For there were many *hetairai* in the army:
Women in Xenophon’s *Anabasis*¹

The mercenaries of Cyrus, the Cyreans, whose story Xenophon recounts in his *Anabasis*, are familiar figures to students of ancient warfare.² The women who accompanied the Cyreans for much of their march, in contrast, have so far received scant attention from historians more often interested in the details of tactics and leadership.³ Nor is such neglect solely the fault of old-fashioned military types, for even those who focus on the political and social aspects of the *Anabasis* army largely ignore its women.⁴ What is more, although women make repeated appearances in Xenophon’s narrative, scholars of women’s roles and status in the ancient Greek have scarcely noticed their presence.⁵ This last omission appears all the more striking, given the amount of scrutiny accorded recently to the category of the *hetaira*, and given that Xenophon several times describes women amongst the Cyreans as *hetairai*.⁶ The histories of women and of warfare, it would seem, are not supposed to mix.

Such an artificial boundary clearly invites breaking, and the *Anabasis* provides invaluable material for the task. This essay examines Xenophon’s testimony on the origins and number of women amongst the Cyreans and the extent of their participation in the social life of the army. His narrative, as we shall see, indicates that at least some of the women who joined the Cyreans in the retreat from Cunaxa to the sea and thence to Byzantium became integral members of the soldiers’ community. Indeed, Xenophon’s use of ἐξήλθος to describe them highlights his recognition that all who shared the rigors of the retreat and the social life of the army merited the name of "companions." Furthermore, the *Anabasis* depicts women in the army as visible, vocal and masculine, suggesting that the particular conditions of the march helped blur some of the strong distinctions commonly associated with classical Greek gender ideology. Finally, because his text obviously constitutes not an objective account but a self-conscious literary

¹ This is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the 2002 APA Panel on Women and Warfare in Ancient Greece. Many thanks to the Friends of Ancient History for sponsoring this panel, to Jacqueline Long for her work in organizing and moderating the session, and to my fellow participants for their comments and suggestions. All translations are my own, and except where noted follow the text of Hude & Peters 1972.


³ See most recently Hutchinson 2000.


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construction, I turn Xenophon’s perspective around and attempt to recover some vestige of how these women may have viewed their experience with the Cyreans.

Women in the Army

Women’s presence in the Anabasis army may be roughly divided into three stages. During the first stage, from the army’s muster at Sardis in spring 401, through the battle of Cunaxa that September, until the massacre of their generals in mid-October, probably very few women accompanied the Cyreans. Only two women, in fact, are securely attested in the army during this period: the concubines (παλλακίδας) of Cyrus himself. At Cunaxa, when the Persians overran the Cyrean camp, they captured the older of the two, a Phocaean; Xenophon remembers her as having been learned and beautiful. The younger παλλακίς, a Milesian, successfully sought refuge with the Cyreans. No further mention is made of her in the Anabasis, although it is possible she remained with the army for the duration of its march.

For Persian elites to bring such women, not to mention wives, on campaign was apparently unremarkable, perhaps even de rigueur. Of them Xenophon writes in the Cyropaedia that: even today those going to war in Asia campaign accompanied by their most valued possessions [sc. wives and concubines], saying that they would fight better if their dearest ones were present; for they say that it would be necessary to protect these zealously. Maybe this is true, and maybe they do it so they can indulge in pleasure.

7 For chronological tables of the march see Boucher 1913: xx-xxiv and Breitenbach 1967: 2501-2502; for maps see Lendle 1995.

8 Anab. 1.10.3.

9 Anab. 1.10.3: τὴν σοφὴν καὶ καλὴν λεγομένην. For her subsequent experience as priestess of Artemis and concubine of Persian kings, see Lendle 1995: 85 and Masqueray 1930: 166.

10 Possibly Cyrus had two Milesian concubines; the manuscripts are corrupt at this point. See Dillery 2001: 137, Masqueray 1930: 87.

11 Brosius 1996: 87-91. On pallakidas see also Hdt. 9.76, 9.81; Xen. Cyr. 4.3.1, 5.2.28; Hell. 3.1.10.

12 Cyr. 4.3.2: πάντες γὰρ ἐπὶ καὶ νῦν οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἄσιαν στρατεύομεν έξωντες τὰ πλέοντα δέεικα στρατεύονται, λέγοντες δὴ μάλλον μέχριν' ἄν εἰ τὰ φίλτατα ταρεῖτ, τούτως γὰρ φασιν ἀνάγκην εἶναι προδῆμας ἀλέξειν. Ἡσας μὲν οὖν ἀντὶς ἔχει, ἡσας δὲ καὶ ποιοῦσιν εἰσά τῇ ἡδονῇ χαριζόμενοι.
Princes like Cyrus were clearly in a different league from ordinary Cyreans, the majority of whom could not afford to maintain a male slave attendant, much less a Persian-style concubine. Yet there are scattered ancient references to non-elite women, bakers and prostitutes specifically, accompanying both Greek and Persian armies of the fifth century BC. Is it possible similar non-elite women, as well as soldiers' wives and concubines, were present in Cyrus' army from the start of the expedition?

Of the 12,000 or so mercenaries who set out with Cyrus in spring 401, about half were drawn from long-service garrisons in Ionia. Most of the remainder were new recruits from mainland Greece, while the condottiere Clearchus came from Thrace with a private army of some 2000 men. Xenophon provides no positive evidence that women accompanied any of these contingents. An argument from silence seems in this case compelling, for elsewhere in the Anabasis Xenophon has no compunctions about mentioning women in the army. He does, in contrast, specifically note that soldiers had left wives and children behind either in mainland Greece or in the cities of Ionia.

There were also practical reasons, both for the mercenaries and for Cyrus, not to bring women along. Until the army reached Tarsus at the beginning of June, the soldiers believed they were embarking on a brief punitive campaign against the Pisidians. Their employer was providing a merchant caravan, from which they could obtain grain and possibly prostitutes. On such a short mission, the mercenaries would have little need for sexual or other entertainment, and they could certainly do their own cooking. For his part, Cyrus wanted a

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13 One good indicator of the average Cyrean's poverty is that the mercenaries continued to follow Cyrus even though he was three months late with their pay (Anab. 1.2.11). On slave attendants in Greek armies, see now van Wees 2001.

14 Hdt. 7.187: γυναικῶν δὲ αὐτοκόιλων καὶ παιδικών (Xerxes' army, 480-479); Thuc. 2.78: γυναικεῖς δὲ δέκα καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτοκόιλοι (defenders of Plataea, 429 BC); Alexis of Samos in Athenaeus 13.572-573 (Müller FHG IV.299): τὴν ἐν Σέλων Ἀφροδίτην, ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐν Καλάμως καλοῦσαν, οἱ δὲ ἐν Ἔλει, Ἀττικαί, φησίν, ἔτορα ἱδρύσασιν οἰ θυσίας ἀναστάτησαν Πειρείσκες, δοσὶ ἐπικλούσις τὴν Σάμον. Εργασάμενι τοις ἰκανῶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὅρας (440-439 BC). Note that the last two of these instances involve armies in static siege situations.

15 For specific figures see Parke 1933: 26 and Roy 1967: 301-302.

16 Anab. 1.4.8, 3.1.3, 3.4.46.

17 Anab. 1.1.11, 1.2.1.

18 Anab. 1.3.14, 1.5.6.

19 Short mission: contrast this with the static siege situations listed in note 14 above. Men cooking: see e.g. Anab. 3.3.1; see also Theophr. Char. 14.11.
swift march across Anatolia and into Mesopotamia before the Great King, his elder brother Artaxerxes, could recognize and respond to the challenge. He would have sought to minimize the number of non-combatants following the army, thereby reducing its logistical burden and quickening its progress. If he permitted vivandières and prostitutes, he would likely have restricted them to the centralized travelling market, where they could most efficiently service the entire army.

Moreover, by having his long-enlistment mercenaries - almost half his men, remember - leave their wives, concubines and/or children back at their Ionian bases, Cyrus would create a ready stock of hostages for the troops’ good behavior. When his generals Xenias and Pasion deserted at Myriandus in July, Cyrus made a great show of magnanimity. "Of course," he said, "I have their children and wives in the garrison at Tralles, but they shall not be deprived of them; rather they’ll regain them on account of their previous excellence to me." To other Cyreans who might have left dependents behind in Ionia, the message was subtle but clear: imagine what could happen if you deserted.

If the Cyreans did not start from Sardis with women, there were few opportunities to acquire many on the way to Cunaxa. With the exception of sparsely populated Lycaonia in central Anatolia, which Cyrus allowed his troops to ravage, the army traversed either the prince’s own provinces, the territory of potential allies, or the Arabian desert fringe of the upper Euphrates. Xenophon recounts only one instance during this period where the mercenaries undertook extensive plundering. In early June, at Tarsus in Cilicia, the men of one contingent, angered by the destruction of two companies of their comrades in the Taurus mountains, sacked the city as well as the palace of Syennesis, the local dynast. Subsequently a speaker in the army’s assembly claimed that the Cyreans had seized many Cilicians and much booty.

20 On Cyrean logistics see Gabrielli 1995 and Lang 1992. That Cyrus brought along his pallakidas does no damage to this argument; rank has its privileges. He may even have intended the Phocaean as a potential emissary, on the pattern of Epyaxa’s diplomacy for Syermesis (Anab. 1.2.12, 1.3.26-27).

21 Anab. 1.4.8: καίτιοι ἔχω γε αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας ἐν Τράλλεσι φρονήσαντες. ἄλλοι οὖν τούτων στερήσαντες, ἄλλοι ἀπολύσαντες τὴς προσδετέν ἐντὸς ἐμῆ ἐκείνης. If any Cyreans could have brought women along, it would have been Xenias and Pasion, Cyrus’ two senior mercenary commanders. That they did not solidifies the conclusion that their troops did not do so either.

22 Read carefully, Anab. 1.4.9 hints that the soldiers understood Cyrus’ announcement as an implicit threat.

23 Lycaonia: Anab. 1.2.19; Cilicia (potential ally): Anab. 1.2.12 and Lendle 1995: 19-20; Arabia: Anab. 1.5.1ff.

24 Anab. 1.2.26.

25 Anab. 1.3.14.
Xenophon presents this speaker as a tool of Clearchus; the man’s entire speech, including the reference to numerous captives, seems exaggerated. It is possible that some mercenaries acquired female prisoners from the sack of Tarsus. Even so, the plunderers came from a single contingent, that of Menon; mustering around 2000, it represented less than a fifth of the army. However many women this contingent held, the soldiers probably sold them as soon as possible, perhaps at one of the busy coastal emporia the army visited in the next month. The point of taking captives, after all, was to profit from their sale, not to drag them along and have to feed them in the process.

From the battle of Cunaxa in early September until the massacre of the generals in mid-October, no further opportunities for the soldiers to acquire women arose. Cyrus had been killed in the battle, and the mercenaries were busy trying to sidle their way out of Mesopotamia while engaging in a fruitless series of negotiations with the Persians. Clearchus, now in command, took great pains to avoid antagonizing the Persians and wrecking a tenuous truce. The soldiers themselves swore oaths not to damage the countryside. When the Persian commander Tissaphernes did grant the Cyreans permission to plunder a set of villages, he specifically prohibited them from taking human captives (ἐνδοτέτοιο). If anything, then, the number of women in the army decreased from September to October, as the merchant caravan, including any vivandières and prostitutes therein, deserted to the Great King along with Cyrus’ satrapal troops and some of the mercenaries.

From Captives to Companions
The second stage of women’s participation in the Anabasis army began with the massacre of the Cyrean generals in mid-October. Apparently lulled into trusting Tissaphernes, Clearchus

26 Many Cilicians: *Anab.* 1.3.13. Cyrus made a rather vague, half-hearted promise to Syennesis that any captives taken might be reclaimed (*Anab.* 1.2.27), but this does not seem to have been acted upon.

27 Menon’s contingent: *Anab.* 1.2.6.

28 For example Issus (*Anab.* 1.4.1-2) or Myriandus (*Anab.* 1.4.6-7).

29 On sale of booty including captives see Pritchett 1971 and Pritchett 1991.

30 *Anab.* 2.4.5-7.

31 *Anab.* 2.3.27-28.

32 *Anab.* 2.4.27.

33 Desertions: *Anab.* 2.1.3, 2.2.7, 3.2.17.
and four colleagues accepted a Persian invitation to dinner, at which they, along with a number of other officers and soldiers, were treacherously seized and ultimately executed.\textsuperscript{34} Although momentarily stunned by this turn of events, the Cyreans quickly recovered. They selected new generals and officers, burned their tents and excess baggage, and prepared to march out of Persian territory.

Whether or not we should accept Xenophon's literary self-fashioning as the savior of the army during this crisis is beyond the scope of this essay. His narrative, nonetheless, suggests that a significant shift in Cyrean behavior took place following the massacre of the generals. Whereas before the soldiers feared to ravage the countryside lest they antagonize the Persians, they now began to see the people and property of Mesopotamia as theirs for the taking.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, Xenophon's rhetoric in this section of the text glorifies the taking of captives as the prerogative of victors.\textsuperscript{36} He makes particular note of the pleasures and perils provided by the women of the Mesopotamian plain, "the beautiful and tall women and girls of the Medes and Persians," as he calls them.\textsuperscript{37} So desirable are they, he adds, that the Cyreans must beware lest they fall into idleness with them, and, like the \textit{Odyssey}'s Lotus Eaters, forget the way home.\textsuperscript{38} Even allowing for Xenophon's panhellenist big-talk, this shift in attitude makes sense.\textsuperscript{39} There were going to be no further negotiations, so the Cyreans had nothing to lose from plundering and much to gain. What is more, taking captives and property might afford them a chance to recoup some profit from a failed venture. Cyrus, after all, was dead, and the mercenaries were not going to see the pay and bonuses he had promised them from the coffers of Babylon.

As the army made its way north up the fertile and settled Tigris valley and toward the mountains of Cardouchia, then, the soldiers began to accumulate substantial numbers of human captives, animals and other loot. Sometimes the inhabitants of settlements in their path fled, but apparently more often they were not so lucky.\textsuperscript{40} In the next several weeks, the numbers of captives and animals, along with some wounded or demoralized soldiers, grew into a substantial

\textsuperscript{34} Anab. 2.5.27-34.
\textsuperscript{35} Anab. 3.2.20-21.
\textsuperscript{36} Anab. 3.1.19, 3.2.28, 3.3.39.
\textsuperscript{37} Anab. 3.2.25 καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν καλαίς καὶ μεγάλας γυναῖξι καὶ παρθένοις.
\textsuperscript{38} Anab. 3.2.25-26; on this passage see Dillery 1995: 62 and 87.
\textsuperscript{39} For "panhellenist big-talk" see Dillery 1995: 61.
\textsuperscript{40} Villagers flee: Anab. 3.4.9; captives taken: 3.5.14.
WOMEN IN XENOPHON’S ANABASIS

crowd (δχλαος). The Cyreans were even forced to devise a special hollow square formation to protect the non-combatants from Persian attacks. Xenophon, having convinced the Cyreans to jettison their tents and wagons, had intended a swift and mobile army. The soldiers, though, were apparently paying more attention to his rhetoric of plunder.

As long as the Cyreans traversed relatively open plains and foothills, the crowd of new captives must have looked more like an impending windfall than a problem. The majority of the mercenaries, wholly ignorant of central Anatolian geography, might even have imagined that soon they would reach urban entrepôts where they could dispose of this booty, just as Menon’s men might have quickly sold their loot from Tarsus. In early November, however, as the army entered the mountains of Cardouchia, it became clear that the march home was going to be a lot tougher and longer than anyone had thought. The Cardouchoi were not about to let the Cyreans invade their territory unchallenged, and the rugged terrain was inflicting serious difficulties. Therefore, recalls Xenophon,

at daybreak, when the generals and company commanders met, it was decided to proceed keeping only the most necessary and fit of the baggage animals while abandoning the rest, and also to get rid of all the recently spear-won captives in the army, however many there were. For the numerous animals and captives were slowing the march-rate, and the many soldiers supervising them were unavailable for combat. Besides that,

41 Anab. 3.2.36, 3.4.26.

42 Anab. 3.3.6. The first appearance of ochlos (Anab. 3.2.36) actually comes before the army burns its excess baggage (3.3.1) and before specific mention of captives. This is better taken as confusion and telescoping of events by Xenophon (perhaps deliberate, if he wanted to claim credit for creating the square formation before the army set out towards Cardouchia) rather than as evidence for many non-combatants in the army before the massacre of the generals. Descriptions of the army before and at Cunaxa (1.7.10, 1.10.1), and from Cunaxa until the massacre (1.10.18, 2.2.4-5) do not include ochlos.

43 Anab. 3.2.27-28.

44 Ignorance of topography: Anab. 3.5.13-18.

45 Anab. 4.1.12-13: δημα δε τη η μερα συκελβασε τοτε στρατηγοις και λοχαγοις των Ελληνων έδαξε των τε υποστηρικα τα αναγκασα και δυνατασα εχοντες πορειας, καταληκταις ταλα, και δεα ην νεωτι αειμαιωτα αχράπτοδα εν τη στρατι επάνω αφεγμα. σχολαιαν γωρ εποιουν την πορειας πολλα άνω τα υπαργια και τα αειμαγματα, τολλα δε οι επι τοτοις ιντες άθομοι διαφωμο σε τις επιτηδειας ιδει πορειας και φερεσθαι πολλων των ανθρωπων δυνων, δοξαν δε τατα εκλεμεν αυτων ποιειν.
with so many people, it was necessary to find and bring in twice the amount of provisions. Having reached this decision, they had heralds tell the soldiers to carry it out.

As the soldiers ate breakfast and formed up for the day’s march, the generals surreptitiously stationed themselves in a narrow place, through which the Cyrean column then passed. Xenophon continues:

If the generals discovered any of the things specified that had not been discarded, they confiscated them. And the soldiers obeyed, except where someone smuggled past a beautiful boy or woman that he desired to keep.

After this the army continued on its way, sometimes fighting, sometimes resting, for the remainder of the day.

If we take Xenophon literally, the number of captives accompanying the army just before the scrutiny could certainly have run into the thousands. The Cyreans at this point still mustered more than ten thousand in ranks, but the number of captives could not have been nearly that many, for the pack animals needed food too. It is also impossible to determine how many beautiful boys and women escaped the generals’ inspection. If for the sake of argument we assume that roughly one in ten Cyreans successfully hid their favorite captives, perhaps a thousand got through. Assuming further that these comprised males and females in equal proportion, perhaps up to five hundred women eluded the scrutiny.

Regardless of the exact figures, this episode signals a second marked change in the behavior of Cyreans regarding women. In the weeks following the massacre of the generals, recall, they had begun plundering enthusiastically with the goal of selling prisoners for profit. Now, however, soldiers were choosing to retain female captives for themselves. Indeed, those who chose to flout the scrutiny willfully disobeyed their superior officers to do so. They may

46 Anab. 4.1.14: ὑποστῆσαντες ἐν τῷ στείρῳ αὐτοὶ στρατηγοὶ, ἐν τῇ εὐβίκαιει τῶν εἰρημένων μὴ ἀφειμένων, ἀφχειροντο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπείθοντο, πλὴν ἐν τίς ἐκλέψειν, ὅλων ἡ παιδίς ἐπιβιμήσας ἡ γυναικὸς τῶν εὐπρεπῶν.


49 Here and elsewhere in this essay I eschew discussion of male captives.

50 Note especially Anab. 4.1.14: ἐπιβιμήσας.
even have had the assistance of comrades in their companies, for it would have been much easier for a man to smuggle someone past the generals with the complicity of his fellows. The ferocious Cardouchian resistance and the difficult terrain, moreover, already sign-posted the arduous trek ahead. A soldier who persisted in retaining a captive under these conditions was almost certainly not looking to future profit. Instead, he was assuming an individual responsibility to protect and feed someone whom it would have been more practical and convenient to leave behind.

From the scrutiny onward, the army's week-long slog through Cardouchia intensified the new relationship between the Cyreans and their women captives. The soldiers on the one hand had contravened orders to smuggle their favorites. The captives, on the other, realized that their captors had saved them from death at the hands of the Cardouchoi. The women were lowlanders, Mesopotamians; they had no more in common with the mountaineers of Cardouchia than did the Cyreans. Indeed, both soldiers and women now shared a common goal, to escape this land of rocks and spears. To survive, they became physically dependent on each other, men and women huddling together in the pouring winter rain or, sometimes, in the relative warmth of Cardouchian villages. If they had not already been doing so in Mesopotamia, women may now have started helping the Cyreans in the performance of the daily tasks of life on the march: foraging for food and firewood, cooking, and looking after sick or injured soldiers.

For seven days the Cyreans struggled through Cardouchia, during which time, Xenophon relates, "they were continually fighting, and suffered evils such as they never had from the Great King and Tissaphernes together." The final test came at the Centrites River, which separated Cardouchia from neighboring Armenia. Threatened not only by the pursuing Cardouchoi, but also by the cavalry and infantry of the Armenian satrap Orontas on the opposite bank of the river, the Cyreans nonetheless managed to find an unguarded ford and to plan a surprise crossing. The army split into halves, with non-combatants safely between them. As the Cyrean advance guard moved for the ford and the battle commenced, Xenophon remembers, the diviners were sacrificing to the river and the enemy was shooting arrows and slinging but not yet hitting; and when the pre-battle sacrifices turned out right, all the

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52 Winter storm: Anab. 4.1.15; villages: Anab. 4.1.11, 4.2.22, 4.3.1-2.

53 Anab. 4.3.2.

54 Centrites river crossing: Anab. 4.3.1-34.

55 Anab. 4.3.18-19: καὶ οἱ μὲν μέστες ἑσφαγμένῳ εἰς τὸν ποταμόν, οἱ δὲ πολέμωσαν ἐτύχων τε καὶ έσφενδόνων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἑπισκοπῆς. ἦν δὲ καλὰ ἢ ἦν τὰ σφόνγια, ἐπαινησάμην πάντες οἱ στρατεύοντες καὶ ἀπηλλάλουσιν, συνωλάλουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ γυναῖκες ὄχεσαν. πόλιοι γὰρ ἦσαν ἐταχρόν εἰς τὰ στρατεύματα.
soldiers chanted the paean and raised a war-cry. And the
women all raised a loud cry together with them; for there
were many hetairai in the army.

The Centrites was the final military obstacle on the way out of Cardouchia. It was also the place
where women in the army underwent a decisive step in their transformation from passive
captives to active participants and companions (ἐταίραι) in Cyrean life. The women, realizing
their personal stake in a successful crossing, openly and vocally took sides with the soldiers. In
fact, the relationships between soldiers and women were now so developed that, while the
crossing was underway, some soldiers of Xenophon’s rear guard apparently broke ranks to look
after their hetairai.56

Xenophon explicitly draws attention to the number and presence of women at the
Centrites crossing. His exact wording, πολλαί γαί ἡσαν ἐταίραι ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι, clearly
indicates their status and their relationship to the soldiers (they are "in the army," not in the
camp or in the δύναμις). Translators, though, tend to render this key phrase in a fashion that
either makes unwarranted assumptions about the women’s status, or denies them the fact of
belonging to the army. Dillery, for instance, offers "there were a large number of prostitutes
in the camp."57 The problem lies not so much in the final words of the phrase - ἐν τῷ
στρατεύματι - as with the complex valences associated with the term ἐταίραι.

Pinning down the category of the hetaira is a notoriously slippery endeavor.58 As Kurke
and others note, both hetairai and their detractors often preferred it that way. Deliberate
mystification of status, for instance, allowed archaic and classical hetairai to play down their
femaleness and non-Greekness and participate in the male sympotic world.59 It also enabled
democratic courtroom moralizing like that deployed in the vituperative speech against Neaira.60
The wealthy and anti-democratic Xenophon, who elsewhere in the Anabasis disingenuously
portrays the mercenaries as having joined Cyrus for honor rather than on account of poverty,
may well have had the élite sympotic context in mind when he wrote πολλαὶ γὰρ ἦσαν ἑταῖραι.61 That is, he was seeking to present the soldiers' relationships with captive women in a light more palatable to aristocratic sensibilities. If he observed soldiers and women drinking, eating and socializing together, the term might seem all the more apt to a mainland Greek audience.62 For hetairai there were in part so named because they could cross the "social barrier which separated wives from the convivial activities of their husbands."63

Translators who call women at the Centrites "prostitutes" or "mistresses," then, draw on the not unreasonable assumption that Xenophon is playing with what one might call the civilian Greek discourse of the hetaira as sympotic and sexual entertainer. Yet there is more to it than that. In naming the women hetairai, Xenophon is simultaneously playing with a different discourse, that of the hetairos, or military comrade and companion.64 The Anabasis frequently references the Homeric poems; on occasion it even portrays the Cyrean officers as a sort of quasi-epic warrior band.65 Thus the company commanders Agasias, Aristonymus, Callimachus and Eurylochus were "comrades...all of them contending for aretē and continually competing with each other.66 By naming women as hetairai and specifying that they were "in the army," Xenophon in effect grants them membership in the heroic band of Cyreans.67 The "beautiful and tall women and girls of the Medes and Persians" had participated in the Centrites battle by their corporate presence and by their voices. They were not captives, but female comrades and companions.68

Belonging to the Army

61 Joined for honor rather than profit: Anab. 6.4.8.

62 Soldiers socializing: Anab. 4.3.2.


64 Konstan 1997: 31-33 and 46-47.

65 Anab. 4.8.14, 5.1.2; Dillery 1995: 76.

66 Anab. 4.7.11-12: ἐταίρος ἔτησι πάντες γὰρ οὕτω ἀντεπουσιν ἀρετὴς καὶ ἀγαμὴν θετοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

67 Compare Homer II. 4.441, 9.1: goddesses are the hetairai of gods in battle.

68 Even ordinary men and women could call each other hetairos and hetaira; see Dover 1989: 20 n. 2; Konstan 1997: 46-47 and e.g. Ar. Lys. 701, Ar. Eccl. 528-529, 911-913. Xenophon's words are therefore not just aristocratic self-presentation; they plausibly reflect at least some of the actual relationships between Cyreans and their women.
The Centrites crossing reified the new status of women in the army. No longer captives, they were now companions, with a share in the army’s survival and a place in its society. The third stage of women’s presence in the army, the march from Cardouchia to the sea and eventually to Byzantium, would see the *hetairai* further solidify their membership in the Cyrean community.

The Cyreans crossed in the Centrites in mid-November 401 and reached the sea near Trapezus sometime in February 400 BC. In these three months, both soldiers and women endured terrible blizzards, sickness and hunger as they trekked across rugged central Anatolia. Their footwear gave out, and they had to improvise moccasins from raw animal hides. The army fought repeated battles, often to secure provisions from native strongholds, other times to clear enemies from its path. These constant, prolonged, and above all shared dangers could only have reinforced the bonds created in Cardouchia between the Cyreans and their women companions. As a matter of survival, soldiers and women would have had to communicate, and living together day and night must have fostered their fluency in each others’ languages.

Nor were these ties attenuated by an influx of new captives. The soldiers may have acquired a smattering of additional women - some boys certainly did join the army during this period - but for the most part the land was sparsely populated and the inhabitants either quick to escape or unwilling to be taken alive.

Now, a soldier who regretted smuggling a woman through the general’s scrutiny would have had no difficulty abandoning her anywhere along the way from Armenia to Trapezus. Indeed, it would have made things easier if one did not have to share what little food there was with a companion. Yet when the Cyreans reached the sea, the women were still there. Probably they looked on and cheered as the soldiers held athletic games to celebrate their successful journey. Hoping to coast Grecianward along the Black Sea shore, the army then spent a month

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70. There were Cyreans who spoke Persian and other non-Greek tongues; see for example *Anab.* 4.5.10, 4.8.4 and Mosley 1971: 1-6. Cyrus’ Milesian concubine (*Anab.* 1.10.3) obviously spoke Greek and likely knew considerable Persian. Xenophon does not mention the Milesian after Cunaxa, but if she too marched with the army, she may well have constituted a central contact between soldiers and women. Even the thousands of ordinary soldiers from the Ionian garrisons could well have spoken some Persian as a result of their interactions with Persian officials and commanders.

71. Armenian women and girls: *Anab.* 4.5.9-10; Cyreans acquire boys: e.g. *Anab.* 4.6.1-3; Taochians commit suicide to avoid capture: *Anab.* 4.7.13-14.

72. *Anab.* 4.8.27: πολλοὶ γὰρ κατέβησαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἑταίραν πολλῆς φιλομελία εὐγενετο. As with 4.4.30 (see note 56), some manuscripts give ἑταίραν (male comrades/companions); again Xenophon may have intended the ambiguity.
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at Trapezus assembling a flotilla of sailing vessels and skiffs. There was not enough space for everyone. Instead, writes Xenophon, "on board the vessels they embarked the sick, the soldiers over forty years old, the boys and the women, and whatever equipment they did not require." Evidently, the women had become fully integrated with the Cyrean community.

As the Cyreans proceeded along the Euxine shore, women continued to make their presence felt. Soon after leaving Trapezus, the army encountered Mossynoecian territory. These tribal people were split into warring factions; the Cyreans allied with one faction in return for guides and ships. As they passed through settlements of the friendly faction, Xenophon remembers, these Mossynoecians "wanted to have sexual intercourse in public with the hetairai whom the Greeks had with them; for that was their custom." The passage is more than anything a comment on the strangeness, in Cyrean eyes at least, of the Mossynoecians; the Greeks found them the most alien peoples they encountered on their trek. Xenophon, at any rate, does not record how the hetairai and soldiers reacted to the proposition.

By May, the Cyreans were out of Mossynoecian territory and on their way into the land of the Paphlagonians. There was a long delay at Cotyora, on the eastern borders of Paphlagonia, as the generals bickered and assembled enough ships to move the entire army. Meanwhile, the soldiers annoyed the Paphlagonians with their unauthorized foraging; they in turn responded with raids on several scattered Cyrean camps. At length the generals turned to diplomacy, inviting to dinner the ambassadors of the Paphlagonian ruler Corylas, along with a number of Cyrean officers and soldiers. After the meal various groups of soldiers, including Thracians, Aenians and Arcadians, stood up to perform their traditional dances. Corylas' emissaries acted suitably

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73 Anab. 5.1.10-16.

74 Anab. 5.3.1: καὶ εἷς μὲν τὰ πλοῖα τοὺς τε ἀσθενῶσας ἐνεβίβασαν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τεταράκορτα ἔτη καὶ παιδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τῶν σκευῶν δόσα μὴ ἀνάγει ἣν ἔχων. Lang 1992: 74-75 (echoed by Hutchinson 2000: 58) argues that παιδας here may refer to children conceived and born during the journey. This is improbable, not least because παιδας represents Xenophon's normal designation for boy companions: see for example Anab. 4.6.1-3, 4.8.27, 7.4.7ff. Compare 1.4.8, where it is certainly Xenias' and Pasion's children (τέκνα) who are meant.

75 Anab. 5.4.9-10.

76 Anab. 5.4.33 (following the text of Masqueray 1931): ἔχτουν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἑταῖραις δὲ ἡγοῦν αἱ Ἑλληνίδαι ἐμφανῶς ξυγγένεσθαι. νόμος γὰρ ἢν ὁδὸς οὐφος.

77 Anab. 5.4.34.

78 Bickering and plotting: Anab. 5.6.25ff; foraging and raiding: Anab. 6.1.1.
impressed:79

The Paphlagonians, seeing this, considered it marvelous that all the dances were under arms. The Mysian [one of the Cyreans], seeing that they were struck by this, persuaded one of the Arcadians who had acquired a dancing-girl to bring her in, equipping her as finely as he was able and giving her a light shield. And she danced the Pyrrhic with grace. Thereupon there was much applause, and the Paphlagonians asked whether women also fought alongside them. The Cyreans replied that these very women were the ones who had turned aside the King from their camp. That was how things turned out on that night.

The next day, the ambassadors spoke in the army assembly, and the soldiers resolved to cease their pillaging. Enough vessels were now available to carry everyone, so the army embarked and sailed westward. In the next months, it would split into factions, récombine, spend the winter in European Thrace as mercenaries for the dynast Seuthes, and finally wind up in Byzantium80. Ultimately, in spring 399, some five thousand surviving Cyreans, presumably still accompanied by their women, joined a Spartan army assembling in Ionia under the general Thibron81.

The feast with the Paphlagonians represents the last substantive appearance in the Anabasis of women in the army. It is a remarkable finale. Consider what the event reveals about the place of women in the army and Cyrean attitudes towards them. First off, women were not only present but clearly visible as a group, as the demonstrative "these very women" (αὐταῖς) implies. It is plausible to conclude that they had come as companions of the officers and men invited to attend the feast. Second, the Cyreans present their female companions as not only warlike but also masculine. The armed dancers, after all, constituted no mere spectacle but a subtle display of power aimed at the Paphlagonians: if we move this well with our weapons, the soldiers hint, think how we fight. By including a female dancer and by responding as they do to the ambassadors’ query, the Cyreans push the message home: look, our women can fight too; they even defeated the Great King82.

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79 Anab. 6.1.11-13: ὃρατες δὲ οἱ Παφλαγόνες δεινῶς ἐποιήσατο πάσας τῶν ὀρχήσεως ἐν ὀπλαις ἐνει, ἐκ τοῦτοις ὅριν ὁ Μυσις ἐκπειρήμενος αὐτοῖς, πεῖσας τὸν Ἀρκάδων τινὰ πεπαμένον ὀρχηστρίαδα ἐλάσκει σκευάσας ὡς ἔδωκεν κάλλιστα καὶ ἀσπίδα δοῦς κακῆς αὐτῆς. ἤδε ὁ ὀρχήσατο πυρρίχῃ ἔλαφρῶς. ἐπεζεύχθη κράτος ἢν πολὺς, καὶ οἱ Παφλαγόνες ἁρπασάν εἰ καὶ γυναῖκς συνεμάχοντο αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ ἔλεγον ὅτι αὐταί καὶ οἱ τρεφόμεναι ἐδόθαι βασιλέα ἐκ τοῦ ὀπλατοπέδου. τῇ μὲν νυκτὶ ταύτῃ τοῦτο τὸ τέλος ἐγένετο.

80 See Stronk 1995 for this last phase of the army’s existence.

81 Diodorus Siculus 14.37.

82 As Demetrius of Phalerum (De Elucutione 131) observed, the Cyrean response either makes their women Amazonian or makes the Great King look exceedingly effeminate: χρήσαι δὲ τὴν ταξίδευε ἐνει καὶ Σευφών, καὶ
Even in mainland Greece, it was not unknown for women to perform armed dances such as the Pyrrhic. What was unheard of was for women to fight. Xenophon himself, in the *Oikonomikos*, claimed that a woman’s place was in the house, while men were better suited to endure the physical stresses of war. The Cyrean response to the ambassadors’ question, of course, reveals nothing about whether women actually fought. What it does reveal is that the Cyreans did not necessarily hew to the strong gender expectations characteristic of "civilian" Greek culture. They were comfortable enough with women in the army, and held them in high enough regard, that they could make a comment of this nature. Indeed, in his *Symposium*, Xenophon has Socrates, having observed another dancing-girl, note that even women can learn courage. It is not surprising that the Cyreans may have held unconventional attitudes towards their women. They themselves, after all, were not "normal" Greeks but a mix of diverse ethnicities, backgrounds, and circumstances. There was room in their ranks for political exiles, ex-slaves, at least one murderer, and a former professional boxer. Some of them were not even Greek. An army which accepted Apollonides, a captain who spoke Greek like a Boeotian but had his ears pierced like a Lydian, might equally take a view of women different from that prevailing in settled polis life.

**The Women’s Perspective**

82 (...continued)

83 Women and armed dances: Ceccarelli 1998, Wheeler 1982. That the *orchestris* knew the Pyrrhic does not necessarily indicate she was Greek. The Arcadian who acquired her almost certainly did so, as we have seen, after the expedition began, note also Xenophon’s use of πεπαράσαν (LSJ s.v. πάρασα: "get, acquire"). It is not impossible that the Arcadian found time to teach this woman the Pyrrhic during the delay at Cotyora, or elsewhere during the army’s slow progress westward from Trapezus.

84 *Oik.* 7.22-7.23.

85 *Xen.* *Symp.* 2.8-13.

86 For soldiers’ origins see Parke 1933 and Roy 1967.

87 Exiles: e.g. *Anab.* 4.2.13; ex-slaves: e.g. 4.8.4; murderer: 4.8.25, 6.6.30; boxer: 5.8.23.

88 Non-Greek mercenaries: *Anab.* 4.8.4, 5.2.29.

89 *Anab.* 3.1.26, 3.1.30-32.
It is important to remember that the *Anabasis*, a soldier’s memoire written down decades after the fact, represents the views of a single man. We have seen that Xenophon, with his elitist and panhellenist sensibilities, had a clear interest in portraying women in the army as aristocratic or heroic *hetairai* rather than as barbarian outsiders. The *Anabasis* is also clearly a male captor’s take on women in the army. The women themselves remain voiceless, and it is necessary to avoid romanticizing their relationships with the soldiers who captured them. The experience of the so-called "comfort women" at the hands of the Japanese army in the Second World War, for example, reminds us that soldiers can perpetrate on female victims the most brutal sexual subjugation and exploitation. That being so, we need to remember that not all relationships between soldiers and women exactly followed the pattern Xenophon’s narrative suggests. In a community of thousands, there must have been considerable individual variation. Some men and women, in response to the shared hardship of the march, succeeded in forming durable and affective attachments. Other soldiers, undoubtedly, never got beyond treating their captives as mere chattel.

Did women in the army really ululate alongside the soldiers at the Centrites crossing? Was anyone who had been forced at spear-point from her home, forcibly dragged into unknown territory, and forced to endure the worst privations of life on the march really so eager to cheer for her captors? One way to get at some vestige of the women’s own experience of being taken captive is to look at their reactions in terms of the so-called Stockholm Syndrome.

Stockholm Syndrome takes its name from a bungled 1973 bank robbery where four bank clerks, three of them women, not only bonded with their captors over a five-day period but subsequently sided with them against the Swedish authorities. Two of the women later became engaged to the robbers. The syndrome has since been recognized as a psychological condition resulting in "the formation of an emotional bond between captors and hostages if the parties are in close relationships under stressful conditions." Although this bond intensifies the longer captors and hostages spend together, its initial formation can be a matter of only a few days or even hours. "Time per se," writes one researcher, "may not be the relevant variable; rather it may be what events...go on in [that] time." A key factor may be face-to-face contact between individual captors and hostages; prisoners held en masse seem less likely to develop the

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90 On comfort women see for example Dolgopol & Paranje 1994, Henson 1999.

91 Ochberg & Soskis 1982: 149-150.


93 Corsini 1999: 949 and 468; see also Colman 2001: 709.


The condition apparently affects "both sexes, all ages, and has occurred in all cultures observed." Researchers have observed that the positive feelings hostages express toward their captors are frequently reciprocated. They note, however, that hostages tend to frame such feelings in terms of a "lack of negative experiences" - for example, not being killed outright - at the hands of their captors.

Stockholm Syndrome provides a useful mechanism for understanding the reactions of the women captured by the Cyreans in Mesopotamia. The mass of prisoners taken by the soldiers before they reached Cardouchia did not apparently develop close ties with their captors. In fact, the large numbers of prisoners initially taken by the army on its way north were held en masse, and so remained a faceless group (διὰ λαοῦ). Those women who escaped the generals' scrutiny entered a different set of circumstances. They were aware not only that their captors had spared them from being abandoned to the Cardouchoi, but more particularly that they had been saved by the individual soldiers who hid them. The women, together with the soldiers, then underwent the extremely stressful march through Cardouchia, during all of which time captors and captives were in close physical proximity and in common imminent danger of death. With these factors taken into account, the behavior of the women at the Centrites crossing becomes more understandable. As in the 1973 bank robbery, intense stress and strong personal ties helped bond Cyrean captors and captives together.

All this is not to suggest that psychological conditions as defined by modern psychologists constitutes a trans-historical phenomenon, or that "human nature" is something immutable. Nevertheless, the analogy with Stockholm Syndrome at least helps us better understand women's experience in the Anabasis army. In particular, it helps confirm the veracity of Xenophon's testimony about women's behavior at the Centrites. Indeed, the experience of the Cyrean women differs in one important aspect from the definition of Stockholm Syndrome. All such cases reported by researchers presume the existence of a rescuing force, the police or a friendly army for instance. There was no such force, actual or potential, for women accompanying the Cyreans. Once the army had left Mesopotamia, the soldiers and the women had more in common with each other than either group did with any of the tribal peoples whose territory the march traversed. In such circumstances, with no hope of rescue, captives would all the more readily have become soldiers' willing companions.

Women and Warfare in Ancient Greece

Women accompanying armies, ancient or modern, tend to be dismissed as mere "camp


97 Ochberg & Soskis 1982: 123.


followers", hangers-on who impede the troops' progress and hinder their discipline.\(^{100}\) Yet, such assessments are unfair and inaccurate. This is in part because they obscure the significant logistical contributions - cooking, washing and nursing, for instance - that women made to many European and North American armies before regularized service and support units began to appear in the mid-nineteenth century.\(^{101}\) The women of the \textit{Anabasis}, as we have seen, were in a rather different situation. They were not primarily servants - the soldiers had been doing their own cooking and cleaning for months before reaching Mesopotamia - but captives turned companions. Nonetheless, to dismiss or ignore them creates a false, incomplete picture of how Cyrean society worked. For decades, scholarship on the \textit{Anabasis} has focused on the dynamics of the army's community life.\(^{102}\) Yet no analysis of the Cyreans as community will be complete unless we understand the place of women in that community (and of male slaves/servants and boy companions, one might add, but that is another essay). One might also add that in the past decade, scholarship on Greek warfare has shifted away from strategy and tactics towards consideration of individual experience.\(^{103}\) This emphasis on individual military experience deserves to encompass women as well as men. In doing so, we can only reach a fuller understanding of women and warfare in ancient Greece.

A final point deserves consideration. The Cyreans have often been judged the prototype of a new kind of army, the sort of wandering rootless mercenary force that would become endemic in the late Classical and early Hellenistic worlds.\(^{104}\) The women who accompanied the Cyreans were pathbreakers too. The hoplite phalanx of the Classical polis had no room for women; they were supposed to stay home, safe in the confines of domesticity. The soldiers of the Diadochoi, though, took their cue from elsewhere. By the second century BC, at least in Ptolemaic Egypt, soldiers' families and attendants were formally recognized as \textit{ol \(\epsilon\nu\;\tau\eta\;\alpha\pi\omega\sigma\kappa\epsilon\nu\nu}\text{, "amongst the baggage," and entitled to legal protection as military dependents.}\(^{105}\) If the Cyreans set the pattern for the new armies of the fourth century and after, they did so not only in purely military, but also in social terms.

\textbf{Epilogue}

\(^{100}\) See for example Garlan 1975: 135.

\(^{101}\) See for example Hacker 1981 on women in early modern European armies, and Mayer 1996 on women in the American Revolutionary army.


\(^{103}\) Hanson 2000, Hanson 1991: 253.

\(^{104}\) Parke 1933, Perlman 1976/77.

\(^{105}\) Holleaux 1926.
What became of the women of the *Anabasis*? If the affective ties forged between soldiers and their companions were as strong as I have argued here, it is entirely possible that the women continued to accompany the Cyreans in their subsequent campaigns.\(^{106}\) Indeed, despite their stated desire to return home, many of the Cyreans continued soldiering for years after 399. They are last found fighting together as a body on the Spartan side at Coronea in 394, after which some of them may have gone to work for Jason of Pherae in Thessaly.\(^{107}\) Those men who survived to retire from mercenary service and return to their native lands might well have brought their female companions home with them. A good half of the Cyreans hailed from the mountainous uplands of Arcadia and Achaea, and a traveler there in the mid-fourth century, one likes to imagine, could have encountered old women, perhaps speaking Greek with a hint of a Persian accent, who could tell how they too had once marched with Xenophon to the sea.\(^{108}\)

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\(^{106}\) At least one Cyrean took a male companion home: *Anab*. 4.6.3.

\(^{107}\) Bonner 1915.

\(^{108}\) Arcadians and Achaeans half the army: *Anab*. 6.2.10.
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