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The Plebeian Republic

THE HUANTA REBELLION AND

THE MAKING OF THE PERUVIAN STATE,

1820–1850

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(introduction)
Introduction

In January 1983, as the insurgency unleashed by the Communist Party of Peru—best known as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), entered its third year, eight Peruvian journalists set out from the city of Ayacucho on their way to Huaychao, a peasant village in the province of Huanta, in the Andean department of Ayacucho. Their purpose was to investigate the murders of a group of alleged Senderistas that a sector of the press attributed to the military. Five of the journalists had come from Lima for the journey, and three others from Ayacucho joined the Limeños on the way. They never arrived at their destination. Not long after their departure, the press reported the discovery of their lifeless bodies in the vicinity of Uchuraccay, another village in Huanta.

The corpses, which were buried, bore signs of a horrifying death. The case passed into history as the “massacre of Uchuraccay” and became one of the most controversial, emblematic, and talked-about murders in an internal war that ultimately claimed nearly seventy thousand Peruvians’ lives.

Although prior to the Uchuraccay massacre nearly two hundred people had been killed in the violence unleashed by Sendero since 1980, none of those killings received nearly as much media attention as the journalists’ deaths. While in previous cases low-ranking policemen (guarniciones civiles) and mostly illiterate, Quechua-speaking peasants were the victims, on this occasion they were men of letters. Painful as it is to admit, adversity had to touch the urban, educated sector directly for the media and the government to pay more attention to a war that had already hit the rural populations of the south-central highlands of Peru harshly.

The case became politically charged when some of the media, especially those on the left, held the military responsible for the journalists’ murders. Controversy grew, moreover, because the massacre and, perhaps more forcefully, the ensuing trial of the Uchuraccay comuneros (community peasants) gave rise to debates about the (unresolved) nature of Peruvian identity, with
not a few commentators evoking images of the Spanish conquest. The trial of the comuneros, held in Lima, pitted monolingual (or barely bilingual) Quechua-speaking villagers against Spanish-speaking magistrates, requiring the presence of interpreters; the villagers remained for the most part silent or refused to collaborate with the magistrates. More than any truth regarding the deaths of the journalists, the hearings of Uchuraccay laid bare another truth: the extent to which ethnic and linguistic markers still defined the place of the powerful in Peruvian society at the very moment social analysts were envisaging a new era of “modernity” and democratization.  

Then President Fernando Belaúnde appointed a commission presided over by novelist Mario Vargas Llosa to investigate the events (henceforth the Vargas Llosa Commission). The commission, which included, in addition to Vargas Llosa, two anthropologists, a linguist, a psychoanalyst, and a lawyer, arrived at the conclusion that the villagers of Uchuraccay killed the journalists because they mistook them for Sendero Luminoso guerrillas—and that they did so without the military’s own advice that the villagers should defend themselves against the terroristas. This hypothesis was endorsed by the comuneros themselves, and its credibility lay in the fact that Uchuraccay did have a history of confrontations with Sendero. Still, the general tendency was to exonerate the peasants from responsibility by appealing to the classic stereotype that emphasizes peasants’ “naïveté,” in consonance with the image the villagers themselves chose to present. Few could accept (without resorting to other stereotypes that associate peasants with savagery and brutality) the idea that the peasants, if they indeed killed the journalists, might have had their own reasons, which they chose not to reveal.

The ensuing hearings in Lima found some military officers indirectly responsible for the crime, but in the end none were convicted. Three Uchuraccayan villagers were found guilty of the massacre and condemned to various prison sentences, but they never disclosed any further evidence, and one of them eventually died in jail, a victim of tuberculosis. The press continued to speculate, and, in the end, each Peruvian was left to compile her own version of the events.

As I finished writing this book, and in the climate of dialogue created by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the Uchuraccay villagers had acknowledged that they killed the journalists. But they were far from endorsing the “cultural” arguments provided in the Vargas Llosa Commission’s report on Uchuraccay (i.e., the Informe [1983]), which stressed the comuneros’ allegedly innate violent predisposition, resulting, in turn, from the “secular isolation” in which, the commission believed, the peasants had lived since “pre-Hispanic times.” Instead, the villagers pointed to current matters. They explained that most villagers in Uchuraccay were indeed convinced that the journalists were Senderistas, partly because they identified the guide who came with the journalists himself as a Senderista, eventually killing him too. They added that when the journalists arrived, the villagers were in high alert against Sendero, which had in recent months, even weeks, killed many people in Uchuraccay and the neighboring communities who refused to abide by the dictates of the Maoist group. Of particular note were the cruel deaths suffered by communal authorities, whom the Senderistas killed sometimes by dynamiting their bodies in “public executions” (asistencias públicas). The villagers, in a word, had begun taking justice into their own hands, applying severe sanctions, including death, against those suspected of Senderismo within and without their community; in this, they were joined by other villages in the Huanta highlands that refused, like them, to give in to the dictates of Sendero. The Uchuraccay villagers who accounted for these facts apologized in the name of their community in the context of the audiencias públicas, or “public hearings,” staged by the TRC. At the same time, however, they have denounced, emphatically for the first time, that in the months following the journalists’ massacre their community was victim of severe retaliation by Sendero Luminoso as well as by military aggression. Between April and December 1983, 135 Uchuraccayinos lost their lives. Most fell victim to Sendero. Others were killed by the military. Among the former were reportedly all the villagers who took part in the journalists’ murder. A list with the 135 names was made public by the TRC, giving the national community, which until then had likened the “tragedy of Uchuraccay” with the deaths of eight men of the press, much to reflect on.

At the time of the killing of the journalists I was completing my studies in Lima, and like many other Peruvians, I was disturbed by those events. My unease resurfaced with particular intensity some years later, as I took a teaching position at the National University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga, in the city of Ayacucho. During my tenure there I began an inquiry into the history of the peasants of Uchuraccay and other high-altitude communities in Huanta, an inquiry that has resulted in the present book.

From local monographs to archives, I set myself in search of references to the “Iquichanos,” the name which the Vargas Llosa Commission, following
ethnographies and histories of Huanta, used to designate the high-altitude peasant communities of Huanta, including Uchuraccay. Colonial ethnographic sources make no mention at all of the Iquichanos. References to them started appearing only during the republican period starting in the 1820s. These sources, especially those originating in the late nineteenth century, portrayed the Iquichanos as descendants of the so-called Chanka Confederation and attributed to them a warlike tradition of opposition to the Incas. They also emphasized the Iquichanos' "hostility toward outsiders" and unwillingness to submit to the laws of the state.

I later learned, however, that such conceptualizations, which were echoed in the Vargas Llosa Informe, did not reflect an actual knowledge of the pre-Hispanic or colonial history of Huanta. Rather, they were construed with a more recent episode in mind: the rebellion that Huanta peasants (thereafter called Iquichanos), in alliance with a group of Spanish officers and merchants, mestizo hacendados (estate owners), and priests, launched against the nascent Republic, between 1825 and 1828.¹⁰ The rebels, acting in the name of King Fernando VII, aimed to restore colonial rule. Their supreme leader was Antonio Abad Huachaca, an illiterate muleteer from the punas (high-altitude lands) of Huanta who was said to have held the position of General of the Royal Army. As my research progressed, I found myself immersed in the work of reconstructing the history of this rebellion and its aftermath, which constitute the subject of this book.

One of the details which initially drew my attention to the monarchist rebellion of Huanta was the similarity between the opinions of contemporaries toward the royalist peasants in 1825–28 and those of the press in relation to the murder of the journalists in Uchuraccay in 1983: basically, the same resistance to accepting that villagers had acted of their own volition. If in 1823 the peasants were persuaded by the military, in 1826 they were duped by the Spanish. Moreover, historians who attempted to explain peasant participation in the monarchist uprising limited themselves to reproducing the interpretations made by contemporary observers. Juan José del Pino, a local historian to whom we otherwise owe a careful compilation of sources about peasant rebellions in Huanta, endorsed the theory of "deception" and peasant naïveté: "These attacks took place because of the deceptions of a group of Spaniards in Ayacucho, who took advantage of the ingenuousness of the indigenous, and
made them believe in the arrival of a Spanish squadron on the coasts along with the return of the chiefs defeated on the 9th of December."11

The "weak spot" in the interpretation of the Huanta rebellion, however, went beyond the confines of local history. "National" historians themselves had not advanced much farther than local historians in their understanding of peasant attitudes in Independence and post-Independence conflicts. As Juan José del Pino was writing the paragraph quoted above in Huanta, Lima historian José Agustín de la Puente y Candamo developed the idea that Independence grew out of the development of a collective consciousness in which distinct social sectors came together under the leadership of the creoles (Americans of Spanish descent).12 The creoles were at the top, indians, mestizos, blacks, and castas (people of mixed racial backgrounds) were at the bottom, all asserting their will to belong to Peru. National identity was less a problem to be explored than a truth to be preached. Consequently, it seemed sufficient to look into the doctrines and well-meaning intentions of certain illustrious creoles in search of the right heroes. De la Puente's became the dominant interpretation of Independence in the 1960s. Within this scheme, an inquiry into "royalist Indians" was not to be expected.

Not long after the publication of the second edition of de la Puente's book in 1970, another interpretation gained momentum. It shared de la Puente's idea that Independence had internal roots but highlighted indian and mestizo rather than creole leadership and sought to emphasize popular participation in general.13 This interpretation was favored by the left-leaning military regime that ruled Peru under the presidency of General Juan Velasco Alvarado between 1968 and 1975. Velasco's government was characterized by a nationalist, anti-imperialist rhetoric and pro-peasant policies—and by its rewriting of Peruvian history. Velasco made Túpac Amaru II, the indigenous leader of the major anti-Spanish rebellion in colonial Spanish America (which took place in Cuzco in 1780–81), the government's official icon. This was a gesture without precedent because of the violent nature of the Túpac Amaru rebellion and because of the fact that, in addition to killing Spaniards, it also attacked creoles. Hence, the figure of Túpac Amaru historically elicited discomfort among the creole elites of Peru, who banned him from historical records for more than a century. By the mid-twentieth century Túpac Amaru's persona was gaining increasing official acceptance as his image as a bloodthirsty indian rebel was "rehabilitated" by historiography, although no previous Peruvian president had gone as far as Velasco in elevating Túpac Amaru to the standing of national hero and foremost symbol of Independence.14

Despite their obvious differences, creole and Velasquista / indigenista interpretations of Independence converged in conceiving of it as a process of "national liberation." As a sample of its conciliatory spirit, the military, on the occasion of the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the proclamation of Independence, erected a monument in a public park in Lima, and renamed it Parque de los Próceres ("Park of the Illustrious men [of Independence]"). The monument featured large statues of "precursors" of Independence from different ethnic backgrounds, including the (historically proscribed) effigy of Túpac Amaru.15

Challenging these two official nationalisms, a third interpretation of Independence emerged at the beginning of the 1970s. It was strongly influenced by Marxism and dependency theory and came to the fore in a polemical article by historians Heracio Bonilla and Karen Spalding, published in 1972. The authors claimed that Independence was not—and could not have been—the result of a process of development of collective consciousness, as the official historiography claimed.16 In the first place, the creoles were never convinced of the need for Independence. Their future and prestige were tightly connected to those of the Crown, and in this respect they differed from the creole elites of Río de la Plata and Nueva Granada; in addition, Peruvian creoles feared the implied risks of a mobilization of the indigenous population, who during prior rebellions in 1780–81, 1812, and 1814–15 had become radicalized beyond the creole elite's expectations. In the second place, asserted Bonilla and Spalding, Indians could not have been active agents in the process of Independence because they had not yet recovered from the wave of repression that followed the defeat of Túpac Amaru in 1781. The defeat of Túpac Amaru, the argument went, aggravated the "ethnic fissures" and fragmentation that generally divided peasant and popular sectors. Finally, peasants were not likely to form alliances with creoles, whom they distrusted as much as, if not more than, Spaniards.

For Bonilla and Spalding, an elite that lacked nationalist convictions, and popular classes that neither identified with them nor offered viable alternatives, were unlikely to have been protagonists in an Independence scenario that was "conceded more than conquered." Rather, it was "brought from without" by the inevitable collapse of the Spanish Empire and the emergence
of Great Britain as a new imperial power eager to promote and assist the process of emancipation of the Spanish colonies overseas. Only because they were coerced did “Indians, blacks and mestizos” fight “equally in the ranks of the patriot and royal armies.”

Bonilla’s and Spalding’s core arguments were far from new. The idea that Independence came to Peru “from without” was widespread by the mid-nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century. When de la Puente articulated his thesis of Independence “from within,” it was precisely to counter a long-established historiographical trend that in many variations stressed the opposite. On the other hand, Bonilla’s and Spalding’s interpretation of Independence echoed (though not explicitly so) that of José Carlos Mariátegui, the celebrated early-twentieth-century Peruvian Marxist thinker. Advancing a hypothesis that was to become central to dependency theory, Mariátegui criticized the “alienation” and lack of nationalism among Peruvian elites, stressing the role of Great Britain in the consummation of Spanish American Independence and upholding the idea that Independence brought neither social transformation nor economic change. A similar criticism of the upper classes had been made earlier by historian José de la Riva Agüero, himself an offspring of the creole nobility he condemned.

Despite their differences, both nationalist and Marxist historians converged in assigning peasants a passive role. For the nationalists, peasants were the unquestioning followers of an illustrious vanguard; for the Marxists, they were “cannon fodder” or at best spectators. If in the first case their role was to support and assert, in the second their indifference was to be attributed to their lack of understanding of the conflict: “The Indian masses could not, were not able to, clearly differentiate between an autonomous government of creoles and a colonial government dependent of the metropolis.”

The Marxist-dependencia interpretation of Independence was not without its merits. In seeking to understand this process in terms of class, it exposed the theory of “national unity” as a myth; in questioning the depth of the changes brought about by Independence, it served as a reminder of the tasks of “nation building” that lay ahead. But it oversimplified at least two other questions: the participation of the “popular sectors,” which were seen as an unconscious and manipulated mass; and the implications of the political changes that did occur in the wake of Independence. The first issue had been partially taken up by the interpretations that assessed the popular sectors’ patriotism, which flourished in the seventies, although, to be sure, critical, nonpatriotic approaches to popular participation in Independence are still scarce. The second question was addressed by a historiography that focused on trade policies and economic nationalism in the caudillo era. None of these currents addressed the problem posed by the royalist peasants. Interestingly, it took anthropologists to do so.

In 1983, the French anthropologist Patrick Husson completed a study in which he compared the Huanta uprising of 1835–28 with another rebellion that had also occurred in Huanta toward the end of the nineteenth century. According to Husson, the Independence wars and subsequent political decisions by the new republican government affected regional rhythms of production and commerce, particularly in Huanta, provoking discontent among the different sectors involved in these activities. This discontent found expression in a monarchist rebellion. Husson’s economic interpretation provided valuable information and insights that have inspired and guided my own investigation. Unfortunately, Husson diminished the value of his findings when explaining peasant participation. Forcing the logic of his evidence, Husson defended the Marxist theory of “manipulation.” Later on in his work, however, Husson insisted on a specific logic with respect to the attitudes of the peasants. He concluded that Huanta peasants rebelled on account of their “natural” resistance to the changes brought about by the new order: “More than the fall of the empire, or more than the weight of a new fiscal burden, the peasant uprising was . . . a peasant reaction to a social change that brought uncertainty.” Or more forcefully still: “It seems that the peasantry, because of its structural position in the society that encompasses and defines it, can only feel horror at changes it had never imagined and had rarely been suggested for it, even when those changes came with the best intentions.”

Husson’s assessment that Huanta villagers were reacting against “social change” brought about by Independence is a bit puzzling given that earlier in his book he had endorsed the Marxist-dependencia interpretation, according to which Independence brought about no change. The unresolved contradiction constitutes, nonetheless, a powerful example of structural Marxism’s and modernization theory’s limitations to grapple with the reality of Latin America. In keeping with these theoretical and political dictates, Husson’s analysis becomes fatalistic: the peasantry is a class destined to perish under the weight of capitalist modernity and thus adopts a defensive position before it, which is inevitably violent: “The only means available for the peasantry to make their
complaints heard against the irremediable injustice that it endured was and continues to be violence." Interestingly but not at all surprisingly—given that both Marxists and liberals share the same "modernizing" principles—this conclusion mirrored the one that, from a very different political angle, Vargas Llosa reached in his quest for "cultural" reasons with which to make sense of the journalists' murders: "It is unquestionable that this atavistic attitude explains, in part as well, the Iquichan decision to combat Sendero Luminoso, and to do so with rude and fierce methods, which are the only ones they have at their disposal since time immemorial."21

In brief, the Huanta rebellions did little more than demonstrate what was already known: that peasants are exploited beings who resist change and are doomed to react to injustice with violence.22

Against studies that portrayed peasants as victims, a literature emerged in Peru during the seventies that highlighted peasants' role as "champions." Significantly, it concentrated on the twentieth century. The so-called literature of peasant "struggles" or "movements" arose alongside that of "labor movements" in the field of sociology. Actually, this model did not so much oppose as complement that which defined peasants as victims—both converging in defining peasants, first and foremost, as exploited beings. The difference was that while in Marxist and modernization-theory paradigms peasant destiny was forlorn, in the movimentista perspectives it was heroic: peasant acts were endowed with a revolutionary and vindicatory character. The victims became heroes. The tendency was selectively to extract certain rebellious peasant acts from their contexts in order to fit them into a politically defined sequence of events. This led to the proliferation of texts that were more chronicles than histories of peasant rebellions.23 It was a good example of what E. P. Thompson referred to as the "spasmodic" vision of history: detached from the everyday, historical subjects existed and were defined precisely in terms of their moments of "explosion."

Some time would pass before other researchers—some of whom, interestingly enough, were also initiated in the field of sociology (and not far chronologically and generationally from the movimentista boom)—transcended these rigid and linear models, applying a more respectable dose of history and professionalism. In 1981 Nelson Manrique published Las guerrillas indígenas en la guerra con Chile.24 Manrique's central preoccupation was to apply an appropriate logic to the participation of the peasants of the Central Sierra in the War of the Pacific (better known in Peru as the War with Chile, 1879–83). His study emerged in response to interpretations of Independence such as those discussed above that overlook peasants' capacity to perceive the national dimension of the conflicts and consequently opt for a nationalist position.25 Based on extensive archival research, Manrique's work overcame the structuralist rigidity of studies that assigned peasants fixed roles and always predictable positions. It also encouraged understanding of peasant assimilation of national conflicts through their cultural expressions, including dances, music, and oral traditions. Perhaps Manrique's major accomplishment was to give further legitimacy to what (given the absence of empiricism in which Peruvian historiography debated the "national question") was most necessary: sensitivity to the primary sources, archival research, and sufficient sense to discard the idea of a peasantry cut off from its mental faculties and either eternally manipulated or perpetually heroic. The key was the regional focus.

The national conflict transcended abstractions when observed in a regional context. Peasants' alignment with national parties (whether nationalist or not) were understood like those of any other group, namely, in terms of their ties, relations, alliances, and conflicts with other local and regional sectors, including officials, landowners, and other peasants. As a work that included a theoretical proposition and a political preoccupation, Las guerrillas indígenas en la guerra con Chile was a true milestone and provoked one of the few genuinely significant debates about the "national question" in contemporary Peruvian historiography. Not long after, historians in North America followed suit.26

As the nineteenth century was "rediscovered" by historians—and seduced anthropologists—other studies appeared, which, although they did not necessarily touch on the issue of the peasants' role in national conflicts, still managed to situate them as active participants in the nineteenth-century state, previously the exclusive domain of oligarchs and military caudillos. From the 1980s on, peasants were defined less and less as "indians" and began to be taken into account in analyses of local power, in their role as tribute payers, in their participation in markets, in their capacity as litigants, and as creators of new meanings for a legal terminology emanating from the early republican elites. Despite their differences, most of these studies sought to break away from heroic expectations as well as from the image of a passive and defenseless peasantry.27 Whether or not this scholarship succeeded in achieving these goals remains debatable. Idealization of peasant and "indian" political goals (or rather what scholars render as such) remains widespread in academia.
Nonetheless, the constructions of peasants as inherently passive or irremediably violent have, at any rate, receded.

My own book may be situated within these most recent historiographical coordinates. It springs as well, however, and perhaps more decisively so, from my own attempts at gauging the political weight of rural Andean society in the shaping of the national state in Peru. This problem, largely marginal to Peru's mainstream political history, became, however, difficult to relegate ever since Sendero Luminoso put Ayacucho at the center of national attention in 1980. As the Sendero insurgency escalated to become "the greatest insurrection in Peruvian history," it became increasingly clear to me the extent to which historians, and not just the government, had forsaken this region.

Researchers attracted to the study of Andean rebellions have, in fact, generally privileged regions such as Cuzco and Peru's "Andean South," which bred the major anticolonial uprisings of the late colonial period. What happened in Ayacucho (called Huamanga in the colonial period) remained largely unknown. But this historiographical void only gave more impetus to my decision to investigate the history of Huanta and, more specifically, of Uchuraccay.

The dearth of studies dealing with the political history of Ayacucho is, in fact, striking considering the role that this Andean department has played in Peru's republican history. One of the poorest departments of Peru, and largely marginal to the nation's economy, Ayacucho has nonetheless played a central role in its politics. In addition to incubating Sendero Luminoso, Ayacucho furnished the site for the battle that ensured Peruvian and Spanish South American independence in 1824 and at the same time became the last loyalist stronghold. As such, Ayacucho gave birth to the only peasant uprising in the first four decades of republican life in Peru, the monarchist uprising of Huanta in 1825-28.

This book constitutes the first in-depth reconstruction and analysis of this uprising. Its aim is, however, less to trace a history of "resistance" than of relationships—asymmetrical, more or less violent, convenient or inevitable—between the emerging republican state and a rural society of the south-central Peruvian Andes. Huanta's highland inhabitants, at first reluctant to submit to the Republic, would eventually adapt to it and become, moreover, indispensable allies of a faction of "nation builders." Thus, my study, while seeking to shed light on Peru's troubled present, hopes to demonstrate as well that Peru, though conspicuously absent from the most comprehensive studies of cau-

dillismo and rural society's input in the process of "state making" in Latin America, was by no means impervious to the process of "ruralization of power" that Tulio Halperin once suggested engulfed Spanish America following Independence.69

The men and women who supported the Huanta uprising were, for the most part, native speakers of Quechua, but rarely used this language in written communication, even in the few cases of Huantans who were literate. My sources are, consequently, all in Spanish. As usual, government agents have left more paper trails than the common people we are most concerned with. My analysis builds largely on these official records, including trial proceedings, notary records, wills, customs records, military and prefectural records, newspaper articles, tributary rolls, and many others. But it draws as well from documents produced by the various leaders and participants in the Huanta rebellion, including war dispatches, manifestoes, and letters exchanged between them as well as documents generated by guerrilla commanders and other actors in the civil wars of the 1830s and petitions that peasant communities addressed to the state up through the 1840s. These records, more often than not, "leak" Quechua terms, syntax, and phonology, and these elements, when compounded with features of the Spanish language, calligraphy, and quality of paper where originals are available, provide useful hints to their possible authorship and context of production. Unfortunately, much of the specificity of the language will not be apparent in the English translation of the citations. Yet, to the extent that the sources have allowed, I have illustrated every aspect of this rural society that may further the comprehension of its political expressions as they became apparent at the moment of the outbreak of the monarchist rebellion. I have followed this rural world's incorporation into the power structures of the early republican state up to the 1840s. My goal has been to trace the story of a political event as much as to account for a political process: Peru's transition from imperial to republican rule, as experienced by a high-altitude rural society which is usually considered to have been "historically isolated."

The province of Huanta is located at the northernmost edge of the current department of Ayacucho, midway between the cities of Cuzco and Lima and at the crossroads of the trade routes that linked Buenos Aires and Lima during the
colonial period. San Pedro de Huanta (as the town was called originally), today Huanta city, the province capital, lies in a temperate, narrow valley, the most fertile in the province, some 2,620 meters (8,596 feet) above sea level and 25 kilometers (16 miles) north of Ayacucho city, capital of the department of the same name. Both the department and the city of Ayacucho were called Huamanga during the colonial period, but the province of Huamanga, of which Ayacucho is also the capital, kept its colonial name. For this reason, the name “Huamanga” has prevailed, and Ayacucho city’s inhabitants still commonly refer to their city as Huamanga, a usage I myself adopt wherever pertinent.

The province of Huanta displays almost as much ecological variety as one can find elsewhere in the Andes of Peru. Its towns, villages, and hamlets are spread along narrow valleys and ravines that range from 1,000 to 4,000 meters (3,281 to 13,124 feet) above sea level and enjoy a variety of ecologies and microclimates. The most densely populated ecological niches in Huanta include quechaus (from 2,200 to 3,200 meters, or 7,216 to 10,499 feet, above sea level) and suis (3,200 to approximately 3,900 meters, or 10,499 to approximately 12,795 feet, above sea level). The Razurulca peak crowns the landscape at an elevation of nearly 5,000 meters (16,404 feet) above sea level. The quechaus are good lands for growing vegetables and maize, while the sunis are best suited for potato and other Andean tubers like oca and allucho, in addition to broad beans and barley (the latter introduced by the Spanish). In the lower edges of the suni vegetables are also cultivated. Above the suis is the puna, 3,900 to 4,800 meters (12,795 to 15,748 feet) above sea level. These are the highest lands in which humans are settled, and their poor soil, subject to intense erosion, is the least suitable for agriculture. Still, ichu, a wild, dry plant commonly used as fodder and for roof making, among other domestic uses, grows abundantly here, and villagers farm a variety of potatoes in small plots scattered about the steep slopes that dominate the landscape. On the other side of the Andean cordillera, to the north and east of Huanta city, lies the ceja de selva (literally, the “eyebrow of the jungle”), also called montaña or selva alta (upper jungle). In this sloped, forestlike ecological niche usually between 500 and 2,300 meters (1,640 to 7,596 feet) coca has traditionally been cultivated. These lands also produce sugarcane and a variety of tropical-like fruits, including avocados and bananas. Montañas enjoy a rather humid atmosphere and increasingly warm temperatures as one descends to the rivers Apurimac and Mantaro. These rivers mark the border of the province while demarcating the frontier with the selva baja (“lower jungle”), best known plainly as selva. To the north lies the

selva of Jujin, to the east the selva of Cuzco. West of Huanta is the Andean department of Huancavelica, a mining region. (See maps 1, 2, and 5.)

In all of these ecological niches, except for the selva, the monarchist rebels established encampments and headquarters. But the most important hideouts were situated in the highest elevations, in the sunis and punas. Uchuracay, then a hacienda 4,000 meters (13,123 feet) above sea level, was the most unsalvable of them. Within its borders lay the so-called fort of Luis Pampa, the rebels’ main headquarters.

In spite of the ecological diversity of the area, the various niches of Huanta have a common feature: a markedly rugged and jagged topography. This is especially true of the punas. The jagged quality of the terrain and its numerous rocky, cavelike structures lend these punas a strategically defensive value, which when coupled with their strategic location explains why the zone, unfriendly to the casual traveler, would attract those plotting rebellions or seeking refuge. The punas of Huanta, in fact, bridge the lower valleys, where the largest towns of the province are located, with the eastern and northern selvas used by the monarchist rebels as critical hideouts, and where some detachments of Sendero Luminoso still operate.

The province of Huanta is smaller today than it was in the late colonial and early republican periods. At that time it embraced the current provinces of Huanta and La Mar and the northern portions of the province of Huamanga, covering an area roughly the size of Puerto Rico. This larger Huanta constitutes the core setting of our study. As Ayacucho’s northernmost province, Huanta forms part of a region of the Peruvian Andes commonly referred to as
the "south-central sierra"—not quite the south, and not yet the center, but historically connected to both by trade and culture. The northern stretches of Huanta are, in fact, at the center of Peru, and its southern area marks the beginning of Peru's southern Andes. "Central sierra" and "southern sierra" are historically as well as geographically defined regions. The central sierra contains important urban centers of relatively recent development, that is, late colonial or republican, such as the trading city of Huancayo and the mining center of Cerro de Pasco, whereas the southern sierra is home to some of Peru's oldest Andean colonial cities, including Cuzco, Arequipa, and (if one stretches the south a bit toward the center) Huamanga itself. The southern sierra was likewise the core economic region of the viceroyalty of Peru, which up to the eighteenth century comprised all of Spanish South America. Concentrated in the south, in fact, were the richest silver ores and mining cities, Potosí in Upper Peru (present-day Bolivia) being foremost among them. Many of Huamanga city's first Spanish settlers, the encomenderos, also owned mines in neighboring Huancavelica, especially mercury mines, mercury being a vital ingredient in the processing of silver. Huamanga was indeed the breadbasket for this mining area—its temperate weather made it the favorite place of residence for the region's wealthy mine-owning encomenderos.43

In the wake of the Independence wars, the central sierra started to thrive by virtue of the recovery of Cerro de Pasco's silver ore, but the fate of the southern sierra looked less promising.44 Thus, Huanta's traditional ties to the central sierra became ever more prominent during this period. Huancayo city, located in the center of the ample Mantaro Valley (also known as "Lima's granary") was the largest settlement in the central sierra and remains so even today. Its rise as a thriving commercial center paralleled the advent of the Republic. Huanta has long been tied to Huancayo by trade and perhaps shares, economically speaking, more traits with this city than with its closest neighbor, Huamanga. Like Huancayo, Huanta lacks the seignorial architectural beauty for which Huamanga is renowned, and, also like Huancayo, it served as a breadbasket for the neighboring areas. Huanta's fertile valleys and montañas supplied foodstuffs to Huamanga and its hinterland from early colonial times.45

For most of the colonial period, Huanta had been a predominantly Indian town, the head of the doctrina (ecclesiastical district) of the same name, and head as well of the corregimiento (Indian tax province) of Sángaro (or Azángaro). Although by the late eighteenth century the town remained largely indigenous, it began to experience some important demographic changes,
marked by the growth of the nonindigenous populations, including Spanish and especially mestizos. These changes were partly a consequence of a series of decrees issued by the Bourbon state to boost the economy and foster the colonization of Peru’s ceja de selva. The decrees were launched within the framework of a sweeping program of political and administrative reforms known as the Bourbon Reforms, which aimed at making Spain’s overseas colonies more profitable and efficiently administered; they also encouraged migration of Spaniards from the Peninsula to the Americas. Although it is hard to tell how many Spaniards arrived in Huanta province as a result of these migratory waves, the evidence indicates that their numbers increased exponentially during the last two decades of colonial rule. A source from 1819 estimated that 14,000 españoles lived in Huanta at that time, undoubtedly a highly inflated figure but suggestive of a considerable increase from the 219 españoles (less than the 1 percent of the population) recorded in the census for the province of Huanta in 1795. The word español as used here should be taken with caution. At the time, it did not necessarily denote, as it does today, birthplace or nationality but rather Spanish ancestry or “culture” or even status; hence many individuals identified as españoles were, in fact, American-born creoles and mestizos. Nevertheless, the increase in the nonindigenous population in the closing stages of the colonial period is evident.

The Spaniards arriving in the early nineteenth century established themselves in Huanta and Iruncocha, the most fertile valleys of the province, and acquired lands in the montañas. Some of these new residents were officers in the Royal Army, others were merchants with links in Huamanga, Lima, and Cádiz, and still others were both. Very few went to live in the high-altitude hamlets, where Quechua speakers had come to predominate ever since the first Spanish encomenderos took over the richest lands in the lower valleys, pushing native peoples to increasingly higher elevations.

The census of 1795 includes other pieces of information that, in the absence of analogous evidence for the time of the monarchist rebellion, allow us to picture two other salient features of Huanta’s demographic landscape at the end of colonial rule. First, Huanta, with its 27,337 inhabitants, was the most populous province in the intendancy of Huamanga (followed by Huamanga with 25,970). Second, Huanta was the province with the largest number of mestizos: 10,080, or 36 percent of the total population. Its Indian population, according to the same census, was close to 17,000, or approximately 62 percent of the total, second only to the province of Huamanga where Indians made up 78 percent of the population.

There are no records of the Indian population of Huanta as of the 1820s. But the Indian tributary roll of 1801 registers 2,582 male individuals, which, assuming a six-member family per tribute-paying individual and considering that some villagers might have escaped registration, allows one to estimate an Indian population in the range of 16,000 to 18,000, mostly grouped in villages. This number is consistent with the almost 17,000 Indians given for the same province by the census quoted above. It is this segment of the population that contributed the bulk of the montoneros (irregular army combatants) for the monarchist rebellion.

In the republican period, a source from 1834 gives 12,000 inhabitants for the villa (city) of Huanta alone, that is, the parish of Huanta, including the four ayllus or parcialidades that comprised it. This figure increases to 36,000 with the inclusion of the districts of Ccarhuahurán, Ayahuancó, and Acón, also belonging to Huanta province.

To what extent, then, is the history of Huanta an isolated case? Or, more broadly, to what degree is the history of northern Ayacucho “exceptional”? Most historical studies do not address this question directly but invariably single out three events that highlight the region’s symbolic importance and strategic location. All three belong to Ayacucho’s distant past, and the first is related to Ayacucho city’s founding by the Spanish. The Spaniards founded the city of Huamanga in 1539, so the story goes, to secure a Spanish settlement as a gateway to the eastern jungles of Vilcabamba, where the Incas had been offering stiff resistance to the Spanish invasion ever since the rebellion of 1536 led by Manco Inca, which had attempted but failed to retake Cuzco from Spanish hands; his followers were to remain in arms in their Vilcabamba refuge for decades. Huamanga was thus called San Juan de la frontera de Huamanga (“Saint John of the Frontier of Huamanga”) and over time became, indeed, a borderland, a Spanish city at the gateway to the still-unconquered selva. But it demarcated not a boundary between Spanish and Indian settlements as much as one between “conquered” and “unconquered” Indians (then referred to as “infidels”), for on both sides of the supposed frontier the natives constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. This was true even in Huanta, the most mestizo of Huamanga’s seven provinces. The story of
Huamanga’s Spanish founding matters, however, in that it looms large in Huamanguinos’ representation of their capital city and is usually recalled with pride by local historians, who are fond of boasting of the city’s Spanishness or, better, of the ancientness of its Spanish past, particularly when compared to Huanta’s. Architecture more than demography no doubt speaks in their favor, for while Ayacucho city is renowned for its thirty-three plus Spanish churches and monasteries dating back to the early colonial years, Huanta city has not a single Spanish structure (of which I am aware) from that era.

The second historical event highlighted by Huamanga historians also relates to the Spanish conquest. Local histories record that the department of Ayacucho furnished the stage of the Battle of Chupas (1542), in which the armies of the Spanish king’s emissary, Vaca de Castro, defeated the Spanish rebel conquistador Almagro “el Mozo,” thereby securing the Catholic monarchs’ hold over the land of the Incas that the rebel conquistadores were struggling to keep for themselves. This royal triumph, which has likewise been recalled with pride by chroniclers of the region, including the celebrated late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century native writer Guaman Poma de Ayala, was also integrated into the city’s name. Thus, in addition to being a “frontier” city, Huamanga became a city symbolizing royal victory, “the very noble and loyal San Juan de la Frontera y Victoria de Huamanga.”

The third memorable “epic” experience goes back to Ayacucho’s pre-Hispanic past and is shrouded in legend. It is the history of the region’s resistance to being conquered by the Incas, which the Incas’ own narratives aggrandized in order to glorify their final subjugation of the region’s populations, the so-called Chankas. Although the facts surrounding these events are in dispute and the very existence of the Chanka Confederation is a subject of controversy, evidence of tension is apparent. Bearing witness to this are the pre-Inca high-altitude fortified buildings that archaeologists identify as “Chanka,” and, most importantly, the proliferation of mitma populations in the Pampas river basin, between the Ayacucho and the Apurímac departments, which historians trace back to Inca times. The mitmas were “ethnic colonies” of sorts, made up of entire communities that were forced to leave their native lands and resettle in those that the Incas considered strategically important or potentially rebellious. Mitma colonization was the Incas’ nonmilitary means of securing control over the territories they conquered. Although mitma colonies could be found almost anywhere within the realm of the Incas at the time of the Spanish

invasion, historians have been particularly intrigued by the profusion of such settlements in Huamanga’s Pampas river basin.

Reading these three fragments of evidence of Ayacucho’s distant past in light of its most recent history, as outlined at the beginning of this introduction, the temptation to argue for the region’s “uniqueness” or particularly violent and conflictive history is great. Nevertheless, having wrestled with the question of Ayacucho’s “exceptionality” for a long time, I will not argue for it here. Ayacucho—or, more precisely, northern Ayacucho, where Huanta is located—may not be so much an “exception” as a place where problems afflicting the national society of Peru simply take on sharper contours or more extreme expression. Closely observed, it is the area’s strategic location at the crossroads of economically and politically neuralgic zones in South America that accounts for most of the difference, having rendered it a decisive stage for battles of great symbolic importance. Other than that, one can see more commonalities than differences between northern Ayacucho and the rest of Andean Peru.

Take, for instance, the geography. Huanta’s rough topography, its narrow valleys and steep, hardly arable lands are a distinctive feature of the Peruvian Andean landscape, which harbors the highest and most rugged section of the Andean cordillera. The boundary that northern Ayacucho shares with the selva is shared as well by most of Peru’s other Andean departments. Moreover, the coexistence of two cities as historically different as Huanta and Huamanga, separated by a mere twenty-five kilometers (sixteen miles), makes this region a privileged laboratory in which to observe Peru’s social contrasts and its historical trends generally, with Huanta representing a rather mestizo and market-oriented society and Huamanga embodying the paradigm of the early colonial, seignorial city.

Second, consider Ayacucho’s most recent political developments. Thought of initially as an isolated “Andean” phenomenon, Sendero Luminoso’s insurgency, born in the Ayacucho countryside, escalated to become the most devastating insurrection in Peru’s history—probably the only one to have affected all of the nation’s populated territories. That is, the conditions that led to the rise of Sendero in Ayacucho in 1980 were soon replicated nationwide.

Likewise, and closer to our subject matter, if Ayacucho became “the last bastion” of the royalists in Peru, Peru was the last bastion of the royalists in Spanish America. Thus, if Huanta was exceptional at this historical moment it
was not precisely on account of its royalism or even its “monarchism” but because in this region alone conditions were ripe for waging war under such banners.

Finally, I shall argue that the makeup of the peasant communities’ leadership in the Huanta uprising may reflect a reality akin to the rest of rural Peru of the time, more so than the widely studied Indian leadership of the great anticolonial rebellions of the “Andean South,” of which Cuzco was the foremost political center. Since this idea constitutes a crucial aspect of my overall interpretation of the Huanta rebellion it deserves further explanation.

Unlike the well-known Indian leaders of the great Cuzco uprisings—from Tupac Amaru to Pumacahua—native leaders of the Huanta rebellion, the so-called Iquichanos, were inconspicuous, barely literate, and humbly born men from the highest punas. They lacked noble Indian lineages, spoke little Spanish and no Latin. None of them, moreover, would claim, or pretend to claim, the status of “ethnic chief,” or kuraka, or the rights over a kurakazo.57 And the reason I say they may represent Andean Peru’s Indian or peasant leadership better than the noble rebels of Cuzco is that late colonial Peru was a society in which noble Indians may have retained social prestige but were inexorably losing political power; this trend was exacerbated by the repressive measures following the defeat of the Tupac Amaru uprising. The diminishing power of the kurakas and the concomitant waning of the Indian nobility-based political leadership in Peru was a late colonial trend that crystallized under the Republic. And this trend seems to have been especially evident in Ayacucho, perhaps even developing earlier there.

The title of this book, “Plebian Republic,” aims to capture this process. It also aims to call attention to the role of plebian rural actors in the play of politics in the early republican state. The recomposition of the authority system in Andean society after the demise of the kurakas has been traditionally a topic dealt with by late-colonial period specialists, but it has not been discussed in the context of early republican caudillo politics. Nevertheless, my study suggests that native Andean peasant leaders played an active role in the play of politics of the early republican state. This role, therefore, merits investigation.

The historian Jorge Basadre once claimed that the Republic politically empowered social sectors which, on account of their racial features or plebian origins, would not have been able to attain high office under the ethnically stratified colonial society. Basadre was referring to the dark-skinned mestizo caudillos who became presidents of the Republic, who never became wealthy but instead died in poverty.14 He had less to say about what was happening at the bottom of the political system. But it is precisely here that my study of Huanta offers useful referents. What I am suggesting is that the “plebeianization of politics” Basadre alludes to was not just about the highest caudillos but occurred also at the very bottom of the political system. In fact, it began earlier there. The caudillo state, which made warfare a way of life and rewarded military skill with political office, opened new avenues of social ascent for plebian sectors, that is, those who, like the peasant leaders of Huanta, were not able to claim noble lineages of either Spanish or Inca origin.

Historians who have followed the demise of the kurakas have suggested that their functions were taken up by mestizo (and criollo) authorities and by the varayocs, Indian mayors, or alcaldes vara, who, unlike the kurakas, ruled over just one community/village and whose position was rotative rather than lineage-based.55 My research supports this idea. But it uncovers yet another type of Indian/peasant chiefainship: that whose authority was rooted neither in their nobility (as was that of the kurakas) nor in community rights (as was that of the varayocs), but rather in war. And although this new leadership’s powers may resemble at times those of colonial kurakas and at other times those of varayocs, they do not really conform to either pattern. Neither can these characters be classified as misfits (the mestizo authorities and hacendados reviled by twentieth-century indigenista fiction writers and usually portrayed as exploiters of the Indians) for they did not always master the literary skills associated with the condition of misfit, though they were, like misfits, brokers of sorts. These new chiefs partook of Indian/peasant community culture and accomplished important economic functions in the peasant communities’ life, especially at the level of circulation of goods. They were muleteers, petty hacendados, and even cattle rustlers. Their economic functions were the basis of their political power and ascendancy over the peasantry. But it was war that ultimately legitimized and enhanced this power. For it was the state that ultimately legitimized war.16

These types of petty caudillos, simultaneously montoneros and local authorities, reigned in the heights of Huanta, and notably in Uchuraccay, within a time period that I call the Plebian Republic (1821–50). And these very same commanded the montoneras that fought the Republic “in the king’s name” in the wake of the Independence wars. I will attempt to show that any belligerency that the peasant leadership of the monarchist uprising may have dis-
played in the context of rebellion was not so much suppressed as rechanneled in the interests of republican politicians, and, ultimately, to serve the state. Inasmuch as the demands of the state and of caudillos striving for state power upon the rural populations presupposed the military mobilization of the peasantry in the form of guerillas, there is every reason to suppose that a similar type of chiefship might have emerged in other Andean regions of Peru.

As can be surmised from the discussion above, this book is about more than a "monarchist rebellion." But inasmuch as it is fundamentally about this rebellion, some further clarifications must yet be made. When I have described to friends and colleagues the subject matter of my investigation, I have been met with a common reaction. Upon learning two of the most salient features of the 1823–28 Huanta rebellion—that is, that it challenged the Republic and that it called for the return of the rule of the Spanish king—not a few of them have pictured it as a "backward-looking" or "traditionally oriented" movement, reminiscent of the French Vendée rebellion (1793), the war waged by the most traditional sectors of the French society affected by the liberal and anticlerical measures of the French Revolution. Perhaps this interpretation is viable if the Huanta uprising is viewed superficially or on the basis of its proclamations alone, but it is, however, problematic in that it obscures some of the rebellion's most significant political features. Such an interpretation also risks distorting the historical context in which the rebellion originated. Liking the Huanta rebellion to a Vendée-like war assumes, first of all, that the Republic in Peru was the outcome of a liberal revolution. Such an assessment itself is controversial given that Peru has been widely regarded as the "reluctant republic" in the context of the Spanish American struggles for Independence. But secondly, and more importantly, the comparison may not apply here because the Huantinos themselves were not, in fact, waging this war in defense of "tradition" or in the hope of restoring the "old regime."

Far from being a beleaguered nobility, a landed elite, or a priesthood stripped of long-held privileges, the promoters of this uprising were either newcomers or social upstarts, this being valid not only for the local but also for the European members of the alliance. Huanta itself, as already mentioned, was a province of rather late Spanish colonization. The rights and privileges that the Huanta rebels claimed were recent and specifically defined rather than "traditionally held" or "ancestral." Most importantly, although the defense of absolute monarchy was indeed quite explicit in the leaflets and proclamations that called for rebellion, this idea, along with the rumors that announced the imminent landing of troops sent by the king, was more entrenched among the Spanish members of the alliance than among the local Huanta populations. It was held particularly by former officers of the defeated king's regiments who found refuge in Huanta after the Ayacucho battle. None of this negates the presence of doctrinaire monarchists among the Huantos as well. But let us not forget that doctrinaire monarchists and Spanish royalists could be found throughout Peru, especially in the urban centers of early Spanish influence, including Lima.

My contention in this book, therefore, is that for most local leaders of the Huanta uprising, monarchism represented an instrumental more than an ideological option. That is, the king's name was invoked as a symbol of prestige and a source of legitimacy, but monarchy as a political system was not necessarily espoused by the local people. Consequently, monarchism as an ideology did not ultimately take hold in Huanta. It didn't take hold in Peru either, for that matter, as it did in Mexico, where Iturbide and Maximilian were crowned emperors, and Ecuador, which experienced the monarchist projects of the caudillo Flores. But even in these two cases, monarchism was short lived, and in the case of Ecuador, abortive. Broadly speaking, monarchies did not make a comeback in America as they did in Europe once the republics were proclaimed.

Ultimately, and paradoxical as it may sound, Huanta province's subsequent political trajectory tended toward liberalism. In the civil wars of the 1830s and also later during the political confrontations of the 1850s, the Huanta montoneros aligned themselves with caudillos who were identified with liberal programs, leaders like Luis José de Orbe Goso and Andrés de Santa Cruz. Later in the century, Huanta peasants adopted a nationalist stance, joining Andrés Avelino Cáceres's campaign of resistance to the Chileans in the central sierra. Early in the twentieth century, Huanta became the seedbed of anarchist reformers and a cradle of nearly all the liberal-minded intellectuals of Ayacucho. With this in mind, it would be misleading to brand the province's historical trajectory as "conservative," let alone conceive of its peasantry as having lived "isolated" since pre-Hispanic times, as the official interpretation of the journalists' murders in Uchuraccay in 1983 assumed, citing the Huanta monarchist rebellion precisely as "proof" of the alleged aloofness.

The "cultural" arguments in the Uchuraccay Informe, particularly in the main Vargas Llosa report and the anthropological appendixes by Juan M.
Ossio and Fernando Fuenzalida, have been widely contested, and I will not claim originality in disputing them once again. But this book might not have been written had I not been convinced that similar arguments continue to be widespread (and not limited to the peasants of Uchuraccay) inside and outside Peru, within and beyond academia.

Overview

Chapter 2, "The Republic's First Peasant Uprising," presents the events which are central to the rest of the book. It follows the Huanta uprising from its inception in 1825 to its defeat in 1828, through its aftermath into the 1830s. Each of the following interpretative chapters scrutinizes a different aspect, or aspects, of the uprising. In doing so, the core narrative of chapter 2 is expanded, synchronic details are exposed, and historiographical interpretations are brought to light.

Chapter 3, "Royalism in the Crisis of Independence," captures the "moment" and precipitating factors of the uprising; it furnishes the short-term explanations at regional and national as well as political and economic levels; it answers such questions as why a monarchist uprising was triggered in this region at this particular juncture.

Chapter 4, "Words and Images: The People and the King," contextualizes the discourse that the rebel caudillos, both Spaniards and natives, made explicit. It introduces and analyzes the ideological propaganda in their leaflets and proclamations and hypothesizes about the roots of their professed adherence to the king.

Chapter 5, "The World of the Peasants: Landscapes and Networks," sets the geographical scope of the rebellion; it describes the types of settlements comprising it and where the bulk of the restorationist army originated. It also gives a sense of the social background of the main protagonists, including peasants and muleteers, hacendados and merchants, and establishes the socioeconomic ties that linked the sectors engaged in the rebellion. This chapter is also crucial in that it uncovers a telling silence: the contemporary town of Iquicha, which supposedly gave name to the so-called Iquichanos rebellion, is absent from all colonial tributary, ethnographic, and cartographic sources consulted and therefore does not form part of the setting. For the "Iquichanos"—if a name can create, or help create, an identity—began their existence as such only after, and as a result of, the monarchist uprising.

Chapter 6, "Government in Uchuraccay," returns to the question of the causality of the rebellion posed in chapter 2, but from a perspective beyond the circumstances that explain the outbreak: the reasons that made it possible to prolong and maintain it. In other words, it explores the social bases of the rebellion. These are found in the rebel caudillos' ability to handle the problems and meet the needs of the local people through actions which theoretically should have been carried out by the state: redistribution of surpluses through appropriation of tithes, administration of justice, and "social control," among others. The rebel caudillos did not accomplish these tasks through random deeds but rather in an institutional fashion, through an organization which I call the Government in Uchuraccay, named after the rebels' main headquarters. This chapter is relevant not only in that it adds one more causal explanation to the uprising, but also in that it tries to decipher its meaning by decoding chiefly nonverbalized and nonarticulated messages: the meaning of the Uchuraccay government hierarchies; the tenor of the rebels' appoint-
ments; the manner in which the rebels adopted colonial and republican \textit{bureaucratic} terminology and the implications of this adoption; the extent of rebel officers' powers. This chapter makes clear that besides waging a war, the rebels were, in their own way, creating government. The quality of the sources used in this chapter provides a unique opportunity to trace the workings of both the late colonial and the early republican state at the local level and in a rural setting.

Chapter 7, "The Plebeian Republic," expands the narrative of the first chapter's final section. It follows the fate of the defeated rebels from 1828 to ca. 1850 and shows how they ended up not only accommodating but taking an active part in the new Republic they had initially so utterly rejected. It analyzes this process at both military and civil levels. Unlike the Spanish instigators of the monarchist rebellion, who ended up exiled or in prison, the native chieftains of Huanta were either pardoned or eluded capture. They remained politically active and formed guerrilla armies that aligned with President Orbegoso in the civil war of 1834 and with Santa Cruz in the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation of 1836–39. In gratitude for their services, these governments publicly honored the peasants and compensated their leaders with appointments in the local state bureaucracy. Antonio Huachaca, for example, became a justice of the peace. This recognition was ephemeral. But their exploits and political ventures—some real, some exaggerated, some invented—produced enough memories among Huantinos and state officials alike to allow for the creation of a new identity—that of the "Iquichanos"—a new village, and a new district, Iquicha, which twentieth-century indigenista writers and academicians would ironically conceive of as being "ancestral."

There was never anything stable or permanent about the Iquichano identity in the nineteenth century, nor is there now. And I would be surprised if someone in Huanta who is not native to the village of Iquicha were to identify himself or herself as Iquichano or Iquichana, particularly considering that the district of Iquicha, at the time of this writing, no longer exists. Ever since the term \textit{Iquichano} began "making history" in 1826, the Iquichanos, conceived of either as a union of ayllus or as an "ethnic group" in Huanta, have been an entity more real in the minds of those using the label to designate Huanta villagers and their caudillos than in the villagers' perception of themselves; peasants continue identifying most commonly with their individual villages. For this reason, I have tried not to be as expansive as my sources in the usage of the terms \textit{Iquicha} and \textit{Iquichanos} and have adopted, wherever possible, more precise forms of identification instead. Nevertheless, this has not always been possible, or convenient, as I later realized, if the perspective of government authorities, which in turn peasants used as a point of reference for their own forms of self-identification, was to be conveyed. Hence, I have resolved that dropping the term altogether would risk downplaying the intricacies of the story that makes the Huanta rebellion so compelling a historical event in the first place. Mental constructions really do matter because they lead humans to carry out precisely the kinds of things that we, in turn, group under the label of "making history." And history is what government officials, the peasants of Huanta, and their montonero leaders made in claiming or disclaiming, boasting of or repudiating, denouncing or embracing Iquicha and the Iquichanos.
dominated the political scene from the late 1820s to the early 1840s. For, if we accept his interpretation, this state had Hapsburgian ideological legacies; and whereas the Hapsburgs encouraged corporatism, economic protectionism, and aristocratic values and privileges, Huanta tended toward liberalism, both economically and politically, while socially it cannot have been further removed from any nobility. If Huanta serves to exemplify other Andean places, one could then say that the state favored by the Gamarraistas and the traders in Lima and the northern coast, for all its economic nationalism—or perhaps, precisely because of it—evolved in contraposition to much of rural Andean Peru. Historiography ought to tackle this question. Perhaps the fact that Gamarra’s political stronghold was Cuzco has muddled the fact that his most powerful allies were in Lima and obscured the extent to which his aggressive pursuit of the presidency was eventually instrumental to the imposition of Lima’s state project on the rest of Peru (pase the Cuzqueños). His overarching association with the former Inca capital may have concealed as well the fact that his support there was not universal but rather limited to the urban spheres. Indeed, as a recent study suggests, Gamarra failed to cater to the Cuzco peasantry.39 Could he have done otherwise? I would not wager a judgment, but such quandaries give us, at any rate, something to think about in the present.

I wonder, finally, in playing with Gootenberg’s compelling “dynastic” analogies, if a parallel between Huanta liberals and the eighteenth-century Bourbon modernizers would make any sense. The temptation to answer yes is great, given that Huanta itself thrived under the Bourbons, precisely because of some of their “liberal” reforms. But here again caution must be exercised. For, as stated at the beginning of this epilogue, the republican state, particularly as it was experienced in Huanta, although it displayed some continuities in relation to its Bourbon imperial predecessor, also differed from it in substantial ways.

Having said that, I cannot go much further. The history of liberalism in Peru’s Andean rural areas has not been written, mainly because it has been thought to be nonexistent; but also, and more significantly, I think, because the equation sierra = “backward Peru” still dominates both politics and scholarship. I have written this book in an attempt to question this idea and in the hope that others may determine the extent to which the conclusions I have reached on the basis of the available evidence for Huanta serve to deepen our understanding of Peru in the nineteenth century and, most importantly, perhaps, in the present.

Notes

ABBREVIATIONS

ADAY  Archivo Departamental de Ayacucho
AGN  Archivo General de la Nación (Lima)
AGI  Archivo General de Indias (Seville)
BN  Biblioteca Nacional (Lima)
BNM  Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid)
BRAHM  Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia de Madrid
Crim.  Causas Criminales (Criminal proceedings)
CRC  Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas (Cuzco)
CODIP  Colección Documental de la Independencia del Perú
CEHMP–AHM  Centro de Estudios Histórico Militares del Perú–Archivo Histórico Militar (Lima)
CONUP  Consejo Nacional de la Universidad Peruana
CRIC  Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Madrid)
cuad.  cuaderno (notebook)
jpi  Juzgado de Primera Instancia
IEP  Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
IFE  Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos
leg.  legajo (bundle of papers)
PUCP  Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
UNSCCH  Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga

CHAPTER 1. Introduction

All translations are Renzo Llorente’s and mine unless otherwise indicated.

1 This hypothesis was endorsed by the newspapers La República and El Diario.

2 Alberto Flores Galindo, Buscando un Inca: identidad y utopía en los Andes (Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1987), 325. For most Peruvians, Sendero appeared “like lightning out of a clear sky,” as Flores Galindo put it. Sendero’s insurgency began precisely when most on the left decided to choose the electoral path and when sociologists and economists were describing Peru as a modern country, one with a growing proletarian and a peasantry in the process of extinction.

3 Mario Vargas Llosa et al., Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay (Lima: Editora Perú, 1983) (hereafter, Informe).

When summoned by Vargas Llosa in February 1983 to reveal the details of the journalists' murders, the Uchuraccay comuneros refused to do so and consistently claimed, "That's all; we, ignorant men, we don't know anything else." "Unpublished Transcripts."


I owe this information to Otis Stern. In 1989, the other two indicted Uchuraccay villagers were released by a pardon granted by President Alan García.

Vargas Llosa et al., Informe, 36, 39. This argument is stronger in the final report prepared by Vargas Llosa himself—but see also the appendixes by the anthropologists Fernando Fuenzalida and Juan M. Osio in Informe. For further discussion of these issues, see Cecilia Méndez-Gastelumendi, "The Power of Naming, or the Construction of Ethnic and National Identities in Peru: Myth, History and the Iquichanos," Past and Present, 171 (May 2001): 127–60.


I have elaborated further on the Iquichano identity in Méndez-Gastelumendi, "The Power of Naming."


For example, Gustavo Vergara Arias, Montoneras y Guerrillas en la etapa de la emancipación del Perú (1820–1833) (Lima: Imprenta y Litografía Salesiana, 1974); Ezequiel Beltrán Gallardo, Las guerrillas de Yauyos en la emancipación del Perú, 1820–1824 (Lima: Editores Técnicos Asociados, 1977). These works had important precedents in such works as Raúl Rivera Serna, Los guerrilleros del Centro en la emancipación peruana (Lima: P. L. Villanueva, 1958).

The publication of Boleslao Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru y los orígenes de la emancipación Americana (Buenos Aires: Hachette S. A., 1957) and Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1947) had a great impact on the construction of Túpac Amaru as a national hero, particularly by singling him out as the initiator of the cycle of Independence struggles in South America. For a discussion of the historiographical "rehabilitation" of Túpac Amaru's image, see David Cahill, Violencia, represión y rebelión en el sur andino: la sublevación de Túpac Amaru y sus consecuencias: Documento de Trabajo; no. 105, Serie Historia (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos [hereafter IEP], 1999).

Another proof of this conciliatory spirit was the publication, under the official auspices of the government and on the same occasion, of more than a hundred volumes of documents relevant to the Independence process. The main goal of this project, which brought together historians of many different social and political backgrounds, was to instill patriotism, regardless of whether the heroic acts had been performed by creoles, mestizos, or indians. Colección Documental de la Independencia del Perú (hereafter CDIP; Lima: Comisión del Sesquicentenario del Independence del Perú, 1971–78).


By the mid–nineteenth century the Chilean historian Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna wrote a treatise on Peruvian Independence in which he qualified the interpretations that stressed the lack of nationalism among Peruvians and the "external" nature of the process, which was seemingly widespread at that time. See Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, La independencia en el Perú, prologue by Luis Alberto Sánchez, 5th ed. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1971). For an early twentieth-century account of Independence that argues for Peru's unwillingness to become independent, see Nemesio Vargas, Historia del Perú Independiente (Lima: Imp. de la Escuela de Ingenieros por Julio Mestinas, 1903), 117.

José Carlos Maríategui, Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana (Lima: Biblioteca Amana, 1952).

A frequently quoted passage can be found in José de la Riva Agüero, "Paisajes Peruanos," in Obras Completas (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica, 1969), 1159.

Ibid., 49. Or, as French historian Jean Piel put it, "At Junín and Ayacucho the Peruvian soldiers on the two sides, that of the Crown and that of Independence, killed each other without a thought. To the majority the idea of an independent Peru meant nothing." Jean Piel, "The Place of the Peasantry in the National Life of Peru in the Nineteenth Century," Past and Present no. 49 (February 1970): 116. The historical synthesis of the Independence in Latin America that best reproduces
these Marxist-dependentista paradigms is John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1986). An interpretation of Independence that, notwithstanding its sympathy with the Marxist paradigm, presented a variant of the Bonilla-Spalding thesis is that of Florencia Mallon, The Defense of Community in Peru’s Central Highlands (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Mallon holds that the incipient bourgeoisie of the central sierra wanted to break with colonial domination, for, unlike the creoles of Lima, the bourgeoisie in this region saw their interests and class development restricted by colonialism. As regards the role of the popular sectors, however, Mallon endorses the Marxist theory discussed here: that of “no perception” and “no participation.” Similarly, see Nelson Manrique, Yawar Mayu: Sociedades Terratenientes Serranas 1789–1910 (Lima: Desco and Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, 1988), 27–28. Both Mallon and Manrique, however, have written extensively about peasant participation in the War of the Pacific (1879–83).

For an empirically rich and nonpatriotic approach that considers peasants as participants in the political debates that preceded Independence, see Christine Hinefeldt, Lucha por la tierra y protesta indígena (Bonn: Bonner Amerikanistische Studien, 1982); and Núria Sala i Vila, Y se armó el tole tole: tributo indígena y movimientos sociales en el Virreinato del Perú, 1790–1814 (Ayacucho: Instituto de Estudios Regionales José María Arguedas, 1996). In the seventies some works emerged in reaction to the article by Bonilla and Spalding that did not support the Puente’s hypothesis, for example, Jorge Basadre, El Azar en la Historia y sus límites (Lima: P. L. Villanueva, 1973). Scarlett O’Phelan also disputed Bonilla but did not discuss the role of the popular sectors. See O’Phelan, “Acercar del mito de la Independencia concedida,” in Independencia y Revolución, comp., Alberto Flores Galindo (Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1987). For Bonilla’s response to some of these critiques, see his “Clases Populares y Estado en el contexto de la crisis colonial,” in La Independencia en el Perú, 2d ed., ed. Heradcio Bonilla (Lima: 189, 1981).


Interestingly, the Huanta peasants’ monarchist ventures sparked the curiosity more of nineteenth-century than of twentieth-century historians. The first historiographical approach to the monarchist uprising in Peru is probably that of Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán (1821–86), Historia del Perú Independiente (tercer periodo 1827–1833) (Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1929), originally published in the 1860s. Paz Soldán’s treatment of the Huanta rebellion is more subtle and extensive than Jorge Basadre’s in Historia de la República, vol. 1, 7th ed. rev. (Lima: Editorial Universitaria, 1989). This, of course, does not include diaries and chronicles from the early republican period, which provide brief though significant data on the so-called Iquichanos. These authors include one president of the Republic, Rufino Echenique, the chaplain of another president, Luis José Orbegoso, and some European travelers. See Peter Blanchard, Markham in Peru: The Travels of Clements R. Markham, 1828–1833 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991); José María Blanco, Diario del Presidente Orbegoso al Sur del Perú, Félix Denegri Luna, ed. (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Instituto Riva Agüero, Lima, 1974); José Rufino Echenique, Memorias para la Historia del Perú, vol. 1 (Lima: Editorial Huascaran, 1953); Heinrich Witt, Un Testimonio Personal Sobre el Perú del Siglo XIX, (1844–1842), vol. 1 (Lima: Banco Mercantil, 1992). On Iquichano participation in the caudillista strife of the 1820s, see Nemesio Vargas, Historia, vol. 1.

Patrick Husson, “Guerre indienne et révolte paysanne dans la province de Huanta (département d’Ayacucho-Pérou) au xixe siècle,” Université Paris IV, 1983, published, in Spanish unreviewed, as De la Guerra a la Rebelión (Huanta siglo xixe) (Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas [hereafter CEB], 1992). The first thesis on the Huanta monarchist uprising is actually by Iván Pérez Aguirre, “Rebelde Iquichanos: 1824–1828,” (Tesis de Bachillerato, Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga Ayacucho, 1982). This work unearths an important array of unpublished sources from which my own work has benefited. His interpretation is, unfortunately, marred by a dogmatic Maoist agenda that makes it difficult to discuss his arguments in broad historiographical terms.

“The main problem posed by the war of the Iquichanos seems to be the transference of a conflict involving the dominant strata toward the social strata which in principle have no stake in the conflict. The problem of the transference of a conflict from the national to the regional level and from an elite to the people could, from our point of view, be resolved in part through an examination of the fundamental role of the duality manipulation-alienation.” Husson, De la Guerra, 123.

Ibid., 229.

Ibid., 22. By the same token, “The two . . . uprisings . . . expressed the great fear of the indigenous peasant masses when confronted with imminent change,” ibid., 236.


Vargas Llosa et al., Informe, 39 (emphasis added).
A footnote cannot do justice to the many studies which during the past twenty-five years have come to question the theoretical and political assumptions on which Husson based his analysis, but see the two well-known studies of James Scott, which delve into nonviolent “resistance”: *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); and *Weapons of the Weak: The Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). For the Andes, see, for example, Steve Stern, ed., *Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World: 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987). The “defensive” reaction of the peasants before the advance of “capitalism” has been questioned for the Andean reality by a series of investigations that address peasant participation in colonial markets. See Olivia Harris, Brooke Larson, and Enrique Tandeter, eds., *Participación Indígena en los Mercados Surandinos: estrategias y reproducción social, siglos XVI a XX*, 2 vols. (Cochabamba: CBRES, 1987); and Brooke Larson and Olivia Harris, eds., *Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).


This classification is only an approximation, but for the elevations and names of the ecological niches I am following relatively closely the classic classification of Javier.
Loyalty to the Crown was not something of which only the white elite boasted. In the colonial era, it was even more important for Indians to prove their loyalty because it was a prerequisite for receiving the confirmation of their titles as kurakas, which allowed them to claim property titles, privileges such as tax exemptions, and, most importantly, the right to rule over a given community of Indians and collect tribute from them. The celebrated chronicler Guzmán Poma de Ayala, who was born in southern Ayacucho in the postconquest sixteenth century is the most renowned example of a native Andean who struggled to demonstrate not only his own loyalty to the king but also that of his ancestors, in the so-called "wars of the encomenderos"—although he was never granted the recognition of kuraka he so longed for. See his Nueva Coronica y Buen Gobierno, 3 vols., John Murra and Rolena Adorno, eds., Jorge Urioste, trans. (Lima: ISP / Siglo Veintiuno, 1980).

This feature is, however, apparent only in the provinces south of Huanta. The area that corresponds to current Huanta province remains a blank spot on the "ethnic maps" of sixteenth-century Huamanga—it's fate under the Incas being less well known (see, for instance, maps in Jaime Urrutia, Huamanga, 20, 51). The presence of mitmas dating back to Inca times is, in other words, not evident in Huanta. The possibility that the Incas may not have completely subdued every corner of the current Huanta province cannot be ruled out. For a recent overview of the archeological work in Ayacucho, see Cirilo Vivanco Pomacanchi, "Arqueología de Ayacucho: Un Examen Necesario," Afines, Búsqueda desde Huamanga 1, no. 1 (1996): 85–95. On pre-Hispanic Ayacucho, see Enrique Gonzales Carré, Historia Pre-Hispánica de Ayacucho (Ayacucho: Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, 1982). For Chanka archaeology, see Lidio Valdés, Cirilo Vivanco, and Casimiro Chávez, "Asentamientos Chanka en la cuenca del Pampas y Qaracha, Ayacucho," Gaceta Arqueológica Andina no. 17 (1990): 17–26. On pre-Hispanic Huanta, see Martha Anders, "Dual Organization and Calendars Inferred from the Planned Site of Azángaro-Wari Administrative Strategies," 3 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1986).


53 The Huanta chiefains may bear more resemblance to the Aymara caudillo Julián Apasa, who, under the name Túpaj Katarí, led the siege of La Paz in 1781. Unlike the members of the Túpac Amaru clan, he was humbly born and had little education, though he doubtless became a charismatic and effective leader and ended up, like Túpac Amaru, being executed by the Spanish. See Sinclair Thompson, "Colonial Crisis, Community, and Andean Self-Rule: Aymara Politics in the Age of Insurgency, Eighteenth-Century La Paz," (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1996), and Thompson, We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002). Other researchers have
called attention to a non-kuraka kind of Indian leadership, particularly in the late eighteenth century, to whom the Huantinos seem to bear some resemblance as well. For example, David Cahill and Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy, “Forging Their Own History: Indian Insurgency in the Southern Peruvian Sierra,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 2, no. 2 (1992): 125–67; Sala i Vila, *Y se Armo*; and Alejandro Díez Hurtado, *Comuneros y Haciendas: Procesos de Comunalización en la Sierra de Piura* (siglos XVIII al XX) (Cuzco: CIPCA / CBC, 1998).


56 In their respective studies of the peasant communities of nineteenth-century Piura (in northern Peru) and Chumbivilcas (Cuzco), the anthropologists Alejandro Díez and Deborah Poole have noticed the existence of a peasant leadership that does not fit the “classic” definitions of kuraka and varayac. Their contributions are especially important in that they pay close attention, as few anthropological works do when covering the nineteenth century, to the way in which the peasant community’s authority system, material culture, and power relations were molded in their relationship with the state. Yet neither of them delves into the impact of caudillo politics in the peasant community authority system and power relations. See Díez Hurtado, *Comuneros y Haciendas*; and Deborah Poole, “Qorilazos, abigecos y comunidades campesinas en la provincia de Chumbivilcas (Cusco),” in *Comunidades Campesinas, Cambios y Permanencias*, 2d ed., ed. Alberto Flores Galindo, 357–95 (Chiclayo: Centro de Estudios ‘Solidaridad,’ 1988); and Poole, “Landscapes of Power in a Cattle-Rustling Culture of Southern Andean Peru,” *Dialectical Anthropology* no. 12 (1988): 97–98.

57 For thought-provoking reflections on this issue, see Alberto Flores Galindo, *La Tradición Autoritaria: Violencia y democracia en el Perú* (Lima: Sur / PRODER, 1999), 25–27.


59 “They [the peasants] have lived isolated and forgotten since pre-Hispanic times.” Vargas Llosa et al., *Informe*, 38.