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constitution enshrined a political model of nationalism and declared Japan to be a pacifist nation.

The Korean War clarified uncertainties as to Japan's international identity and role, cementing it as a Western ally and capitalist economy. Early on, Japan's postwar ruling elites espoused economic nationalism, and from about 1960 Japan's position as an emerging economic giant, along with constant comparison with other economies, further encouraged ordinary Japanese to identify with the nation. Notions of national identity centered on blood and descent became gradually stronger, in contrast to prewar discourses, which had emphasized the hybrid nature of the Japanese nation to support colonialism.

After Korea was divided in 1948, North and South engaged in intense political, economic, and military rivalry. In public discourse, each became the other's main enemy, and each claimed to be the true representative of all the Korean people. Official South Korean nationalism was strongly anti-Communist, while North Korea stressed self-reliance.

In the People's Republic of China, state and party have been the focus of allegiance in official rhetoric and campaigns. The culture of Communism has been broadly internationalist, and elite conceptions of national identity have included socialist brotherhood and a view of China as a model for the underdeveloped world. Nevertheless, the question of national culture has remained, becoming a particular concern after Mao Zedong's death in 1976. The official view that national identity corresponds to Han Chinese ethnicity, both in the People's Republic and on Taiwan, stresses ethnic homogeneity, despite the presence of many ethnic minorities. Attitudes to minorities have been ambivalent, but official rhetoric has often stressed common ancestry and blood as a way of sustaining allegiance to state-centered nationalism. Ethnic nationalism, however, has also threatened official Chinese nationalism in Tibet and among Muslims in Xinjiang. China's territory expanded with the return of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999; since 1949 the goal of "regaining" Taiwan has also been important in official views of the nation.

The 1980s Onward. Economic growth from the 1980s onward has once again transformed East Asian nationalisms, prompting a search for new cultural identities in more prosperous areas such as South Korea, Taiwan, and parts of China as they emulate Japan's economic success. At the same time, separate and assertive expressions of Chinese, North Korean, and Japanese nationalisms—over such matters as China's military build-up and relations with Taiwan, North Korea's missile tests, and Japanese

demands for revision of Japan's pacifist constitution—have increased regional tensions. In Japan there are also widespread calls for the development of a "normal" nationalism that would allow, for example, Japanese participation in international peacekeeping operations.

[See also Boxer Rebellion; Japanese in China; May Fourth Movement; Pacifism, *subentry* Japan; Pan-Asianism; Russo-Japanese War; Sino-Japanese Wars; Three Principles of the People; Twenty-one Demands; and "Unequal Treaties."]

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SANDRA WILSON

Latin America

Nationalism thrives on myths, that is, collectively held beliefs about a shared past, including memories of war, colonization, or migration, as the early German social theorist Max Weber (1864–1920) remarked. Nationalism in Latin America is no exception. One of the peculiarities of the region is, however, the early rise of sovereign national states and the relative stability of their boundaries. Indeed, while during the first decades of the nineteenth century Europe lived in a system of principalities and monarchies, America witnessed the emergence of the first national states of the modern era, as Benedict Anderson reminded us in *Imagined Communities*. The longevity of the national boundaries of Latin America's countries is due to at least two factors. One is the lasting legacy of the administrative boundaries established by the Spanish and Portuguese in the colonial period, for it is on the basis of such boundaries that the independent states were shaped. The other factor is that the region had not experienced the kind of ethnic nationalisms that have split states apart in other parts of the world.

One of the most widespread forms of nationalism is official nationalism, nationalism sponsored by the state through school curricula, public monuments, and military

commemorations. Official nationalisms in Latin America are largely shaped around the wars of independence, which in mainland Spanish America occurred between 1809 and 1825. During the early postindependence period in this sub-region, ruling elites adopted fervently anti-Spanish rhetoric that sought symbolically to identify the new nations with a romanticized indigenous pre-Columbian past. This trend is also known as Creole nationalism because ruling elites in Spanish America were for the most part Creoles, that is, American-born individuals of Spanish descent. This was most ironic because elite Creoles were culturally attached to Spain and socially distant from descendants of native ancestry, so-called Indians, whom they usually treated with contempt. Creoles' aim to associate the new nations with an ancient indigenous past is well epitomized in the iconography of the national symbols. The eagle, the serpent, and the cactus in the Mexican national flag, for example, symbolize the mythical founding of the Aztec empire, and the sun at the center of the Argentinean flag evokes the main Inca deity, notwithstanding Argentina's peripheral place in the Inca Empire.

If independence from the colonial powers provides the founding landmark for official national rhetoric, it is by no means the only one. Two other important sources of nationalist traditions are conflicts between bordering nations, especially in the nineteenth century, and U.S. intervention in the twentieth century.

Conflicts between bordering nations have often been more decisive in shaping both official and popular senses of nationhood than wars of independence have. A prime example is the War of the Pacific between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia (1879–1883), in which a triumphant Chile acquired large swaths of territory from Peru and Bolivia, depriving the latter of its littoral provinces. Henceforth, “the outlet to the sea” became a nationalist slogan in Bolivia, while the tensions between Chile and Peru constantly resurface in diplomatic relations, the media, school textbooks, and popular jokes.

In the Caribbean, Dominicans' national identity is heavily shaped by contrast with their poorer and blacker Haitian neighbors. Mexico's two great postindependence wars—the U.S.-Mexican war of 1845–1848, in which Mexico lost half of its territory to an expanding United States, and the subsequent fight to expel the French invasion in the 1860s—have strongly marked this country's nationalist attitudes to the present.

During the first decades of the twentieth century, as U.S. intervention in Latin America became more blatant, nationalist, anti-U.S. responses drew increasing support. Cuba is emblematic in this respect because of the success of its 1959

JOSÉ MARTÍ (1853–1895) is Cuba's most revered founding father and national hero. A poet, diplomat, journalist, and revolutionary, he died in an armed incursion that sparked the final stage of Cuba's fight for independence from Spain in 1895. Martí founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party, which advocated the armed path for independence and on which Fidel Castro later drew inspiration. Martí also made popular the notion of a “raceless nationality,” which stressed the equality of all races in Cuba and the bonds of solidarity forged between blacks and whites during Cuba's protracted struggle for independence in which blacks and whites fought side by side. The idea of a raceless nationality was revolutionary at a time when scientific racism was at its peak and when the United States experienced deep racial segregation under the Jim Crow laws. Martí spent much of his life in exile in New York, Spain, Mexico, and many other parts of Latin America, where he is well known and well regarded both as a literary and political figure.

revolution. The Cuban Revolution was not so much the success of a communist movement, although it was perceived as such during the Cold War, as the triumph of a fervently nationalist revolution, which put an end to a long history of U.S. intervention in the island. Although they were not nearly as successful as Cuba with Fidel Castro, Central American countries also bred revolutionary nationalist heroes, such as the guerrillas Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua and Farabundo Martí in El Salvador, both of whom died in the early 1930s after a long fight against U.S. occupation and U.S.-backed dictatorships in their countries. However, unlike what happened in Cuba and Mexico, where nationalist revolutions in the twentieth century succeeded, in Central America, save for the short reign of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, revolutionary nationalism never became an official ideology. The same is true for most of Latin America. This does not mean that anti-imperialism or anti-U.S. sentiment was embraced only by armed groups or a small opposition. In fact, anti-imperialism peaked in Latin American intellectual circles in the 1920s and 1930s and managed to influence government policies. From the 1930s through the 1960s, for example, populist and nationalist governments ruled over several Latin American countries. A similar tendency is on the rise in the early twenty-first century, as exemplified by presidents of Venezuela and Bolivia, Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales, respectively, both outspoken opponents of U.S. policies.

Although nationalism has been a powerful driving force in the history of Latin America, only since the 1990s have

scholars started to research it as a specific field of inquiry. This is due in part to the lasting influence of Marxist thinking, since Marxism hardly recognized any sort of nationalism among either the elites or the common people. Indeed, Marxist intellectuals and dependency theorists have traditionally questioned official rhetoric of national unity, claiming, for example, that independence owed more to external factors than to internal will, while indicting elites for their alleged lack of nationalist leadership. Thus, nationalist expressions remained either unnoticed or were subsumed into questions such as revolution and class struggle. But now that Marxist theories of class and revolution are waning and scholars have become increasingly pessimistic about the viability of socialism, the study of nationalism as a phenomenon that transcends ideologies has sparked unprecedented interest.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, nationalism is a burgeoning field of study in Latin America, with most works concentrating, not surprisingly, on the nineteenth century, the century of the birth of nations. The tendency is to acknowledge some form of elite nationalism, as well as popular nationalism. Elites are no longer seen as monolithic, and historians have come to distinguish periods of state economic nationalism (that is, protectionist market policies), where in the past, dependency theorists and Marxists had seen only "elites selling out," prominently, in the early postindependence period. Similarly, indigenous peasants and poor African descendents, who were seen by Marxists and liberals alike as mere cannon fodder and "manipulated masses," are now acknowledged to have been more aware of, and to have participated more in, national politics, to the point where the study of popular forms of patriotism and nationalism in the nineteenth century is becoming a field in itself. In addition, race and ethnicity are now seen as factors shaping the sense of national belonging (and exclusion), as well as representations of the nation. Economic-oriented debates on nationhood are giving way to studies that emphasize culture and national representations.

[See also Latin American Wars of Independence.]

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NATIONALIST PARTY. The Nationalist Party, or Guomintang (Kuomintang), came into being as a political party in 1912 in the aftermath of the revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty. It evolved from the anti-Manchu and pro-republican Revolutionary Alliance that Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan) had formed in Tokyo in 1905. In National Assembly elections in the winter of 1912-1913, the Nationalist Party won a plurality of votes (43 percent) over several political parties and was primed to take key legislative posts when the assembly convened. Song Jiaoren, slated to become the prime minister, was assassinated, however, at a Shanghai train station in March 1913—the result of a plot by President Yuan Shikai, who practically ignored the assembly once it met. Nationalist Party adherents played central roles in the rebellion that exploded against Yuan in the summer of 1913 and that Yuan handily put down. After coercing the National Assembly to ratify his election as president for a five-year term, he in late 1913 outlawed the Nationalist Party, in form and objective a parliamentary-style party, and then in early 1914 abolished all representative bodies:

Cooperation with the Communist Party. In October 1919, Sun renamed the party he had organized in Japan in 1914 the Nationalist Party. Over the next several years, Communist International (Comintern) agents helped establish the Communist Party and pushed it to form a united front with the Nationalist Party, the largest "bourgeois" party, to oust warlords and imperialists. Sun agreed to accept Comintern assistance in reorganizing and strengthening the Nationalist Party. The agent Mikhail Borodin rebuilt the loosely structured Nationalist Party on a Leninist party model that was based upon the principle of democratic centralism and assigned party