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The Paths of Terrorism in Peru
Nineteenth to Twenty First Centuries[*]

CECILIA MÉNDEZ

> 'The most important thing which can be done immediately towards stopping lynching is to gather all the facts of lynching and give them the widest publicity'
>
> *W. E. B. Dubois, 1916*

The Paths of Terrorism: A Preliminary Framework

In Peru, the term 'terrorism' is unequivocally linked to the Communist Party of Peru Sendero Luminoso (PCP SL), best known in English as the Shining Path and in Spanish as Sendero Luminoso (SL), or simply 'Sendero'.[1] Formed in 1970 as a splinter of another Maoist communist party, the PCP SL took up arms in 1980 to unleash the bloodiest and most lengthy insurgency recorded in Peru's modern history. The 'time of terrorism' refers to the years from 1980 to approximately 1998, in which Sendero launched their so called 'people's war' *(guerra popular)* with the ultimate goal of taking over the state and establishing the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. The insurgency took the form of attacks on infrastructure, such as electrical towers, bridges and emblematic buildings (from embassies to shopping malls), individual

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1 They most commonly signed simply as PCP, vindicating their Communist political allegiance, and did not like to be reduced to 'Sendero'. In this essay I use Sendero (or SL) at times, as a concession to the scholarship and common parlance, but I also adopt PCP SL to emphasise their identity as a political party and the ideological roots they claimed.

assassinations, massacres and 'popular trials' that included summary executions and exemplary punishments. The latter were especially prevalent in peasant villages of the south central Andean highlands of Peru, particularly the department of Ayacucho, the cradle of the movement. Sendero targeted a diverse array of people and social groups, from low ranking policemen and military officers to elected civilian authorities such as city mayors and peasant community authorities, leaders of political parties, grassroots community leaders, merchants and, ultimately, anyone who dared to oppose their dictates. Though they were initially supported by groups of radicalised youth from public universities, and the impoverished peasantry of the south central Peruvian Andes, peasants started turning against Sendero early on, and ended up becoming its foremost victims. Because of their systematic attack on all forms of organised society, some have described SL as the opposite of a social movement. Others have likened it to Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, in the light of their authoritarian ideology and methods, and their agrarian based self sufficient communist utopia.

Unlike Peru's previous twentieth century armed insurgencies, the Shining Path war encompassed virtually the entire national territory, but was most devastating in the south central Andean highlands, home to a majority of Quechua speaking peasants, particularly in the department of Ayacucho, where it all started. According to the 2003 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación) Report, nearly 70,000 people were killed or disappeared in the conflict, the majority of them (54 per cent) at the hands of the Shining Path, 1.5 per cent at the hands of another armed insurgent group, the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), while the Armed Forces, paramilitaries and peasant patrols or *ronderos* were responsible for around 37 per cent of the remaining victims. Among them, nearly 29 per cent correspond to the Armed Forces. Approximately 75 per cent of the victims were rural, mostly illiterate, poor, and spoke Quechua or other indigenous languages as a mother tongue.[2] The population of Ayacucho was decimated. According to the late anthropologist and former TRC member Carlos Iván Degregori, 'If the ratio of victims to the population of Ayacucho were extended to the whole country, the violence would have resulted in 1,200,000 dead and disappeared.'[3]

2 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, *Informe Final, Perú: 1980 2000* (Lima, 2003), Vol. 1, p. 56 and Vol. 8, pp. 246 8.

3 C. I. Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God: Shining Path's Politics of War in Peru, 1980 1999* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), p. 46. The figures of the TRC have been disputed by S. Rendón, 'Capturing Correctly: A Reanalysis of the Indirect Capture

Today, the scars of the war are likely to be unnoticed by foreign visitors and a younger generation of Peruvians. Major cities, starting with Peru's capital, Lima, are bustling with shopping malls, gourmet restaurants, luxurious hotels and fast food chain restaurants bearing typical US brand names. A celebratory mood that takes pride in the country's economic growth, tourist attractions and culinary riches has taken over since the first decade of the twentieth century, making references to the recent past of political violence an uncomfortable truth that many have preferred not to look at.[4]

But this national celebratory mood belies scars of violence that run deep. On the one hand, there is the staggering figure of the 'disappeared'. Calculated at around 20,000, it continues to grow. In 2003, the TRC identified 3,023 clandestine burial sites (by 2016, 2,244 have been exhumed), but the figure is now 4,000, and new sites continue to be reported, which suggests that the death toll estimated by the TRC may be conservative.[5] Considering both deaths and the 'disappeared', the figures greatly surpass those reported for the 1960s–80s dictatorships of Chile, Argentina and Brazil put together.[6]

On the other hand, there is the discursive legacy of the 'time of terrorism', which has powerfully affected language, politics and policies, determining the limits of what can be said – or not – in public. The defeat of Sendero's terrorism has not put terrorism to rest. On the contrary, at times it seems that 'terrorism' is invoked more often now than when the insurgency was in full swing. For, even though SL was disbanded as a political organisation shortly after the capture in 1992 of its main leader and founder, Abimael Guzmán (alias 'Presidente Gonzalo'), his wife Elena Iparraguirre, the second in

Recapture Methods in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission', *Research and Politics* 6/1 (2019).

4 This celebratory mood is superbly analysed in G. Cánepa Koch and F. Lossio Chavez, *La Nación Celebrada: Marca País y Ciudadanías en Disputa* (Lima, Universidad del Pacífico/Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2019).

5 Interview with Ricardo Caro, officer in charge of the Dirección General de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas (DGBPD, General Directorate for the Search for Disappeared People of Peru's Ministry of Justice and Human Rights), Lima, 13 August 2019, and emails exchanged in August 2020. On the figures of the exhumed burial sites, see Equipo Forense Especializado (EFE), Ministerio Público, Fiscalía de la Nación website, www.mpfn.gob.pe/iml/efe/, accessed 15 August 2020.

6 Between 1973 and 1989, in Chile under the Pinochet dictatorship there were 3,065 dead or disappeared. In Argentina during the military junta from 1976 to 1983, the dead and disappeared amounted to nearly 30,000 people, and in Brazil's military dictatorship of 1964–85, the military was responsible for 421 assassinations and 'disappearances' of political adversaries of the regime. See A. Benites, 'La dictadura militar brasileña causó 421 muertos y desaparecidos', *El País*, 13 November 2014, https://elpais.com/internacional/2014/11/14/actualidad/1415926043_376239.html.

command in the party, and other high ranking commanders who are serving prison sentences the 'threat of terrorism' is invoked by conservative politicians and media with such virulence and frequency that people unfamiliar with Peru could be led to believe that it is in fact a live threat.[7] The accusation of being a 'terrorist' is routinely brought up to crush political opponents, criminalise social protest, censor critical opinions and delegitimise any discourse calling for change, a scenario that replicates itself in other countries in the region, especially those that have passed through armed conflicts, such as Colombia. Even human rights activists can be dubbed 'terrorists', which is quite ironic, considering that Guzmán disparaged the discourse of human rights, which he deemed to be part of 'bourgeois ideology'. There is even a (racially tinged) neologism for the insult: *terruco*, which conflates the ideas of 'terrorist' and 'Indian', as historian Carlos Aguirre has insightfully analysed.[8] The term reflects the stigma attached to people who were actually, ironically enough, the majority of Sendero's victims. But because the cradle of the insurgency was also the department with one of the highest percentages of Quechua speaking peasants who are usually referred to in Peru as *indios* or *indígenas* (this is not necessarily a self assumed category), they were often forced to put up with the stigma, even when most of the troops of the armed forces that repressed alleged and actual Senderistas shared with them the same linguistic and social characteristics and phenotypes. The PCP SL's highest commanders themselves, though, including Guzmán, were rather mestizos or whites from the privileged provincial elites.[9] The noun *terruco*, in turn, brought with it a new verb: *terruquear*, or to call someone a *terruco*, and provides a good example of the way in which labels associated with terrorism are ethnicised. Yet, in contrast to cases in which the label of 'terrorist' is usually attached to those whom the mainstream deems foreigners as happens in the US with Muslims and 'Arab looking' people in Peru the prime suspects were Peruvian themselves, especially if they were Quechua speakers (or spoke a Spanish infused with Quechua or other indigenous languages' phonetics),

7 When in 1992 Abimael Guzmán was captured he called for a ceasefire. Although much of the party was disbanded, several of his former followers continued in arms until approximately 1999. Currently, some detachments are still active in the eastern rain forest mountains of south central Peru, a region known as VRAEM, but their fight is no longer ideological; they are engaged in the lucrative business of cocaine production and trafficking.

8 C. Aguirre, 'Terruco de m. . . Insulto y estigma en la guerra sucia peruana', *Histórica* 35/1 (2011).

9 Aymara and Quechua are the most widely spoken but not the only languages of pre Hispanic origin in Peru.

and poor.[10] In recent years, *terruqueo* has democratised its targets. Anyone who is critical of power, regardless of physiognomy or class, can be subject to *terruqueo*.[11]

* * *

The literature on the Shining Path insurgency from its outbreak in 1980 to the beginning of its downfall in 1992, and into the 2000s 'post conflict' period is good and abundant. There are outstanding accounts of the early stages of the uprising and its roots, such as those by Carlos Iván Degregori and Gustavo Gorriti, studies on the peasant patrols (*rondas*) that fought them, SL's development in urban areas, and increasingly more works focusing on memory and the post war aftermath. With notable exceptions, such as Jaymie Patricia Heilman's *Peru Before the Shining Path*, scholars generally do not venture into the *longue dureé* to understand the Shining Path and its particular commitment to violence.[12] Let me suggest two main reasons for this absence.

One is Sendero's own detachment from Peruvian historical referents. Unlike other well studied terrorist and revolutionary organisations world wide, Sendero does not make historical claims to the past or vindicate Peru's historical figures in search of legitimacy, even though their own name pays

10 See C. Méndez, 'Obama y Humala: ¿Nacionalismo o Democracia?', *Lamula.pe*, 15 December 2011, https://lamula.pe/2011/12/15/obama y humala democracia y nacionalismo/lamula/.

11 For example, linguist Virginia Zavala was recently subject to *terruqueo* for stating that the 'groups of power' establish the hegemonic way of speaking Spanish, but that it was not the only correct way to do so. See V. Zavala, 'Sobre la discriminación lingüística, el "terruqueo" y los grupos de poder en el Perú', *Lamula.pe*, 13 May 2020, https://virginia zavala.lamula pe/2020/05/13/castellanos en el peru/virginiazavalac/.

12 For some important works on the Shining Path see C. I. Degregori, *Qué difícil es ser Dios: El partido comunista del Perú Sendero Luminoso y el conflicto armado interno en el Perú, 1980 1999* (Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2013); G. Gorriti Ellenbogen, *Sendero: Historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú* (Lima, Apoyo, 1990); C. I. Degregori, J. Coronel, P. del Pino and O. Starn, *Las rondas campesinas y la derrota de Sendero Luminoso* (Lima, IEP, 1996); J. P. Heilman, *Before the Shining Path: Politics in Rural Ayacucho, 1895 1980* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010); P. del Pino, *En nombre del gobierno. El Perú y Uchuraccay: Un siglo de política campesina* (Lima/Juliaca, La Siniestra Ensayos/ Universidad Nacional de Juliaca, 2017); C. Tapia, *Las fuerzas armadas y Sendero Luminoso: Dos estrategias y un final* (Lima, IEP, 1997). For a comprehensive compilation in English see S. Stern (ed.), *The Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru 1980 1995* (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1998). Regarding the *longue dureé* approach, J. L. Rénique in *La voluntad encarcelada* (Lima, IEP, 2013) sees the PCP SL as part of a 'radical tradition' that he traces back to the progressive liberals of the second half of the nineteenth century, but his analysis is focused on intellectual and political history rather than ideology or political practice.

tribute to José Carlos Mariátegui, the celebrated Peruvian Marxist thinker of the early twentieth century. The 'Shining Path' alludes to their following of 'the shining path' of José Carlos Mariátegui.[13] Yet, unlike Sendero's rigid interpretation of Marxism, Mariátegui's vision of Peru's socialist future was shaped by his vison of Peru's pre Columbian Andean society and its agrarian communal roots. Be that as it may, the references to Mariátegui that had marked Sendero's internal discussions in the 1970s, as they struggled to differentiate themselves from the rest of the left, faded to the background as they launched their long period of armed struggle in 1980. Henceforth, the word of Abimael Guzmán, their leader and founder, became the bible of the movement. Guzmán, a philosophy professor from the Universidad de Huamanga, in Ayacucho City in the south central Andes of Peru, fashioned himself as the 'fourth sword' of the world revolution (after Marx, Lenin and Mao), and relished the personality cult the party lavished upon him as 'Presidente Gonzalo', his *nom de guerre*. His ideological script was referred to as *pensamiento guía* (the 'guiding thought').

More often than not, if the PCP SL spoke of history, it was in the abstract terms of the laws of historical materialism and class struggle: the exploitation of men by men that had been going on for millennia, and history as a succession of 'modes of production' with communism as the final stage. In their view, Peru in the 1970s was a feudal society not unlike China of the 1930s, an overwhelmingly rural country with a large peasantry. Accordingly, if history mattered in their vision of communism, it was more that of China than Peru. They exhibited a particular admiration for Mao, borrowed heavily from his 'people's war' and guerrilla tactics and the idea of strangling the cities from the countryside, though, admittedly, they were not alone in this, as Maoism exerted a special allure among the Peruvian left. The absence of referents to Peruvian history in Sendero's conceptualisation of the revolution goes in tandem with their ideological rigidity and disregard for social organ isations and movements, which other leftist parties sought to court. As Degregori put it: 'A fundamental characteristic of Sendero's activity is [its] disregard for grass roots organizations: peasant communities, labor unions, neighborhood associations. These are all replaced by generated organisms that is, by the party that decides everything.'[14]

13 Rénique, *La voluntad encarcelada* discusses Mariátegui's influence in Sendero at length. See also D. Asencios, *La ciudad acorralada* (Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2016).

14 C. I. Degregori, 'A Return to the Past', in D. S. Palmer (ed.), *The Shining Path of Peru*, 2nd ed. (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), p. 57.

Not surprisingly, their ideology was just as devoid of nationalist rhetoric and drives, a feature that sets Sendero apart from other Latin American leftist armed groups of the twentieth century (Marxist or not), which were highly nationalistic, as were most world revolutions of the twentieth century, if one follows Benedict Anderson (*pace* Marx) from José Martí to Fidel Castro in Cuba, from Augusto César Sandino to Farabundo Martí in Central America, from the Tupamaros in Uruguay to the Montoneros in Argentina. All embraced nationalism. All denounced national elites (or 'comprador bourgeoisies') that colluded with foreign invading or interventionist powers. Unlike those movements (including Peru's own coeval of Sendero, the MRTA), Senderistas never wrapped themselves in the national flag. Theirs was, unmistakably, the red flag of the hammer and the sickle. To be clear, Sendero did embrace the 'anti imperialist' rhetoric that was common to the left in the continent during the 1960s and 1970s, but this never translated into nationalism, references to the soil or the national past. Likewise, unlike other armed movements in the twentieth century worldwide, the PCP SL did not claim to vindicate any racial or ethnic identity, nor did they raise racial or ethnic questions, though in this they were no different from the rest of the left in Peru and most of Latin America at the time.

Without national heroes to emulate, Senderistas saw themselves as 'the initiators', as Abimael Guzmán proclaimed in a speech announcing the start of their 'armed struggle'.[15] He envisioned Peru as the centre of the 'authentic' communist world revolution, one which Deng Xiao Ping's China had allegedly betrayed. This is no small detail. The year in which the PCP SL launched its 'armed struggle', dead black dogs bearing a piece of paper that read 'Teng Siao Ping' appeared hanging from electrical light poles in Lima. If there was history, then, it was not Peruvian; it was the history of global communism. And it was in the future more than in the past.

The second reason why scholars have tended to keep their analyses of Sendero within rather constrained chronological boundaries, I will argue, may have to do with the nature of the violence that they elicited. Indeed, Sendero's violence was so openly reckless, and so seemingly gratuitous, that suggesting possible parallels with previous insurgencies or civil wars in Peru became taboo, and may even be subject to a 'soft' censorship (as I can witness in relation to my own work). Truth be told, Sendero was a fundamentalist organisation built around the cult of personality of Abimael Guzmán, which punished disloyalty with death. But the lack of empathy they elicited, in comparison to other armed insurgencies that took up arms in Latin America in the past century, may be attributable less to

15 The most detailed account of Sendero's origins is in Gorriti, *Sendero*.

the violence per se than to the fact that it was a deliberate strategy built into the party's ideology, not a last resort. The political context of their birth is important if we are to understand this. Sendero rose up in arms not to fight a repressive military dictatorship — like most Latin American revolutionary movements of the twentieth century — but to boycott an emerging democracy. They launched their war at the precise moment in which the country was transitioning to a democratic regime after twelve years of military dictatorship. Significantly, their first insurgent act was the bombing of the ballot boxes in the village of Chuschi, in the department of Ayacucho, on the eve of the presidential elections of May 1980. To consummate the irony, this was the first presidential election of the twentieth century in Peru in which illiterate people were allowed to vote; the detail is especially significant in a country where elections are mandatory. Their target, in other words, was not a particular regime, but democracy itself. This fact, in turn, explains why their violence had to be so reckless. Their attacks were meant to elicit a level of repression that would justify branding the state as 'fascist'. Such a situation, in turn, they hoped, would leave Peruvians no choice but to opt between them, Sendero, and the state. This is the way in which the PCP SL hoped to create the 'conditions for the revolution'. Accordingly, it not only ordered its militants to kill but expected them to die — or give a 'quota' in blood — for the party.[16] Likewise, this is why Sendero broke with the rest of the left, which decided to take, instead, the electoral path.

* * *

Much has been written about the place of violence in the PCP SL's ideology. Not unlike a fundamentalist religious organisation, they believed in the 'purifying' effects of bloodshed and cultivated a mystical relationship to violence, as Gustavo Gorriti early noted. Carlos Iván Degregori, for his part, suggested that the leadership's messianic zeal coexisted with an 'excess of reason', or an adherence to Marxist dogmas as 'scientific truth'. As he put it: 'They are the last children of the Enlightenment who, two hundred years later and isolated in the Andes, ended up converting science into religion.' Or, 'their vision, that sought to be absolutely scientific, became exceedingly emotional, offering its members a strong quasi religious identity'.[17]

16 Ibid.

17 Degregori, 'Return to the Past', pp. 55–6. See also Gorriti, *Sendero*. Later on, sociologist Gonzalo Portocarrero used the concept 'reasons of blood' to describe the combination 'rational' and 'irrational' elements in Sendero's ideology, inspired by Remo Bodei's theories.

My goal in this essay is not further to examine this ideological distinctiveness, for which there exists an ample and superb literature. It is, rather, to understand where the violence that Sendero turned into such a rigid ideology came from. I start from the premise that the top down violence that Sendero exerted was not precisely invented by them; it was already built into the pre existing Peruvian social fabric. What Sendero did, I would suggest, was to turn this violence into ideology. I build in part on Carlos Iván Degregori's provocative thesis that, upon the breakdown of the latifundia regime in the southern central Peruvian Andes following the 1969 agrarian reform, the Shining Path filled the void left by the oppressive landowners, or *mistis* (a Quechua term for mestizo, or white), also known as *gamonales*. They exploited peasant labour and exerted upon them forms of violence not unlike those that tend to be labelled 'terrorist', in complicity with or with the acquiescence of provincial and local authorities such as prefects, sub prefects, governors, police and judges. Degregori likens the mixture of violence and paternalism that *mistis* displayed in their relationship with 'their' Indians and the racism inherent in it to the hierarchical structure of the Shining Path. Anthropologist Marisol de la Cadena, in turn, traced Sendero's disdain for the very indigenous peasants they sought to attract to an entrenched pattern of 'silent racism' among twentieth century Peruvian intellectuals, or a sense of intellectual and cultural superiority that traverses the whole ideological spectrum.[18] With these considerations in mind, I proceed to take terrorism out of the Shining Path's exclusive compartment to trace its genealogy in Peru's republican history, starting with the story of its naming. The argument is presented in three parts.

In the first place because terrorism is a term with its own history and terrorist actions are not the exclusive purview of non state actors I start by tracing the term 'terrorist' in the early nineteenth century, before it was used to designate the violence carried out by rebels in arms and when it was used to refer almost exclusively to the violence and abuse of power by states and statesmen, particu larly in reference to monarchical or authoritarian regimes. The opposite of a terrorist was often a liberal. Nowhere is this clearer than in 1867, when a so called 'law of terror' was debated in Congress. This case constitutes the second part of our analysis. The 'law of terror' was a draft law presented to the national Congress by three landowners (*hacendados*) of the southern department of Puno, which aimed at violently and militarily suppressing a wave of peasant uprisings in

See G. Portocarrero Maisch, *Razones de sangre: Aproximaciones a la violencia política*, 2nd ed. (Lima, Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2012 [1998]).

18 Degregori, *Qué difícil*; M. de la Cadena, 'Silent Racism and Intellectual Superiority in Perú', *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 17/2 (1998).

the region. Even though the 'law of terror' is a misnomer, as it never became law, due in great part to the fierce opposition of liberals and an emerging pro Indian and pro peasant rights movement, the debate it elicited vividly illustrates the degree to which liberals effectively instrumentalised the term 'terrorism' to denounce the violence inherent in a system of exploitation of peasant labour and the dispossession of their resources. Lastly, I will discuss two key moments in the history of the Peruvian APRA Party (PAP), which at various points in its trajectory was deemed 'terrorist': the dictatorship of Luis M. Sánchez Cerro (1930 3), and the governments of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero and Manuel Odría (1945 56). APRA, an acronym for Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Revolutionary Popular Alliance) was founded by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in Paris, in 1926, while he was in exile. A centre left political organisation of international scope, APRA fashioned itself as a revolutionary and 'anti imperialist' alternative to communism. In an effort to repress APRA and other opposition forces, the government passed the 1932 Emergency Law. This law remained in force until 1945 but reverberated into the late 1940s, when, most likely for the first time, the state resorted to the term 'terrorist' in its search for a new legal framework to quell APRA and political dissent more broadly. In the final analysis and without belittling the violence of the repression of the peasant uprisings of 1867 and 1868 I will attempt to show that, as the state's repressive apparatus consolidated in the course of the twentieth century, it became more able not only to increase the level of violence it exerted over its citizens but to legitimise violence through law, thus nurturing a growing spiral of violence and disbelief in state institutions which may, in turn, help shed further light on the PCP SL's formation, and its legitimacy in the eyes of a significant group of Peruvians.

A few cautionary words may be in order before we continue. Insofar as (as mentioned above) comparing the PCP SL insurgency with prior political upheavals in Peru is a taboo of sorts for Peruvians, I am aware that my *longue durée* approach, and my attempt to understand terrorism from multiple angles, may be interpreted as a justification (or 'relativisation') of SL's cruelty and violence. It is not. To talk about state violence and terror is not to condone anti state violence and terror. It is to put things in perspective. For, as historian David Andress has brilliantly analysed in his study of the Terror in the French Revolution: '. . . in the cold light of history, the Terror, is not, has not been, a unique aberration'.[19]

19 D. Andress, *The Terror: The Merciless War for Freedom in Revolutionary France* (New York, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005), p. 7.

Considering that I am only decades, and not centuries away from some of the themes to be studied, my task is even more daunting than Andress's. Sendero is still a threat in the minds of some generations of Peruvians in a way that the French Terror in France is not, and its destructive legacy runs deep: it is political, physical, emotional, ideological, juridical, cultural. But precisely because (unless you embrace the party's ideology) its ideological justification of violence is not self evident, considering they had alternative political paths, a deeper exploration into the history of the violence that may, in turn, allow us to understand Sendero's violent path is necessary.

Liberals Versus Terrorists

Let us turn to the early nineteenth century, a time when 'terrorism' was used mainly to describe the violence of states or statesmen. By the 1820s most former colonies of the Spanish Empire in America had become national states following bloody independence wars that put an end to 300 years of European rule. Warfare did not recede quickly, though, as the former colonies continued to be embattled in internal and external wars for the control of the emerging national states and the shaping of national boundaries. Instability notwithstanding, newspapers proliferated with the new freedom of the press, and became a natural place for the expression of political ideas and debates. Newspapers followed world events very closely, particularly those of Europe, often reprinting and discussing political and historical documents. Our impressionistic look at Spanish American newspapers from the 1830s to the 1870s suggests that 'terrorist' had Robespierre's Reign of Terror as its main referent. Nevertheless, subsequent events in France, and Europe more broadly, imprinted new political meanings on the term.

At first glance, references to terrorism do not seem to be bound to a specific ideology so much as to a form of exercising violence through fear by powerful *caudillos* (political bosses) and 'tyrannical rulers'. But, at a time when political outcomes were decided in battle, it was hard to say who could be free of the charge of being a 'terrorist'. The enemies of Marshall Andrés de Santa Cruz, leader of the Peruvian Bolivian Confederation (1836 9), claimed that his power derived from 'the terrorism and bayonets of his three numer ous armies',[20] while others considered that 'the slogan of his administration

20 *El Comercio*, 18 October 1839. The words belong to Manuel Bulnes, a member of the Chilean military who allied with Santa Cruz's enemy, Mariscal Gamarra, to defeat the Confederation.

was terrorism'.[21] Nonetheless, the same charges could have been brought against his nemesis, Marshall Agustín Gamarra, a famed authoritarian president of Peru, who opposed Santa Cruz's free trade policies, and was backed by Lima's conservative elite and the government of Chile. Moving to the Río de la Plata region, we find slightly different examples. Members or sympathisers of the Unitarian Party, who tended to be (socially conservative) liberals, referred to Juan Manuel de Rosas, Governor of the province of Buenos Aires and leader of Federalist Party, as a 'tyrant' and a 'terrorist'.[22] Indeed, his reputation as such was well established in his time, as witnessed by the short story by Esteban Echeverría, eloquently titled 'The Slaughterhouse' ('El Matadero'), a direct reference to the Rosas regime.[23] Yet Rosas and Federalism were popular among gauchos and poor peasants. Earlier on, during the wars of independence, and also in the Río de la Plata, in the region corresponding to present day Uruguay, José Artigas, *caudillo* and guerrilla leader whose political programme included agrarian reform, was also referred to as a 'terrorist' by his political enemies.[24] One might be tempted to deduce from these examples that 'terrorist' referred to politicians who favoured social causes, or 'Jacobins' of sorts, but this was not necessarily the case. Rosas, for instance, embraced Catholicism as a central tenet of his party's identity. What is significant here is that those deemed 'terrorists', far from being on the fringes of politics, were for the most part rulers, statesmen or aspirants to such roles.

In the 1850s and 1860s a clearer ideological pattern emerges. Even though one can find occasional associations between terrorists and liberals,[25] what becomes increasingly common is their opposition: 'terrorist' as the antithesis of 'liberal'. Liberals of different hues labelled their opponents as 'terrorist': from conservatives to partisans of the monarchy, to *godos* (a derogatory term for Spanish or conservative), 'enemies of freedom', and adherents to tyrannical rule. In 1851, an author who signed as 'El Indígena' in the Peruvian newspaper *El Comercio* referred to a columnist whom he charged with

21 *El Peruano*, 1 January 1840.

22 *El Mercurio de Valparaíso*, 30 December 1839 and 13 March 1841. See also J. Rivera Endarte, *Rosas y sus opositores* (Montevideo, Imprenta del Nacional, 1843), p. 210.

23 'El Matadero' was allegedly written in the late 1830s, but it was only published posthumously, in 1871. See E. Echeverría, 'El Matadero', *Revista del Río de la Plata* 1 (1871).

24 Letter from 'the government' to Belgrano, 26 April 1819, Ms. Archivo General, cited in 'Páginas históricas de la Independencia de Argentina por Bartolomé Mitre … La guerra social, 1819 (continuación del capítulo XXVII)', reproduced in *La Nación* 7/1892, 21 September 1876.

25 See for example, the Mexican newspaper *El Siglo Diez y Nueve,* 10 June 1875, p. 2.

despising Indians as 'terrorist and *godo*'.[26] Into the 1860s, the association between terrorists and monarchists deepened, coinciding with European imperialist recolonising ventures in America, among them the French invasion of Mexico that resulted in the re establishment of the monarchy (1862 7), and Spain's invasion of the Peruvian coasts in 1866. In this context, Mexican liberals, who tended to identify themselves as republican, fiercely opposed the mon archists as 'terrorists'. In April 1863, for instance, the liberal newspaper *Siglo Diez y Nueve* published reports decrying the violence and ransacking committed by the partisans of Napoleon III, who invaded the city of Aguascalientes under the cry 'Up with religion and France'. The writer claimed that the *chusmas* (vulgar people) were emboldened by their 'terrorist fame' and blamed the 'French tyrant' for the misery ravaging the city and especially the working poor.[27] A few years later, historian Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán denounced 'the forces and terrorism that the Spanish have availed themselves of to subjugate us' in Peru, in reference to the 1866 reconquest attempts.[28]

The 'Law of Terror'

But it is Peru of the 1860s that provides what may be the starkest example of liberals' use of the term 'terrorist' to attack reactionary politicians and the violence they promoted. On 8 May 1867, three congressmen, who were also *hacendados* in the southern department of Puno, drafted a law meant to suppress with brute force a wave of peasant unrest in that department and dissuade further rebellions. Five days later, on 14 May, the draft law was published in Peru's main newspaper, *El Comercio*, stirring a debate, mostly against the legislators' initiative. The following day, another newspaper, *El Nacional*, published one of three consecutive editorials against the proposed law, entitling all three columns 'The Law of Terror, the Indians'.[29] Henceforth, other commentators popularised the term, speaking of the terrorist attitude of *gamonales* and partisans of the project of law and the terrorist methods and practices aimed at exterminating Indians. Liberal public opinion criticised the proposed law so fiercely that one of the three congressmen who had drafted it withdrew his signature from the proposal,

26 *El Comercio*, 16 April 1851. Article signed by 'El Indígena'.
27 *El Siglo Diez y Nueve*, 30 April 1863, p. 3.
28 M. F. Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú independiente: Primer periodo, 1819 1822* (Lima, 1868), p. 27.
29 Reprinted in E. Vásquez, *La rebelión de Juan Bustamante* (Lima, Juan Mejía Baca, 1980), pp. 341 51.

and it was ultimately rejected by both the Government Commission and the Legislation Commission in Congress. There is no record that the draft law ever passed, against what historiography has long assumed.[30]

What was at stake? In the course of 1866, as the demand for wool increased in the international market, peasants in the department of Puno, in the altiplano region bordering Bolivia, rich in pasture lands, felt an increasing pressure to sell their lands. Before the incursion of British traders in the region, peasants had owned most of the land in Puno and traded their wool at provincial fairs.[31] But as the demand for their lands soared, *hacendados* sought to enlarge their estates as well as get further control over the wool markets at the expense of the peasants. What made the situation untenable for the latter was a head tax (*contribución personal*) imposed by the government early in 1866, in part to compensate for the losses caused by the recent war against the Spanish invasion. In theory, the *contribución personal* applied to all adult men, but in practice it fell on indigenous peasants' shoulders, evoking the spectre of the colonial 'Indian tax' abolished in 1854.[32] Peasants felt the brunt heavily and protested by attacking and taking over offices of governors, prefects and sub prefects that is to say, the local authorities in charge of the collection of taxes and in some cases demanding that they be returned to them.[33] Other grievances denounced included an alleged 'property tax' enforced illegally by the department's prefect, which forced all peasants who owned land to pay tax in exchange for a land title of no legal value.[34] This conjunction of factors became explosive in a society that had been enduring structural exploitation for centuries. Even though prohibitions against unpaid labour existed as early

30 For the ruling of the two congressional committees, see 'Dictamen relativo a la proposición sobre los indígenas de Puno', No. 24049, 9 21 May 1867, ff. 163 7, Archivo del Congreso de la República de Perú, Lima (ACRP). On the congressman who withdrew his signature from the proposal, Federico Luna, see 'Actas de las Sesiones del Congreso Constituyente, Cámara de Diputados', 20 May 1867, p. 432 (ACRP). On the historiography on the Puno rebellion, see Vásquez, *La rebelión*; M. Gonzales, 'Neo colonialism and Indian Unrest in Southern Peru, 1867 1898', *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 6/1 (1987); N. Jacobsen, 'Civilization and Its Barbarism: The Inevitability of Juan Bustamante's Failure', in J. Ewell and W. Beezley (eds.), *The Human Condition in Latin America: The Nineteenth Century* (Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources, 1989); N. Jacobsen and N. Domínguez, *Juan Bustamante y los límites del liberalismo en el Altiplano: La rebelión de Huancané (1866 1868)* (Lima: Servicios Educativos Rurales/SER, 2011); C. McEvoy, 'Indio y nación: una lectura política de la rebelión de Huancané, 1866 1868', in C. McEvoy (ed.), *Forjando la nación: Ensayos de historia republicana* (Lima, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú/The University of the South, Sewanee, 1999).

31 Gonzales, 'Neo colonialism'; Jacobsen and Domínguez, *Juan Bustamante*.

32 Jacobsen and Domínguez, *Juan Bustamante*, p. 54. 33 Gonzales, 'Neo colonialism'.

34 Vásquez, *La rebelión*, pp. 388 93.

as the first colonial legislation, unpaid Indian labour was the norm in Andean society, the reason for the accumulation of wealth by many non Indians and even essential for the state and public services to operate: community peasants were expected to work for free on tasks ranging from public works to serving as domestic servants in the houses and offices of authorities and as porters, jailers and servants of mayors, priests and the *hacendados* themselves. Peasants were even expected to give their children as servants to local authorities, who in turn gave them as 'presents' to people they wanted to be on good terms with.[35] In theory, peasants could vent their grievances in courts, and many chose to do so. In practice, though, they could hardly win any legal battle. Since many, if not most peasants were monolingual Quechua or Aymara speakers, language bar riers added to class and racial discrimination, and the collusion of judges with *hacendados* and local and regional authorities prevented them from ever winning a case in court.[36]

The so called 'law of terror' aimed to give legal legitimacy to this status quo, and it seemed particularly intent on denying peasants the right to property, for, in addition to punitive violence, it prescribed the dispossession of their lands. The lawmakers justified their stance by arguing that the peasant rebellions, rather than resulting from legitimate grievances, were the product of a 'caste war' (*guerra de castas*) 'poorly extinguished in 1814', and which had to be rooted out.[37] This is a remarkable statement. The reference alludes to the 1814 15 Cuzco Rebellion, which was part of Peru's wars of independence against Spain, thus showing the extent to which that fight was experienced by a privileged sector of the provincial elite of Puno as an affront to their privileged (white/mestizo) status (*casta* somehow blending race and status). Additionally, the draft law argued that the rebels destabilised 'public order' and threatened the 'life and property of the inhabitants of the Republic, which are under the government guarantee'. Yet, indigenous peasants clearly did not count as 'inhabitants of the republic', to judge from how the proposed law referred to their lives and property. Article 2 authorised the Executive to deport '*in perpetuity* . . . to the inhabited points of the [rainforest] mountains of Carabaya the *communities* or *parcialidades* of Indians that have shown themselves to be the most sanguinary and

35 J. Bustamante, *Los indios del Perú* (Lima, J. M. Monterola, 1867), p. 9; Gonzales, 'Neo colonialism'; A. Flores Galindo, 'República sin ciudadanos', in *Obras Completas*, Vol. 3.1 (Lima, Casa de Estudios del Socialismo, 2005).

36 Gonzales, 'Neo colonialism'; Jacobsen and Domínguez, *Juan Bustamante*.

37 'Dictamen', ACRP, ff. 165r and 166r.

defiant',[38] while establishing that their lands be sold at public auction, thus revealing the extent to which the rapaciousness for peasants' lands was a drive behind the lawmakers' intentions. Finally, and no less contentiously, the proposed law called for the deployment to the region of an army division 'made of the three branches' and the establishment of martial courts for the 'instigators and ringleaders of the insurrectionist Indians' (Articles 1 and 2). Lastly, it prescribed the same measures for similar cases that may eventually take place in other parts of the republic (Article 7).[39]

It was not hard for the two Congressional Commissions that discussed this draft law to debunk each one of its arguments, in a remarkable legal and political defeat for the *hacendados* of Puno. The Commissions' rulings alleged that the draft law infringed upon the division of powers, going beyond the functions of Congress, and questioned the legality of martial courts, deportations and the deprivation of anyone of their property as a form of punishment. Hence, they condemned the idea of perpetual deportations as much as the selling of the deported peasants' lands, because 'no one can be dispossessed of their property except for the juridically proven public good or owing to a condemnatory sentence in a criminal trial conducted according to law'.[40] Most importantly, the Government Commission decried the punitive sprit of the draft law, as it considered in tune with most liberal commentators that the peasants' rebelliousness was justified: 'The uprising of the *indígenas*', it asserted, 'has as a main cause the mistreatment that over long centuries, one could say, all their lives, they have been victim of.'[41] They considered that conciliatory methods would yield better results, and went on to draft an alternative law offering amnesty to the indigenous rebels who surrendered.

The forcefulness of the congressional commissions' rulings, added to the criticism of the liberal press, ultimately caused the proposed law to founder, yet the alternative conciliatory legislation seems not to have come to fruition either. In the meantime, peasant unrest continued in Puno, while the government of Mariano Ignacio Prado was besieged by conservative military uprisings, prompting a new civil war that eventually forced him to resign. At this point, Colonel Juan Bustamante decided to join the peasant uprisings. Bustamante was a Puno trader, former congressman, former prefect and subprefect, world traveller and a liberal minded advocate of indigenous rights. Scholars contend that Bustamante joined the uprisings to defend the besieged

38 Ibid., f. 165v. Emphasis in the original. A *parcialidad* was a form of communal organisation in the Andes.
39 Ibid., ff. 165–6. 40 Ibid., f. 16rv. 41 Ibid., ff. 166v–167r.

reformist President Mariano Ignacio Prado in the ongoing civil war. But they also agree on his credentials as an honest and indefatigable intellectual and public servant. Amidst the turmoil of 1867, Bustamante founded the Friends of the Indians Society, an organisation that denounced the exploitation and abuses committed against Andean peasants, usually called *indios*, *or indígenas*, and advocated for their rights. It was the first institution of this kind in Peru. He ultimately met a tragic death as he and his rebel armies were captured by the Prefect's forces in the town of Pusi, in the province of Huancané, in Puno, where seventy one peasants were crammed into one or two small rooms, which were eventually set on fire. Those who did not die asphyxiated were shot to death. Bustamante was forced to take the cadavers out, then he was hung upside down, naked, from a tree in the public square, where he was flogged and decapitated. It was 3 January 1868. A bloody percussion ensued in the rebel towns. Sixty five rebels were taken prisoner and deported to the rainforest of Carabaya by orders of a military commander after receiving 200 lashes; among them were apparently national guards that had joined Bustamante. Several others died as a consequence of the floggings.[42]

The tragic end of Juan Bustamante and the Puno uprising shows that even though the 'law of terror' did not pass in Congress it was enacted in practice. The rebellion was put down by dint of terror and military force, including executions without trial and deportations. There are several important points to take from this story for our historical analysis of terrorism, and the first one has to do with the use of the term itself. 'Terrorism' was used as the most effective term to decry local state agents' violence and *hacendados'* violence against peasants. The three editorials published in *El Nacional* in mid May 1867 under the title 'The Law of Terror The Indians' described it as the 'terrorist project of the three congressmen of the Puno department'. The columns constituted, as did many other similar publications in the press at the time, a call to fight back against the systemic exploitation that indigenous peasants were subject to at the hands of prefects, sub prefects, governors and priests. Nearly a year after the publication of those editorials, and with Bustamante already dead, a member of the Friends of the Indians Society, Antonio Riveros, a supporter of Bustamante, addressed a public letter to the Friends of the Indians Society shortly after having been released from prison, in which he resorted to the term 'terrorist' four times when describing those abuses at length. He argued that the repressive measures of the 'Pacification

42 Numbers and versions of the facts differ somewhat. I have tried to strike a balance between the following: Jacobsen and Domínguez, *Juan Bustamante,* p. 61, and Vásquez, *La rebelión*, pp. 205 9, 326 9 and 363.

Campaign' laid bare a wish to exterminate Indians — a theme that comes back again and again in liberal indictments. Said campaigns, he claimed, 'initiated terrorism against them [the Indians]'; he described, at times with proper names and places, crimes such as forcing them to work without pay, the stealing of their property, including cattle, and a host of other arbitrary aggressions. Like Bustamante and other liberals in the Friends of the Indians Society, Riveros asserted that peasants were being punished for the crime of defending their right as citizens. As he put it: 'Indigenous citizens are chastised . . . only for aspiring to equality before the law, for the right to keep their interests so that they are not ransacked and their persons not sacrificed to extermination.'[43] After the 'pacification', he asserted, 'terrorism has reached its height'.[44]

But what exactly did Riveros, and other pro-indigenous liberals, mean by terrorism? As one can glean from his letter and its larger context, terrorism did not just refer to the violence — physical or otherwise — that state authorities inflicted upon peasants; it referred to the authorities' capacity to coerce them to abide by their will by dint of threats. Terrorism alluded, in other words, to the systematic use of fear against a population that had little way of defending themselves, in order to take advantage of their resources and labour, a veritable labour regime. For example, if a peasant refused to comply with the forced, unpaid labour demanded by a prefect or other authority (say, building fences, ploughing the land or working as porters), or with the low price a mestizo offered to pay for their wool or other products, they could be threatened with floggings, with taking their children away from them and giving them to authorities or politicians, or with taking away their cattle, a practice known as *rebeque*.[45] And because, as already mentioned, peasants had no easy way of defending themselves in court, these threats were effective.

But terrorism was something more; it constituted 'a way of living', in Riveros's keen sociological observation, a habit (*costumbre*) that became entrenched in the absence of laws which corrupt authorities had no interest in enforcing, their preaching to the contrary notwithstanding. 'In these places', he lamented, 'there are no laws but habits acquired *velis nolis* [whether you want it or not], and fighting and pacification are carried out to re-establish them'. He added that in other towns 'the same abuses are starting by dint of terrorism, which has reached its height'.[46] He went on to note that some authorities lived off terrorism because they had lost their own means of

43 Letter from Antonio Riveros to the Secretariat of the Friends of the Indians Society, *El Comercio,* 18 March 1868, cited in Vásquez, *La rebelión,* p. 332.
44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., pp. 332–3. 46 Ibid., p. 332.

subsistence due to their own misdemeanours, in a statement that helps us further understand the pervasiveness of the practice, as well as its economic base.

Importantly, to the threats already described, it is necessary to add one more: the threat of being accused of being 'revolutionaries', 'insurgents', or *caudillos* or ringleaders of the rebellion.[47] Tragically, as Riveros witnessed, 'such a loathsome system' was so entrenched that peasants themselves began using it against other peasants, so that 'if one of them wants treacherously to seize the land from another, he accuses him of being a revolutionary, and the authority, upon hearing this slanderous accusation, humiliates the latter without a trial and without seeking the truth, and in this way the former succeeds'.[48] This means that the terrorist system put in place by authorities and local bosses to the detriment of peasants in the wake of the Puno rebellion had the capacity to contaminate the entire social fabric, a problem that resonates to this day, as the TRC noted of the Sendero Luminoso's terrorism: 'its "peasant war" against the state turned, in many cases, into confrontations between peasants'.[49]

Ultimately, the Puno case reinforces the association of 'terrorism' with state terror and conservative positions, in clear antagonism to liberalism, a pattern that we observed earlier in our analysis of the nineteenth century press. It showcases a radical liberalism with a socially progressive agenda that antagonised local state agents and local bosses' terrorism. Significantly, the authorities who condemned or repressed the rebellion did not call the rebels 'terrorists', even when the so called 'law of terror' accused them of instigat ing violence in the form of a 'war of castes'. They could be called 'savages' and 'uncivilised' (even by liberals), but not terrorists. Words such as 'insur gents', 'revolutionaries', 'rebels' or 'insurrectionists' were more common.

This lexical order was to be flipped in the course of the twentieth century, in tandem with strategies to repress APRA and the Communist Party and organised labour first, and Senderista violence later. Terrorism progressively ceased to be used to describe state terror in Peru (whether identified with monarchic absolutism, and tyrannical rulers, or exploitative provincial authorities colluding with *hacendados*). Rather, it now fell into the hands of the state to determine not only who was to be called terrorist but who was to be tried as terrorist. Terrorism became a question of law. And law's enact ment required a more solid repressive apparatus than that which existed in the nineteenth century. Hence, although in 1867 a proposed law meant to put

47 Ibid., p. 333. 48 Ibid.
49 Comisión, *Informe*, Vol. 8, p. 247. For examples of such cases, see Del Pino, *En nombre*.

down peasant unrest in Puno by dint of blood and fire could not pass in Congress, in 1932 the 'Emergency Law' meant to put down APRA by similar means did pass, even if it was forced into Congress by the Executive power. The methods that the state used to repress the 1866 8 Puno rebellion were used again, but perfected to fight APRA, including martial courts, executions without trial, military force, suspension of constitutional rights. But this time around violence was legitimised by law. Yet, paradoxically, as state terror magnified, the idea of a terrorist state, or terrorist rulers, faded from the language. 'Terrorist' was applied increasingly to revolutionaries or insurgents that fought the state. In the grammar of politics, what started as an adjective became a noun. But the process was neither overnight nor uniform.

This resemanticisation of 'terrorism' from a term associated with the state to a term associated with insurgencies against the state was due to a complex set of factors that started to take shape around the mid twentieth century. Some were international factors, such as the Cold War, McCarthyism, the birth of the Doctrine of National Security, the US training of Latin American militaries; all contributed to reinforcing the technologies to fight insurgencies along with their legitimating discourses. But the basis of it all was the strengthening of state institutions and the state's increasing capacity to claim the monopoly over 'legitimate violence', to use Max Weber's famous formula, that is to say, the state's control of the repressive apparatus. With more power at its disposal, the state was not only more able to dictate legislation instrumental to the repression of armed insurgents (and political opponents), but, along with that, and most importantly, to determine when terrorism was law, and when was it breaking the law. The professionalisation of the armed forces was central to this process. In Peru it started in 1895, in the aftermath of the last civil war of the nineteenth century, when a professional army and military schools were established with the help of a French military mission. This process cemented military institutions, delimiting the bound aries between civilians and militaries that had remained blurry for most of the civil war plagued nineteenth century. During that time, armed insurgencies (with the participation of both the military and civilians) were a routine path to state takeover.[50] But with the coming to power of a series of consecutively elected civilian presidents, a period Jorge Basadre called the 'Aristocratic Republic' (1895 1919), armed insurgencies aiming at state take over had more difficulty in being accepted as routine. This does not mean

50 C. Méndez, 'Militares populistas: Ejército, etnicidad y ciudadanía en el Perú', in P. Sandoval (ed.), *Repensando la subalternidad: Miradas críticas desde/sobre América Latina* (Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2009).

they ceased to exist but that they would have a harder time achieving legitimacy.[51] In this new political context, different terms came to be used for armed insurgents, as their methods were progressively delegitimised; one of them was 'terrorist'.

In this way, 'terrorist', a term suggesting violence, was transferred lexically from state to non state actors, paradoxically, when the state increased its capacity to exert violence. This point is crucial, for, as we shall see, legislation concerning terrorism as a crime was made from its inception with specific political groups in mind, tacitly excluding state actors. What I am trying to suggest, I think, is that the history of terrorism cannot be separated from the history of the power to name it.

The Peruvian APRA Party: Between Ballots and Bullets

Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre founded APRA's first international cell in Paris, in 1926, while in exile. The Peruvian branch of the party, known as PAP (Peruvian APRA Party), was only formed in 1930, in the aftermath of the fall of the corrupt dictatorship of Augusto B. Leguía, the president who had sent a young Haya de la Torre into exile in 1923.[52] Haya was a prominent student activist and one of the leaders in the movements for workers' rights that Leguía repressed. The Peruvian APRA Party (henceforth referred to simply as APRA) had since its inception engaged simultaneously in armed actions and electoral politics but, as historian Iñigo García Bryce rightly noted, historians tend to downplay the former.[53] It is not a glorious side of its history. APRA was responsible for the assassination of a standing Peruvian president, Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro, in April 1933 (following an assassin ation attempt by an APRA militant the previous year), and the assassination

51 C. Méndez, 'La Guerra que no cesa: Guerras civiles, imaginario nacional y la formación del Estado en el Perú', in C. Thibaud et. al. (eds.), *L'Atlantique révolutionnaire* (Bécherel, Les Perséides, 2013), p. 385.

52 I. García Bryce, *Haya de la Torre and the Pursuit of Power in Twentieth Century Peru and Latin America* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2018). See also M. Giesecke, *La insurrección de Trujillo, jueves 7 de julio de 1932* (Lima, Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú, 2010).

53 Except, perhaps, one may add, when it comes to the Trujillo insurrection of 1932, which has been thoroughly studied by Giesecke herself. See García Bryce, *Haya,* and Giesecke, *Insurrección*. See also G. Thorndike, *El año de la barbarie, Perú 1932*, 2nd ed. (Lima, Mosca Azul Editores, 1972). For accounts written by former militants on Aprista insurrections, see V. Villanueva, *La sublevación aprista del 48: Tragedia de un pueblo y un partido* (Lima, Editorial Milla Batres, 1973); A. Villanueva and P. Macera, *Arrogante montonero* (Lima, Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú, 2011).

of the editor of Peru's main newspaper, *El Comercio*, and his wife in 1935. Later on, in 1947, two Aprista militants were convicted for the assassination of the editor of another important newspaper, *La Prensa*.[54] In 1948 APRA, in alliance with navy officers, launched a coup against the democratically elected government of Manuel Bustamante y Rivero, a former ally. Although the coup did not succeed, it helped to precipitate a military dictatorship shortly after.

APRA's terrorism has been recognised but not analysed by historians. One of the few to speak bluntly about it was Peru's major historian of the republic, Jorge Basadre. He defined APRA as a 'typical product of World War I'. After summarising its myriad of influences and the ideological evolution of APRA ranging from Bolshevik communism to German national socialism, to China's Kuo Ming Tang (from whom, Basadre claims, Haya adopted the anti imperialist platform), to the Mexican revolution and its *indigenista* and agrarian agendas he notes:

> At times it showed some terrorist and direct action aspects of rapturous groups of Eastern Europe or the Middle East, such as the Romanian 'Iron Guard' or the Iranian 'Islam Fadayam', a framework that can be explained and in part justified due to the persecutions it was subject to and which the passing of time has erased.[55]

Basadre was right. Whereas, on the one hand, the APRA of the early years did defend the principle of insurrectionary violence, its violent paths were enhanced by the persecution, censorship and brutal repression its militants endured from the party's inception up to the mid 1950s, when it abandoned its revolutionary stance to form a pact with conservative forces. To under stand APRA's early commitment to revolutionary violence we must go to where it all began: APRA's fierce confrontation with the Unión Revolucionaria party (UR) and its founder, Army Colonel Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro. Sánchez Cerro rose to the presidency through a coup that ousted then president Augusto B. Leguía, who by 1930 was ruling as a dictator, his government marred by corruption. Sánchez Cerro's coup proved to be very popular, and he subsequently sought to legitimise it in

54 A recent study by a journalist claims that the men convicted were not likely the authors, but does not discard the involvement of the APRA in the assassination of the editor. E. Rúa, *¿Quién mató a Graña? Crimen político y golpe de estado* (Lima, self published, Industrial Gráfica San Remo, 2018).

55 J. Basadre, *Apertura: Textos sobre temas de historia, educación, cultura y política, escritos entre 1924 y 1977* (Lima, Ediciones Taller, 1978), p. 465, cited in Rénique, *La voluntad encarcelada*, p. 35.

a general election held on 11 October 1931. Sánchez Cerro won by a wide margin, 50.7 per cent over 35.4 per cent to his closest contender, APRA and Haya de la Torre. Significantly, it was the first national election in which direct popular vote was enforced.

But Apristas did not concede defeat. Alleging fraud, they contrived a variety of strategies to take power. Haya explicitly called for violence. The harangues he addressed to his militants from the city of Trujillo, on the northern coast of Peru — APRA's bastion — on the very day of Sánchez Cerro's inauguration, are hard to differentiate from those Abimael Guzmán would address to his own followers almost half a century later: 'More Aprista blood will run. The immortal list of our martyrdom will grow, the terror will begin again its hateful task.'[56] On that very day, Apristas set off bombs in Lima. Days before, APRA had staged a blackout in the same city, leaving it in darkness, not unlike Shining Path would recurrently do in the 1980s.[57] Concurrently, Apristas made plans for a more massive insurrection. On 5 December 1931, they launched a number of coordinated uprisings in various parts of the country, which drew considerable support. Participants included agricultural workers, the middle classes and disgruntled army and police personnel. They seized public offices such as telegraph stations, municipal ities and police headquarters and staged strikes, all of which contributed to destabilising the government.[58] 'In the insurgent towns, half of the popula tion was involved', states historian Margarita Giesecke.[59] But it was the Trujillo insurrection, which broke out on 7 July 1932, that sealed APRA's fate as a proscribed and persecuted party for years to come. That day, a group of a hundred APRA militants, among them agricultural workers, army licentiates, students, port workers and members of the 'special guard' of Haya de la Torre (who was then in jail), led by an APRA cadre known as 'Búfalo Barreto' and the schoolteacher Alfredo Tello, stormed the military headquarters of the city, causing over fifty deaths, most of them soldiers.[60] After their successful capture of the headquarters they proceeded to establish a revolutionary government in the city, while other armed columns took over the nearby sugar estates (a bastion of APRA militancy) and armed movements were sparked in neighbouring provinces and departments. Sánchez Cerro's response was swift and brutal. He deployed a war machinery comprising all three branches of the armed forces: the air force, the army and

56 V. R. Haya de la Torre, *Construyendo el Aprismo*, pp. 172 5, cited in García Bryce, *Haya*, p. 60.
57 García Bryce, *Haya*, p. 60. 58 Giesecke, *Insurrección*, pp. 195 235. 59 Ibid., p. 210.
60 Ibid., pp. 269 72.

the navy. This included 7,046 troops, one warship, two submarines and 'a squadron of seven airplanes and hydroplanes'.[61] The first airborne bombs were dropped in a packed main square of the city where people were celebrating the revolution. Bombs also targeted the headquarters where it all began, a hotel, a theatre, a hospital and the nearby port of Salaverry, while the army surrounded the city.[62] Never before had the republican state deployed such war machinery against its own civilian population. García Bryce notes, 'Trujillo's residents witnessed one of the first civilian bombings in history, predating the more famous Guernica bombing in Spain.'[63] The bombing continued over the following days, showing the government's resolve to exterminate Apristas, or 'Aprocommunists' as they were often called. Those who could escape the city fled to the countryside in the Andean highlands, and continued resisting. Things soured further for Apristas when government forces found the lifeless bodies of a group of military and civil guard (police) officers and soldiers showing horrific signs of violence, including mutilations, in the city's prison.[64] Although APRA never acknowledged the crimes, they gave the government the perfect pretext for doubling down on the repression. Apristas were chased, sometimes taken from their homes, subjected to martial courts, or simply executed without trial, en masse. Approximately 400 men were executed in the pre Columbian archaeological city of Chan Chan, on the outskirts of Trujillo, from 12 July to 16 July, according to Giesecke.[65] In less than a week, the government had recovered control of the city. But Sánchez Cerro did not live long enough to enjoy his bloody success. The following year, a young Aprista militant shot the president to death as he was leaving Lima's hippodrome. A new military dictatorship took power until 1939. After a brief amnesty, in 1933, APRA went underground again.

The bloody events in Trujillo marked decades of Aprista persecution and shaped the party's martyrdom identity in a considerable way. They also inaugurated a long lasting rivalry between APRA and the army. The legal framework that Sánchez Cerro's government created in his war against APRA also had important repercussions. Of particular salience was the 'Emergency Law' tailor made to 'exterminate' APRA, in the words of Giesecke. The Executive drafted the law and submitted it to Congress for

61 García Bryce, *Haya*, p. 64.
62 Giesecke, *Insurrección*, pp. 286 7; García Bryce, *Haya*, p. 64. 63 Ibid.
64 The exact number is disputed. Some say they were 34 or 35, but Margarita Giesecke in her thorough research came up with 52. See Giesecke, *Insurrección*, pp. 294 5.
65 Ibid., p. 311.

debate on 8 January 1932, but no debate took place, as the sessions were interrupted by armed law enforcement agents that had apparently broken into the building. Aprista congressmen protested, to no avail. The minutes of that day's session in Congress show some gaps, and a courageous dissenting legislator's minority opinion attests to the use of force. The Executive promulgated the law the following day.[66] The 'Emergency Law' was almost a verbatim copy of a law that the triumphant Republican government had recently passed in Spain, as Basadre noted. By virtue of this law a permanent 'state of exception' ensued, suspending many constitutional rights. The law was sweeping against all opposition. It decreed the suspension of their posts for state officials who questioned the government; it restricted the right of political and social gatherings, censored opinion, authorised suppression of publications, ordered the requisition of both legally and illegally owned arms; it imposed fines, confinement and even expatriations to opponents. Prior to that, Sánchez Cerro had passed other laws that went even further, such as a 'state of siege' establishing martial courts to try civilians, and dissolving workers' unions controlled by APRA.[67] In short, state repression did not just target violent insurgency and terrorist attacks but also unarmed opposition, and even organised labour, an attitude that the succeeding governments continued to embrace, if not perfect. Ultimately, APRA's fate was sealed in the Constitution of 1933 promulgated by Sánchez Cerro, which outlawed 'political parties of international organisation'.[68]

Yet neither in the legislation nor in other official documents issued under Sánchez Cerro does one find the term 'terrorist'. Apristas were most com monly referred to as 'Aprocommunists', or 'Communists' (even though at that time Peru had its own Communist Party, which competed with APRA but could never rival it in size or strength). One possible factor to explain this absence is the multiplicity of violent rebellions facing the government. APRA was the most visible, but hardly the only armed group conspiring against Sánchez Cerro; many more rebellions occurred, and the overwhelming majority of them came from within the army itself. Allegedly, as many as twenty six military uprisings took place between 1930 and 1933 (including one in 1933 in which APRA colluded with a general to overthrow the president).[69] Indeed, whereas the state's repressive apparatus had grown

66 'Expediente Ley de Emergencia, Iniciado el 29 de diciembre de 1931, Terminado el 9 de enero de 1932, Ley No. 7479', Congreso Constituyente de 1931, 16 ff., ACRP, Lima.
67 *El Peruano*, 26 November 1930. 68 García Bryce, *Haya*, p. 14.
69 Giesecke, *Insurrección*, interview with Víctor Villanueva, former Aprista militant, former army officer and historian.

considerably, the state was still weak, the ruthless deployment of military might in Trujillo notwithstanding. In fact, one may say that that spectacle of war was an expression of fear more than force, as the government was hardly in control of the country.

The discursive transformation of Apristas and Communists into terrorists would take a few more years and bloody events. The saddest part of the story may be APRA's own self destructive path, which is no small thing to say, considering it was the largest, best organised, and most important party in the history of Peru. In 1947, two alleged Apristas assassinated the editor of *La Prensa*, Francisco Graña. Subequently, *La Prensa* and *El Comercio* published successive headlines denouncing terrorists' plots, and the discovery of bombs and explosives, all linked to Apristas. These were not mere inventions, or not all were. APRA did plan serious attacks with explosives and was getting armed.[70] On 3 October 1948, APRA, backed by sectors of the navy, took over the fortress of Peru's main port, Callao, in an attempt to overthrow President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero. But Bustamante was not a dictator, he was a former democratic ally. The insurrection or coup which took some two hundred lives, was quickly put down by the army but it left the already fragile government of Bustamante on the brink of collapse. Bustamante y Rivero, a centre right moderate civilian, had run for president in a broad, momentous coalition that included APRA. Once in power he declared amnesty and repealed the Emergency Law, thus ending at least fifteen years of persecution of Apristas. But APRA was not content merely to play a secondary role. Having won the majority in Congress, it aspired to control or at least have a larger dose of power in the Executive (laws at that time had not allowed APRA to run with its own presidential candidate).[71] The short lived democratic coalition led by Bustamante did not take long in falling apart. Besieged from within, by APRA, which activated both its legal and armed branches, and by members of his own cabinet, its days were numbered. On 27 October 1948, merely three weeks after APRA's failed coup, General Manuel Odría, Bustamante's own Minister of the Interior, backed by the army, deposed Bustamante in a new coup, putting an end to a significant, albeit short lived, democratic experiment. Odría was a fiercely conservative,

70 *El Comercio* (Lima), October, various issues, 1948; *La Prensa* (Lima), October and November, various issues, 1948.

71 For this interpretation, see García Bryce, *Haya*. For a different interpretation, see J. Lossio and E. Candela, *Prensa, conspiraciones y elecciones: El Perú en el ocaso del régimen oligárquico* (Lima, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Insituto Riva Agüero, 2015).

pro US and anti communist army general. His government inaugurated one of the most repressive dictatorships in twentieth century Peru, enthusiastic ally backed by the oligarchy (1948 56). A new era of persecution of Apristas was unleashed, and it was to be the last one, as the party would soon abandon its revolutionary stance to co govern with the most conservative political forces, obstructing the very reforms that it had once called for.[72] And it is under Odría that the discursive making of Apristas, *comunistas* and labour and peasant organisations as *terroristas* started to come into effect.

Odría outlawed APRA and the Communist Party, and on 1 July 1949 he promulgated the 'Law of Internal Security of the Republic', which sought to punish all forms of 'sociopolitical crime' including 'terrorist acts'. This was, in all likelihood, the first time that the term 'terrorist' was imprinted into law, though still as an adjective. Its reach was enormously wide, from 'propagating false news' to 'adhering to foreign doctrines' to attacking military and government person nel, public buildings and facilities, to fomenting illegal strikes and 'unrest in unions, workplaces or schools'. Sentences ranged from fines to expatriation and the death penalty.[73] According to this law, in stark resemblance to Sanchez Cerro's legislation, defendants would be tried in martial courts and summary trials, bypassing the judicial system and expanding the role of the police, which led to a host of arbitrary actions. Even though the law was abolished at the end of Odría's term, military jurisdiction did not cease to be expanded, even under constitutional regimes, in the apt analysis of jurist Diego García Sayán.[74]

In a public speech given a few weeks after the passing of the 'Law of Internal Security of the Republic', Odría evoked again the legal figure of terrorism, this time as a noun. Appealing to the Geneva Convention, he defined terrorism as a 'crime against democracy', equivalent to genocide. His strange logic (don't forget he was a dictator) was intent on persuading the international community not to give political asylum to Haya and other Apristas.[75] Odría's targeting of Apristas and Communists as terrorists was

72 An exception was the first term of Alan García (1985 90), the first and only Aprista to make it to the presidency. He adopted a centre left discourse, but his government, marred by corruption, brought the country to one of its worst social and economic crises.

73 'Decreto Ley 11049', 1 July 1949, Archivo Digital de Legislación del Perú (ADLP), www .leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/Leyes/11049.pdf.

74 D. García Sayán, 'Perú: Estados de excepción y régimen jurídico', paper presented at the seminar 'Regímenes de Excepión en los países de la region andina' (Lima, 1986), pp. 6 10.

75 'Mensaje a la nación del presidente del Perú, general Manuel A. Odría Amoretti', 27 July 1949, p. 5, ADLP, www.congreso.gob.pe/Docs/participacion/museo/congreso/files/mensajes/1941 1960/files/mensaje 1949.pdf.

significant because it was profoundly political. It was not just about or not even principally about fighting violent crimes so much as curbing the very possibility of social and political change, as the text of the Law of Internal Security suggests. Timing is important here. Odría's rule coincided with the Cold War and post Second World War climate, when the US backed dictatorships that committed themselves to fighting (real or imagined) communists. Not coincidentally, with Odría the army achieved greater political clout. All this happened within the framework of the Doctrine of National Security, when fighting internal enemies and 'subversives' reached new levels of sophistication.

Later on, the military governments of 1968–80 created another new legal figure, 'the state of emergency', which was incorporated into the Constitution of 1979 (enforced in 1980) thus 'constitutionalising' the states of exception, which entailed suspending a great range of constitutional rights, to cite Garcia Sayán again. At this point, on 17 May 1980, the PCP SL unleashed its violent insurgency and the constitutional government of Belaúnde, who came to power shortly after, through the first presidential elections held after twelve years of military dictatorship, promulgated the first 'antiterrorist' law in 1981, explicitly to fight the PCP SL. Shortly after, he expanded military jurisdiction over civilians even further by abdicating democratic authority and delegating all powers to 'politico-military commands' in the zones declared to be in a 'state of emergency', charging them with the responsibility of fighting the PCP SL and the 'control of internal order' more broadly. Thus, ironically, whereas the 'politico-military commands' were established unconstitutionally, according to García Sayán during the military dictatorship of 1968–80, it was Belaúnde's democratically elected government who gave them constitutional legality and a full range of powers. This situation further disempowered civilian authorities such as judges, state attorneys and prosecutors in the zone declared to be in emergency, as their jurisdiction was taken over by military personnel.[76] The 'dirty war' was unleashed, and with it tens of thousands of people were killed in the name of the nation, mostly poor, peasant and illiterate, without having been subject to any hearings, other than summary trials with either the armed forces or the PCP SL, if at all.

The coup of Alberto Fujimori on 5 April 1992 introduced an even more expansive antiterrorist legislation that severely curtailed the rights of defendants in the processes of detention, interrogation and trial by establishing that

76 García Sayán, 'Perú', 13.

the identity of the magistrates remain secret (the famous 'faceless judges', inspired by Italy and Colombia); by granting the National Police free rein to 'intervene without any restrictions' in the investigation process;[77] and by allowing the armed forces, yet again, to try civilians accused of terrorism according to military law.[78] As a consequence, thousands of innocent people were convicted.

With the return of democracy in the 2000s, some of the most controversial articles of Fujimori's 1992 law, such as the martial courts to try civilians and the faceless judges, have since been nullified, but his 'antiterrorism' legislation is otherwise in force and continues to be expanded, more recently to restrict the rights of citizens who have completed their sentences and have been released from prison.[79] Importantly, as jurist Carlos Rivera points out, if there is a constant in the antiterrorist legislation since 1981 it is 'the absence of a clear, precise and concrete definition of what act can be considered as terrorism', as a consequence of which, Rivera goes on, 'it is very easy to encompass any fact or act against people or property as terrorism'.[80] This point is crucial, with the caveat that this fuzziness does not start in 1981 but in 1949, when Odría first sought to sanction terrorist acts as a special type of crime 'against the organisation and internal peace of the republic'.[81] So, rather than an aleatory problem, this very fuzziness may be at the heart of what makes conceptualising terrorism as a distinctive crime such a powerful political weapon. The fuzzier the definition, the easier it is to use it publicly to disqualify a person or an act.

It should not come as a surprise that dictatorships such as those of Odría and Fujimori would indulge in such legislation. But the fact that the democratically elected, constitutional governments that have ruled Peru since 2000 have kept such an open definition of terrorism should be a matter of concern. As the TRC reflected, 'the antiterrorist legislation has generated a culture of emergency and a practice of the exception as the rule' that puts the 'reason of

77 Decreto Ley No. 25475, 5 May 1992, Article 12, ADLP, www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/Leyes/25475.pdf.

78 Decreto Ley No. 25659, 12 August 1992, ADLP, www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/Leyes/25659.pdf.

79 Ley No. 30794, 18 June 2018, ADLP. The title of this law is telling: 'Law that establishes as a requirement to provide services in the public sector not to have sentence for terrorism, apology of terrorism and other crimes'.

80 C. Rivera Paz, 'Ley penal, terrorismo y Estado de derecho', *Quehachacer* 167 (July August 2007), p. 2.

81 After listing a wide range of acts that could qualify as such (some of which we described above), a clause adds that 'those who undertake any terrorist act in a way that has not been foreseen by the aforementioned dispositions' also commit such a crime. Decreto Ley 11049, Chapter II, paragraph g.

state' above juridical security.[82] With this in mind, and considering the Peruvian state record in human rights violations (not by random chance is former president Alberto Fujimori serving a prison sentence for his responsi bility in a number of such crimes), one wonders why the concept 'terrorism of state' never gained acceptance in Peru, as it did, for instance, in Argentina, Brazil or Chile after their 'dirty wars'. One possible explanation (in addition to the fact that the PCP SL's distinctively cruel methods have drawn most of the attention to them) may have to do with the fact that, for most of the duration of the conflict, Peru was ruled by democratically elected, constitu tional regimes (1980 92), not dictatorships like those countries, thus demand ing more subtle explanations. Yet, it is precisely under those regimes that most human rights violations at the hands of the state were committed, as the TRC concluded.[83]

Final Thoughts

In his book *Persona*, poet and historian José Carlos Agüero, winner of Peru's National Literature Prize, questioned the widespread tendency in Peru to refer to the period of the PCP SL insurgency as 'the time of terrorism'. Among other things, Agüero protested the singular. He did not mean to deny Sendero's terrorism as much as vindicate the right of, among others, his parents, who were both militants of the PCP SL, to be remembered as something other than terrorists, perhaps as human beings. Most importantly, Agüero intimated that singularising terrorism in Sendero Luminoso led to the forgetting of the terror of the state that killed both his parents without a trial, among thousands of other Peruvians, most of them poor peasants, not Senderistas.

Agüero's reflections are in tune with the 'pluralistic' approach to terrorism that I have proposed in these pages. As we have seen, terrorism in Peru derived from multiple sources and existed in different times, almost as a constant in its national history. Why, then, reduce its analyt ical scope to the recent past and a single terrorist entity? Why use the term only according to the state prescription, especially knowing that the state's historical trajectory has been anything but democratic, even under elected democratic regimes? And knowing, moreover, that 'terror ist' has been deployed not only for juridical reasons but also political ones, to curb and crush social protest, organised labour and even discussion

82 Cited in Rivera Paz, 'Ley penal', p. 8. 83 Comisión, *Informe*, Vol. 1, p. 171.

about social change? Why, then, be surprised that after decades of 'ruling by abandonment' — to borrow Jaymie Patricia Heilman's expression — something other than a terrorist political organisation would come to fashion itself as the solution?

And yet, this is only part of the story. For, as responsible as the state may be for abandoning its citizens to the forces of terror — its own, and those of self-proclaimed twentieth-century revolutionaries — the state is made of people, who are in turn part of a society where it all converges or, rather, where it all springs from. So, a 'pluralistic' approach does not simply entail recognising the different sources of terrorism but also patterns. Along with authoritarian patterns that traverse the terroristic practices of state agents, political parties and *hacendados* that we have analysed in the preceding pages, there is also a pattern of racialised social hierarchies that have made some sectors of the society more likely to be on the receiving end of the various terrorist violences. This brings us back to De la Cadena's notion of 'silent racism', and Degregori's hypothesis that Sendero's 'racist conceptions and sense of superiority with regards to indigenous peoples'[84] reproduced those of the exploitative *mistis* they replaced in the rural highlands of Ayacucho. Nevertheless, as we have seen in our analysis of the terrorist labour regime that was at that basis of the wool export boom in Puno in the 1860s, these racialised patterns of violence have deeper roots and other geographies. But there is more.

We cannot conclude without bringing up the case of another, yet more ominous, terrorist labour regime that was put in place in Peru's northern Amazon region of Putumayo, bordering Colombia, half a century later, to extract rubber for export, which reached a genocidal scale. In the span of ten years, a population of 50,000 women, men and children was reduced to 7,000 or 10,000. They were killed by starvation, executions or floggings to death, among other forms of torture, for failing to fulfil their rubber quotas.[85] Even though this case became internationally well known and was denounced by the press in Peru, nothing stopped the terrorist genocide, and nobody was punished, because, according to Federica Barclay, everyone, from politicians in Lima to merchants and workers in Iquitos (the largest city in the Peruvian Amazon), drew some benefit, in one way

84 Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 248.

85 *Libro Azul Británico: Informes de Roger Casement y otras cartas sobre las atrocidades en el Putumayo*, translated from English by L. E. Belaunde (Lima, Centro Amazónico de Antropología y Aplicación Práctica, 2012 [1912]), p. 300.

or another, from the economic prosperity of the rubber boom. Everybody, except those who produced the wealth.[86] Closer to the century's end, the PCP SL subjected other indigenous groups in the Amazon to a similar regime of terror. They forced Ashaninkas to join their armies or do the domestic chores for their armies in concentration camps of sorts. They executed many of their leaders and threatened to kill those who opposed them. The TRC estimates that out of a population of 50,000 Ashaninkas, 10,000 were forcibly displaced, about 6,000 died, and a total of thirty to forty communities 'disappeared'.[87] The TRC wrote bluntly about the PCP SL's genocidal policies.[88] A common practice in the various terrorist regimes subjugating populations deemed *indígenas* was the practice of taking children away from their parents, whether to be servants, as in Puno in the 1860s, to force them to extract rubber, as in the Putumayo in the 1910s, or to indoctrinate them as Communist soldiers and teach them how to kill, as in the Andes and Amazon with the Shining Path.

These histories of terrorism are part of a whole and should be understood as a whole. The history of this whole is not taught in schools, but, as W. E. B. Dubois said about lynching in the US, the only way to stop violence is by making it known. We can take inspiration, perhaps, from those who already started that job: from Juan Bustamante, Antonio Riveros and other liberals in the 1860s; from those who put together the nine volumes of the TRC Report in the early 2000s, to mention only the ones I have cited most in this essay. But I know there are many more. In this learning process, let us not forget that terrorism has a history, which should not be detached from the history of terrorism, the term. It is the awareness of this history that will free us from reproducing the state's repressive gaze and to embrace our citizenship.

Further Reading

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87 Comisión, *Informe*, Vol. 5, p. 62. 88 Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 248.

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