"To 'P' or Not to 'P'?": Marking the Territory Between Pacific Islander and Asian American Studies

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I stole this title from a great Pinoy joke told to me by Gus Espiritu. Its humor comes from the particularities of Filipino rearticulation of Shakespeare’s famous question (the joke also resonates among Carolinian speakers from Micronesia, and perhaps among many other Austronesian-based Pacific Island language speakers), but I also want to suggest that its stronger force likewise comes from a kind of lightness of being that self-mockery can make of ontological fundamentalism.

Self-mockery is a serious weapon of cultural resilience and resistance—and as someone waiting in line, somewhat impatiently, I want to re-aim the line of “P’s” trajectory in the direction of another culturally and historically specific mode of becoming. The converted question, “To P or not to P?” becomes, then, my way of marking the present territory, a slippery, even sticky sea of historical, political, and cultural determinations that exists between Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in a more turbulent ocean of United States imperialism and colonialism. Choppy too, of course, is the no less innocent world of institutionalized study of these struggles, no matter how noble the motives may be.

In this essay, I want to address the tensions raised by the “P Question” in relation to Asian American Studies from the vantage point of one who has been located in Pacific Studies as viewed from the Islands, particularly from Guam in Micronesia, where I was born and raised, and where I taught in the 1990s. But, I was also trained at the University of
Hawai‘i, and though I did my doctorate in California, Hawai‘i—through tremors that rocked the field of Pacific Studies as it intersected and was led by scholars housed at the UH Center for Pacific Islands Studies (CPIS), the East West Center, and especially Kanaka Maoli scholars at the Center for Hawaiian Studies—continues to be generative in and of my own intellectual, political, and scholarly development. A robust and busy crossroad as well as homeland, Hawai‘i draws up and projects out theoretical, cultural, and political movements from across the Pacific Island region and beyond the seas to make it a particularly fruitful location for intellectual and political production, especially for the kind that pays specific attention to the nuances of travel and mobility in relation to the staunch determinations over land that anchor Indigenous struggles. But lest my attempts at nuance fail, let me make one thing absolutely clear: for whatever productive dialogues there may be between Pacific Islander Studies and Asian American Studies, under no circumstance should Pacific Islanders, or Pacific Islands Studies, be subsumed under the institutional framework of Asian American history and experiences. Though I’m sure nobody wishes this to be the case, the question of just how Pacific Islander and Asian American Studies are articulated together will always raise the specter of unequal power relations.

At the same time, however, I think it is vital, in order to maintain the integrity of our respective struggles and projects, that our resolve to keep the differences clear and equal not reify in any way any of the categories in question. To avert this unwanted outcome, I want to highlight the various sites or locales from which we practice our respective crafts. These different, differential, and differentiating sites of and for the situatedness of knowledge and politics, I believe, not only make a world of difference in our work, but are also themselves as much constituted by as they help constitute that work. Thus, I want to emphasize at the outset that the critiques of Asian American and Pacific Islander Studies look very different from within the shores of the various Pacific Islands. But, I also want to assert that an Asian American inquiry must strive to comprehend the kinds of historical and political struggles that Native Pacific Scholars are trying to articulate, just as Native Pacific Scholars need to understand the specificities of Asian histories as they are bound up with the American
imperial project among and amidst Native Pacific Islanders in the continent and in the Islands.³

**The Substance of “P”**

From the vantage points of where and how I come, the substance of “P”—the contested and contesting sign in question—is the fluidic yet steadfast political and cultural histories of Pacific Islanders as Indigenous people in the Islands and in the continental United States. But, the ground covered by “P” also includes Islands and Islanders not formally under United States rule, as well as Islands and Islanders under U.S. rule who continue to live lives that are not entirely subsumed under U.S. hegemony. For example, one cannot understand the social and political experiences of American Samoans (from the eastern part of the Samoan archipelago, that has been under U.S. rule for over a century) without comprehending their residual and formative relations with those from the western islands (formerly known as “Western Samoa” but now called “Samoa”), who have never been under formal U.S. rule. Moreover, like their more distant cousins from the Kingdom of Tonga, another Island group that has never been under U.S. political control, there are many “Western” Samoans in the Polynesian Diaspora in the continental United States. The “P” in this case is at once inside, outside, and more importantly *in transit* in and out of, the United States and the Islands. This is also the case with other Pacific Islanders, such as Chamorros from Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, or the Kanaka Maoli from Hawai’i, whose islands are officially classified as “American” (Guam is an “Unincorporated Territory of the United States”; the Northern Marianas are a “Commonwealth of the United States”; and Hawai’i is the “Fiftieth State.”). Though all three are formally associated, in varying degrees, with that republic called the United States of America, the Indigenous societies of each also precede and even exceed American political and cultural conventions.⁴

This “P” stands, then, for the need for a framework that can flex nationally, internationally, transnationally, sub-nationally, supra-nationally, and even extra- and post-nationally, and in such a way as to accommodate the many “nations” involved (namely, the United States, Tonga, Hawai’i, The Marianas or *y Nacion Chamoru* (as Chamorro nationalists
call it), and “Samoa” (of which “there is only one,” according to my colleague, Damon Salesa). We might even mention Aotearoa/New Zealand in this list (which is not meant to be exhaustive, of course), insofar as it constitutes an important scape/circuit that triangulates with the United States and the aforementioned (Polynesian) Islands of Samoa and Tonga in the social, cultural, and political experiences of their Diasporic Natives. Let me be clear, by the way, that in naming these particular groups I do not mean to say that they are the only Pacific Islanders on the continent, and I especially do not want to further the tendency to view all Pacific Islanders under the category of “Polynesia.”

Hardly natural, certainly not innocent, the term “Pacific Islanders” has become the accepted appellation for the Indigenous people from the Pacific “basin,” as opposed to the “Asia-Pacific Rim.” Arif Dirlik is right in cautioning us about the term’s (“Asia-Pacific”) overdeterminations in mutual histories of Oriental and Occidental colonial desires and anxieties, recharged by late global capital. Likewise, in Pacific Islands Studies—whose composite and sometimes contradictory “fields” I will describe shortly—and in the Pacific Islander communities in the United States, there has long been a conscious effort to demarcate Pacific Islanders and Islands from the generic and totalizing “Asia-Pacific” category. This is precisely why Pacific Islanders “qualify the ‘P’ with the I,” as J. Kehaulani Kauanui has expressed it in one form or another over the past decade. You should also know that there is a strong current in Pacific Island Studies, exemplified and embodied in the work of the Tongan post-academic (or is it the post-Tongan, post-academic?) Epeli Hau’ofa, and Teresia Teaiwa (another Pacific Native writer whose works likewise burst all available genres) to replace the term “Pacific” with “Oceania.” For these two, at least, the term “Oceania” best captures a seafaring heritage that wields the potential to disrupt the insularity and essentialisms attached to the term “Pacific” without, as Teresia has theorized, “losing the Native” altogether.

But for now, I want to suggest that discussions about Pacific Islander histories, placed alongside an Asian American frame, require an understanding of the composite fields of Pacific Studies and Pacific History as they are shaped by tensions arising from Native struggles for self-deter-
mination and decolonization, and by the condition of flux in academic theorization and practice. To stage such tensions, including those that obtain in the question of institutional relations between Asian American and Pacific Islander Studies in and for the continent and the Islands, I rely on a genealogy of struggle and study, as institutionalized in the academic fields of Pacific Studies and Pacific History and my coming of age in them through graduate training, teaching, and research in Guam, Hawai‘i, California, and, of late, Michigan. This genealogy offers just one illustration, one vantage point, that features central themes in Pacific Islander struggles in the United States, struggles which continue both to feed off and to inform experiences and relations in the Islands, which in turn continue to shape Islander realities inside and outside the fold of the “American” experience (and I emphasize the quotation marks around the term, “American”). If there is a commonality between Pacific and Asian American histories, without the big “H’s,” it is this force-field called “America,” or, more precisely, the various “Americas” that are located both on the continent and on the various islands. These Americas, I should like to suggest, are themselves charged with their own forms of cultural and historical exceptionalisms, whether in the Asian American or the Pacific Islander American (re)articulations or inflections. Consider, alone, Guam’s official slogan: “Where America’s Day Begins!”

Tun Pedro “Pedang” Cruz, in a documentary about Chamorro experiences during the Japanese Occupation of Guam, captures the intensity of Chamorro political and cultural investment in America. Trembling with emotion, a tearful Cruz clenches his fist and jaws: “To this day, when I see that American Flag ... I tell you, I would rather live in Hell under America than live in Heaven under any other country.” To be sure, this sentiment does not exhaust the range of Chamorro sentiments towards the United States, whether during or after the Japanese Occupation, but it does signify, nonetheless, an America that has in fact been the privileged locus of Native Chamorro investment in ways that fortify American claims on the world.

Thus, a second critical point for considering both Asian American and Pacific Islander (in this case, Pacific Islander American) histories, still with the little “h’s,” would be the need to critically interrogate what
(and where) we mean by invoking the term, “America.” For me, the promise in a dialogue between Asian American and Pacific Islander histories is precisely in their shared potential to destabilize prevailing ideas of United States Culture and History—with the “Big C” and the “Big H” as well as those other “Cs” and “Hs” that come from all those other “Ps” that have historically articulated their political realities and identities in relation to America.

For example, though I am a newcomer to the study of Asian American history in the continental United States, I have long lived and grappled with the entangled histories of Asians and Pacific Islanders and versions of America as played out in the islands, particularly those of Filipino and Filipino American articulations in the “American” Pacific Islands of Guam and Hawai‘i. There are Asians in the islands, and not just in Hawai‘i, as canonical Asian American history texts seem to believe. In the U.S.-controlled islands, there are Asians because they want to come to “America” and/or because they are “pulled” to it for any number of structural reasons. Sometimes, to complicate the matter, Asians are pulled into the islands by Native elite agents eager to augment or fortify their economic or political interests, though clearly these efforts have not been without tremendous anxiety, such as the occasional outcry by Chamorro or Palauan political and economic leaders over the influx of Asian and Micronesian immigrants, whose presence, again, is partly accounted for by the legislated need for available (“cheap?”) labor for the islands’ economic and social growth.

Moreover, in the Pacific Islands, whether or not they are part of the United States, there are competing versions of what it means to be a Native Pacific Islander, as well as what it means to be a Pacific Islander American, in addition to the competing versions of what America is all about. In the Islands (“we do it island-style,” as a pop tune from Hawai‘i goes), these versions also are consistently elided by “mainland” versions. Is it really possible to continue our work as if “mainland” versions were normative and still not replicate the colonial and imperial perspectives that are problematic to begin with, and which constitute a big part of what the critical Asian American project is all about? How might we proceed conceptually and politically without either privileging any one particular geo-
graphic or temporal and cultural locale and do so without losing, at the same time, the important particularities and specificities that make up our respective histories, without essentializing any of them?

Let me transpose this problematic in terms more familiar to practitioners of Asian American Studies than to practitioners of Pacific Studies: already institutionalized in various forms, in various universities and colleges in the U.S. Midwest, is an emergent “East of California” agenda, whose motive is to emphasize the geographic and discursive diversity of the field and movement, and to counter what some have called the West Coast hegemony (but oh, how I’ve often longed for the West Coast hegemony in the past four years at the University of Michigan). Indeed, it is vitally important to discern the specificities of Asian American—and Pacific Islander—experiences in places like the U.S. Heartland.

My colleague, Amy Ku’uleialoha Stillman, likewise has begun to inventory the specific role that places like Cleveland, Ohio played in the national production and international dissemination of “Hawaiian” Sheet Music, as well as the Midwest’s significance in the production of Tiki Culture.12 Similarly, in the Asian/Pacific Islander American Studies Program at the University of Michigan’s Program in American Culture, we have begun to identify other specific connections between the U.S. Midwest region and Oceania.13 Yet despite, or perhaps as a way to strengthen, my new institutional location in the U.S. Heartland, I find myself calling for something like a West of California criticism—and even a West of Hawai’i, or elsewhere from Polynesia, criticism. On the other hand, since, at least from Oceania, California is east (making East of California our Far East), I could continue this reorientation to argue for displacing California as the privileged term/space/historical agent with the more fluidic Oceania and privilege, instead, something like an East and/or West of Oceania agenda. Perhaps we should rename AAAS “Oceanic Studies,” and perhaps do so in order to better equip ourselves to supplement the “Atlantic Studies” initiatives that seem, at least to me, to be radically reimagining the space of American Studies through their own racial and cultural rereadings.14

I’m not arguing for this move, of course, for there are just way too many problems with it, the least of which, for some of you, would be the
complete subsuming under an entirely foreign agenda of the various and varied stakes that presently sit under the sign of Asian American Studies. Moreover, as Chris Connery reminds us, the Oceanic imaginary isn’t innocent either. Though I write in jest, I am dead serious about my belief in an Oceanic critique’s potential to disrupt the categories under question without necessarily losing their political potential. Indeed, more than the question of being firm in our categories is the question of how we move, and how we are moved by, these categories. This is my way of keeping the tension between drawing our politics from our identities and drawing our identities from our politics, as George Lipsitz reminds us to do.

**STUDYING “P”; “P” HISTORY**

I come into this discussion from a Pacific Islands-based brand of Pacific Studies, despite, or especially more so since, my recent move to the U.S. Midwest. Pacific Studies as an academic occupation has a long and complex history, but still can be understood in the general terms of European and American discovery and conquest of the region and as materiality for European and American self-fashioning. I’m referring here only to the West, whereas a fuller story would also include “Asian” explorations and incursions—such as state-brokered projects like Japan’s Nanyo in Micronesia between World War I and II; or its earlier negotiations with Hawai‘i sugar barons around cheap labor; or the Philippine Government’s own version that helped provide labor for the massive U.S. postwar military build-up of Guam; or a critical accounting of Asian settler complicity in the neocolonization of the islands. These are only the starting points.

Still, the systematic study of the Pacific for much of our purposes is derived from and structured by European American strategic interests in the region. Essentially orientalist, Pacific Studies in the last two decades also has been shaken up by assaults from two fronts: Native struggles for self-determination and decolonization, and the epistemological upheaval in academe along the lines of race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, disciplinariness, colonialism, and postcoloniality. The critique of postcoloniality is another entry point for a discussion, but one which I believe must be negotiated very carefully, considering the ways that it has
been invoked in the Islands to reassert academic imperial authority, viz the contested character of the historical struggles for Native sovereignty and/or self-determination.20

The history of the field of Pacific History in the Pacific region is instructive as well.21 Its formal development is linked somewhat romantically to Professor James Davidson of Australia National University (ANU), who is sometimes called the “Father” of Pacific History, and who sat as its first Chair at ANU’s School of Asia and Pacific Studies.22 The Pacific wing at ANU also founded and still publishes the *Journal of Pacific History*, the field’s flagship journal, and it hosts the annual Pacific History Workshop.

The political genealogy of the formal study of Pacific History goes like this: in the late 1950s, Professor Davidson and like-minded colleagues began to urge historians to shift their foci of attention on the Pacific from European and American imperial and colonial concerns, and become island-centered or oriented. Until then, Pacific History was exclusively about the successes or failures of European American incursions into the region. In that vein, the Pacific was *tabula-rasa*, with history proper beginning in 1521, and its principle subject and drama was European and American political and cultural self-replication. If Islanders ever figured into the drama, it was on terms fatal.23

In short, the agenda for a Pacific Island-oriented history and historiography would give way to calls for Pacific-Islander orientations. At a time when fashionable high academic theorizing turned to structure, discourse, and post-structure—and the end of the subject—Pacific historiography championed Islander agency.24 Of course, these nationalist struggles were also contemporaneous with the Civil Rights Movement and the highly politicized emergence of Ethnic and Women’s Studies in the U.S., thereby providing a historical and social moment of solidarity. The political trajectory of long-time Chamorro rights activist, scholar, and now statesman, Robert Underwood, was partially inflected by the Civil Rights Movement, and especially by a nascent Chicano movement in California, just as his leadership would influence pan-ethnic coalitions and caucuses of Asian Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans through his post as a U.S. Congressman in the 1990s, especially as a ranking member of the powerful House Armed Services Committee.25
But, it was not merely coincidental that Pacific History as a field that privileged Islander agency emerged contemporaneously with formal decolonization in the Pacific Island region. First to gain political independence, for instance, was “Western Samoa” in 1962. It is also no mere coincidence that Davidson, canonized Father of Pacific History, was also a Samoan “specialist” who had very particular ideas about how the new nation should look, given the history he could help imagine.26

Pacific Historiography reflected a conscious effort to keep apace with decolonization and Indigenous intellectuals’ and activists’ calls to discard European American narratives in favor of Native and nation agency. Indeed, local and regional Native struggles for decolonization played no small role in challenging, if not altering, the terms by which non-Native academics studied the region and its peoples. Anthropologists, for example, now had to deal with metropolitan-educated leaders who were now placing conditions on field research. But specialists, too, if they were savvy, could parlay knowledge into service and become advisors and consultants. In Guam, for example, a cottage industry has emerged around history: a government commission revises public school history textbooks along more politically-correct perspectives that, while critically engaging foreign perspectives in anticolonial mode, remain remarkably silent about local, Native-ordered gendered and class hegemonies. Alongside government-sponsored projects, retired ex-patriot educators write general history text and coffee-table books, some whose superficial nods to Islander agency seem more interested in riding the wave of Native nationalism to the bank with nice royalties in hand than in trying to openly contend with, or even honor, that dimension of the history.27

In addition to exercising national and geographic flexibilities, we need to keep in mind the productive tensions between the history of disciplines and academic institutional processes and imperatives on the one hand, and Indigenously-oriented political and cultural struggles on the other. Quite frankly, I’m already worried that the specific socio-historical and institutional trajectories shaping the study of Asian American history in the United States will marginalize those aspects of Islander history that are ferociously local and Indigenously-ordered, and not the other way around. I am certainly not alone in that worry, and I will return shortly to these concerns.
By the 1970s and ‘80s (it is often said, as if it were a natural occurrence), the tide of political decolonization had rolled northward to Micronesia, producing new, quasi-independent nations out of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The TTPI, as it was called, was part of the United Nations trusteeship system through which the U.S. was granted fiduciary responsibilities over the island region that, immediately prior this point, had been under the Japanese Mandate system, and before that under German and Spanish rule. U.S. responsibilities and obligations were to facilitate social, economic, and political development, including decolonization. But, the new microstates were Native-driven, and were achieved against the grain so to speak, for the U.S. was more obsessed with exercising its strategic interests—including nuclear testing—than with permitting such acts of self-determination. In response to such clamoring, the U.S. pumped millions of dollars into the coffers of the new administrations (out of a mix of guilt and outright desire to buy favor). And yet, the overall effect was that even by the 1970s Micronesians (excluding Chamorros in Guam and the Northern Marianas) were living at a standard below pre-war levels under the Japanese Mandate. Another byproduct of the “compacts of free association” with the United States, for citizens of these so-called “Freely Associated States” (namely, The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), The Republic of Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands), was unrestricted travel to and residency in the United States, meaning, for the most part, Hawai’i and Guam but also the U.S. West Coast. Thus, as I was polishing this essay on my laptop in a gym in Greenville, North Carolina—where I was spending the Winter-Spring break—I sat within view of two “Native” Greenville County Recreation employees, sisters born and raised here, whose parents had moved to these parts from their home atoll of Pulap in the Central Carolines, just after the creation of the FSM through the signing of its Compact of Free Association with the U.S. in the late 1980s. In Guam, Native Chamorros had also revived a political movement for greater autonomy, but in the 1970s and especially by the 1980s it would become articulated in terms of Native self-determination and sovereignty.

My political and cultural identity as a Pohnpeian and Filipino scholar has been and continues to be shaped profoundly by the contingencies of birth and upbringing in Guam, despite my recent relocation to Michigan.
I continue to grow—and sometimes regress—at a time of tremendous flux. By the time I was in high school in the mid-1970s, Chamorros had already begun to question in print the wisdom of their loyalty; the appropriateness of their gratitude to the U.S. for “liberating” them from the Japanese; and the colonial structure of local governance and U.S. citizenship. In the 1960s and ’70s, and wildly in the ’80s, Guam had undergone rapid changes in its physical, social, and cultural terrain. Between massive military buildup, the implementation of a cash economy, and the emergence of an Asian tourist industry (that rivals Waikiki in attracting Japanese white—but especially blue-collar-workers as well as hormonally-angered young adults and their older counterparts, the honeymooners), Guam experienced spectacular growth made possible by Filipino and other Asian H2 and Micronesian “non-quota” labor. The Island’s later linkage—positively and negatively—to the Southeast Asian economy via Taiwanese and Korean capital also played no small role in its political and cultural redevelopment. When in 1962 the U.S. lifted its Security Clearance requirements for travel in and out of the Island, Guam also became “Guam U.S.A.”—gateway to America for Asian and other immigrants looking for a piece of the mythical pie, or at least an American passport and U.S. citizenship.

By 1980 the Chamorros for the first time in history had fallen to under 50% of the total population of the Island, from about 95% before World War II. Concomitantly, Chamorros in the Diaspora—following military bases in Hawai‘i and the U.S. West Coast—began to exceed the number who remained at home. A minority in their own homeland for the first time in history, Chamorros began to push for Native self-determination. Guam, like Hawai‘i, had become a new multicultural place (there is an older “multiethnic” history), and Chamorros did not appreciate being reduced to one among a group of “ethnic” minorities. Moreover, non-Chamorro residents were being seen increasingly as accomplices and collaborators for U.S. colonialism. And if self-determination for Guam was to be genuine, it had to be reserved exclusively for the Indigenous Chamorros. Chamorros were also being compared to, and began to network with, Native Americans and other Indigenous peoples in the Pacific and around the world. In an article published in *Amerasia* in 1979, Katherine B. Aguon, the first Chamorro woman to earn a doctoral de-
gree, wrote, “The Chamorro shares with other Indigenous peoples the legacy of having come under domination for no other reason than having been born on a valuable piece of real estate. They have first rights to land, water and air. Sovereignty inheres in them by their very existence.”38 This was, and still is, the view of Native Chamorro nationalists, and this is the milieu that continues to shape my intellectual and scholarly production, particularly as I find myself located farther and farther away from the Islands.

As one whose homelands were elsewhere, but whose very presence in Guam owed quite clearly to its status as a U.S. colony,39 these views began to ring true to me. When I transferred to the University of Hawai‘i in 1979, it wasn’t hard to tune in to the Native Hawaiian struggle, then most visible in skirmishes between the State of Hawaii and Hawaiian “squatters”—as the state and the media depicted them—over so-called “public lands.” My own coming of age was also shaped, albeit from a distance, by the Protect Kaho‘olawe Ohana’s (PKO) campaign to stop the bombing of that Island.40

As a student in the University of Hawai‘i Political Science Department, I quickly learned about a lineage of Micronesian and Filipino activists and rebels who had passed through Manoa and the department, and who had actively challenged U.S. imperialism in the Pacific and the Far East.41 I was inflamed by an anticolonial sentiment that was anchored firmly by a perspective that championed Native self-determination in all things. My interest in decolonization and in the revival of Native traditions and practices has furnished me with lessons and facts of Islander history and knowledge impossible to gain in Western classrooms and textbooks, and which has sharpened my critical sensibilities. I still believe in this cause, including the need for its engagement on the “academic,” especially on the theoretical, front, although I also have come to see the need for the struggle to engage simultaneously with the national, racial, ethnic, classed, and gendered ways that Indigeneity has been self-articulated in relation to colonialism.

Still, this evolving, moving, standpoint is very clear politically and intellectually: decolonization in the Pacific Islands must be determined by the Indigenous people of the land in question, and non-Indigenous people—and scholars no less, or all the more—need to understand how
they are also implicated in colonialism. Such self-realization won’t automatically solve our problems, but it is as much a necessary part of scholarship and analyses as it is a precondition for social justice in the Islands. Undergirding this view are adamant and indefatigable discourses of Indigeneity, of cultural and spiritual rootedness and stewardship in and of the land and sea. These roots are undoubtedly contested from within, but they are also resilient and steadfast in the face of encroachment, especially encroachment by rude people. The genealogies are to pre- and extra-western pasts and futures, to ever-changing cosmologies and epistemologies; and, as articulated recently by the Maori scholar, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, they involve the need for Indigenous methodologies to boot.42

**Problems “P-ing”**

Reflecting the wider social and political struggles of the Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Smith’s call to engage in Indigenous research and studies underscores the recurring themes and motifs of Native alterity and difference from mainstream and immigrant societies and scholarship. It also recalls productive tensions between academic study of the Pacific Islands and Native Pacific discourses of sovereignty and self-determination to which I’ve alluded earlier. Just how these tensions will now play in the institutionalized setting of Asian American Studies, especially under the framework of Ethnic Studies on the continent, is unclear and worrisome.43 For example, from my vantage point outside the field, there appears to be something provincial and provincializing about the institutionalization of Ethnic Studies within American universities, even as I am now seeing first-hand the need to strengthen the Ethnic Studies project and resource base in relation to the field of American Studies. I also worry about the potential for conservative and liberal college administrators to use Ethnic Studies departments to manage the messiness or contain the demands of diversity and U.S. Minority political discourse. Or worse yet, I am concerned about the trotting out of Ethnic Studies as a way for universities to disavow or mask the persistence of racial inequalities in society or in academia, or how critical studies of race and ethnicity tend to be ghettoized as the preserve of Ethnic Studies programs in ways that get other disciplines off the hook of having to actually deal with them in their work.
As for linking with Asian American Studies in order to secure positions for Pacific Islands Studies, I remain troubled by how the numbers game that helps justify the creation of positions in Asian American Studies also will automatically militate against the hiring or retaining of Pacific Islander faculty, and against the development of Pacific Islander Studies curricula. On this latter point, I wonder how Pacific Islander-oriented and Pacific Islander-specific content and material, voluminous in the Island region but practically unknown on the continent (except to anthropologists and an increasing number of literary critics), can ever get the airtime they need in course syllabi and program development. In teaching a graduate seminar on U.S. Imperialism in the Pacific, for instance, I have chosen to include the Philippines. But, the inclusion of the Philippines in this course, in a place like Michigan, which has tremendous primary source materials on U.S. imperialism (because of its direct involvement in it), nonetheless has the potential to take up the entire semester and effectively wash out, to keep the “P” metaphor going, the other Pacific material. Another graduate seminar, restricted only to the Pacific Islands (called Pacific Radicalisms) and focused exclusively on materials from Guam, Hawai‘I, and Aotearoa/New Zealand, also made it very clear that we needed at least one semester to cover each group. Above and beyond the potential for marginalizing Pacific Islander content, I continue to worry about whose critical frameworks will get to interpret and evaluate these materials and experiences, and about the direction of Pacific Islander-oriented research, particularly as it takes place in the continental United States.

Perhaps the biggest difference between Pacific Islander and Asian American histories, struggles, and studies is that binary between the condition and status of Indigeneity versus Immigrant/Settler identity under the sign of America, recent emphases on Indigenous travel and mobility notwithstanding. Often couched as an opposition between the quest for equality or civil rights on the one hand, and equity and sovereignty on the other—and even these are not unproblematic or unproblematized—Native Pacific struggles, unlike those of U.S. Ethnic minorities, but much more similar to the struggles of Native Americans, are typically regarded as a quest for regaining lands and seas lost through colonialism and imperialism. It may very well be an artificial binary—the rooted versus the
routed—and it may very well be better conceptualized as a range of beings and strategies, but it remains a pretty wide one with worlds of differences that matter.

As the new century progresses, the quest(ion) for Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination still matters in relation to a United States of America that is no less, and is perhaps all the more, a colonial and imperial power in the Americas as well as in Oceania—and beyond. Among the consequences of this fact is a new wave of Pacific Islander immigration to the United States, as well as to other Islands. At the same time, these genealogies of Native travel, of displacement in the “mainland” United States and to other islands, offer up points of comparison and contrast with Asian American experiences of sojourning and settlement both here and in the islands. A precise point for comparison and contrast ought to be as much on the nature of their relationship to the American Dream, to the struggles of the Aboriginal or First Peoples of this continent, and to those Islands under examination as to questions that seek to clarify their “own” cultural and political identities. My own hope is that any kind of comparative work that must involve “P-ing” of one kind or another, whether carried out in a renamed association or not, will be done so in a way that can keep apace with the historical and cultural comings and goings of Islanders in an equally fluid, oceanic history. For, the question at the end of the day isn’t really whether or not to “P” but whether to “P” with such force and volume as to mess up individually, collectively, and institutionally the cultures of power that continue to reconsolidate themselves over here on the continent and over there in the Islands, particularly through the ways we choose to define ourselves and our practices.

Notes
1. This article was originally produced for the plenary panel, “Reconceptualizing Asian Pacific American History: Including Pacific Islanders,” at the 2002 meeting of the Association for Asian American Studies (AAAS), held in Salt Lake City, Utah. The panel immediately preceded the general membership meeting in which I introduced a resolution to (only) discuss and debate the stakes in a possible name-change for the Association to include, in some appropriate format, the category of Pacific Islanders. Neither for nor against the specific campaign to actually change the name that emerged in the wake of that meeting, this essay continues a historical effort by Pacific Islanders to
discuss the terms of the relationship between Asian American Studies and Pacific Islanders. For a lineage of that discussion, indeed, for an argument not only against a name change but also against any effort to include Pacific Studies within the “responsibility” of Asian American Studies, see J. Kehaulani Kauanui, “Asian American Studies and the ‘Pacific Question,’” Asian American Studies after Critical Mass, Kent A. Odo, ed. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 123–143. Though Kauanui’s intervention is directly pertinent to my present essay, I am not able to address her arguments because of time constraints. My own stance on the name-change proposal is that, as a Native Pacific Islander (Pohnpeian) and Filipino from Guam, I think there may very well be a critical mass of Pacific Islander scholars, both on the U.S. continent and in the Pacific Islands, for and with whom the study of Pacific Islander issues might very well be conducted institutionally alongside Asian American Studies in ways that do not conflate or “subsume” Pacific Islander histories and struggles, as appears to have been the case in the past and, notwithstanding Kauanui’s fears, such will ultimately be the case in the future. My interest in comparative work between Asian American and Pacific Islander Studies, including pursuing the potential for institutional reorganization—a reorganization that is clearly premature at this time, as debate over the name-change has revealed—stems from a hope that their conjunction could very well help dislodge the spatial and discursive orientations that continue to restrict, in my view, current institutional arrangements of Asian American and Pacific Islander Studies. For more caution on the specificities of Pacific Islander Studies vis-à-vis Asian Studies, see Teresia Teaiwa, “Specifying Pacific Studies for an Asian Pacific Agenda,” Presented at the conference, Remaking AsiaPacific Studies: Knowledge, Power, and Pedagogy, School of Hawaiian, Asian, and Pacific Studies, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, December 2002.

2. For another Hawai’i-inflected critical insight, enabled from her own crisscrossing of two other powerful albeit differently positioned “crossroads” in Pacific Studies:— the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji, and the History of Consciousness Program at the University of California at Santa Cruz—see Teresia K. Teaiwa, “L(o)osing the Edge, The Contemporary Pacific13:2 (2001): 343–365. For kindred insights and analyses in and for the fields of American Studies and Ethnic Studies, but inspired by Yoruban discourses of sacred crossroads and those co-produced by the intersectionality of cultures of late capital and struggles of resistance against it, see George Lipsitz, American Studies in a Moment of Danger (Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).

3. For a Chamorro-centric historical treatment of Chamorro political and cultural consciousness as it is framed within a complicated history between American and Japanese hegemony in Guam and the Northern Marianas during and immediately after World War II, see, for example, Keith Camacho, “The Past on Exhibition: A History of World War II Commemorations in the Mariana Islands since 1945,” Doctoral dissertation, University of Hawai’i


6. See Hau’ofa, “Our Sea of Islands”; Teaiwa, Yaqona/Yagona; Teaiwa “L(o)osing the Edge.” For an oeuvre that is structured and inspired by Oceanic seafaring, see Greg Dening, Beach Crossings: Voyaging Across Times, Cultures and Self (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004).


14. See the Atlantic Studies Initiative at The University of Michigan, http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/asi/. I read in Gary Okihiro a critical gesture of using Asia and Pacific Worlds or Civilizations to counter U.S. Heartland and Atlantic hegemonies in U.S. History, even as he described the U.S. as a kind of fluidic, moving island; see Gary Okihiro, *Common Ground: Reimagining American


20. The most thoroughgoing critique of Indigeneity vis-à-vis postcoloniality in Pacific Studies is Teaiwa, “Militarism, Tourism, and the Native.” See also Diaz and Kauanui, “Native Pacific Cultural Studies on the Edge.”


24. But see Chappell, “Active Agents versus Passive Victims.”


26. Thanks to Damon Salesa for reminding me of this.


30. For a sense of the entangled web among traditional seafaring, educational opportunities, and modern state formation in the “outer islands” of these


For a critical treatment of the politics of Chamorro culture, and the culture of Chamorro politics in terms of their mediation through Spanish/New World, and American “World Cultures,” see Ronald Stade, Pacific Passages: World Culture and Local Politics in Guam (Stockholm: University of Stockholm Press, 1998).

From the period of military build up of the island between 1944 and 1950, however, there were sometimes up to 250,000 military and civilian contract hires temporarily stationed on Guam (in comparison to the resident
Chamorro population of about 20,000). The new minority status which began to be reflected in the 1980 census pertains to the sharp rise in the number of “stateside,” Asian (mostly Filipino), and later Micronesian and other Pacific Islander immigrant-settlers in/to Guam after the 1960s.


41. On the Micronesian side, see Carl Heine, Micronesia at the Crossroads: A Reappraisal of the Micronesian Political Dilemma (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1974). The “leaking” of portions of a classified federal report (the “Solomon Report”) in the 1960s, said to have explicitly articulated a formal policy of building economic dependence in order to maintain U.S. political control over Micronesia, is often attributed to radical Micronesian students at the University of Hawai‘i.


43. Relatively new to Asian American Studies on the continent, but not to the study of Asian American articulations in the Pacific, I have been kept abreast of the field, but from a distance, through conversations and emails with practitioners like J. Kehaulani Kauanui, Glen Mimura, and Elena Creef.