement with the studies of science presents a story akin to other social sciences that have received ample support during the Cold War (area studies, behavioral science, human relations, development studies, American studies, and a host of other disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields), and that served national interest but not necessarily in predictable ways (Engerman 2010). The claims of the CCF intellectuals of being "independent" and "free" in their thinking would not survive the 1960s, as the revelation of the CIA sponsorship of the Congress shattered comfortable assumptions of scholars in the service of the state. Yet, their quest for "middle ground," reconciliation, and compromise, as part and parcel of their conceptions of scholarship and service, was effectively shifting the debate away from simplistic Cold War narratives of East-West dichotomies.

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