structure his material: “generation” and “crisis point.” For the 1950s and 1960s there were basically two different youth generations to consider: the Hitler Youth generation with its very specific experiences of Nazi education, war, and dashed dreams of hegemony, and the first postwar generation, whose initial confidence in a peaceful and secure future ended in disappointment and resignation. While the Hitler Youth generation was broken from the beginning, the first postwar children had to be broken when they failed to function according to the pedagogical optimism that drove youth politics in the first decades of the GDR’s existence.

McDougall finds a general lack of deep analysis, coherent strategy, and flexible practices on the side of the political class in general and the official youth organization, the Free German Youth or FDJ in particular. Here McDougall identifies a series of “crisis points,” moments in GDR history that challenged youth functionaries and their belief in their own political work. These “crisis points” begin with the June uprising in 1953, in which young people were overrepresented among the active participants and a large number of functionaries themselves turned out to be ideologically unstable. The next crisis occurred in 1956, when the disillusionment about Joseph Stalin as a heroic figure and adversary to Adolf Hitler shocked older believers, in turn weakening their ability to face criticism from the youth they most wanted to win over. The building of the Berlin Wall presented a major turning point in GDR history; while it seemed to solve many problems in dealing with youth, it was one of those rare events in history that had an immediate and obvious impact on lives and provoked severe critical reactions. The triumph of Anglo-American popular youth culture in the mid-1960s initiated a culture war that the FDJ could not win. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 destroyed any hopes for a more democratic socialism and succeeded in depoliticizing GDR youth, discouraging them through greater control and repression. As a result, youth were basically lost for socialism or any other political movement until tiny segments in the late 1970s and early 1980s began to create what would become a small but articulate opposition movement.

McDougall presents rich evidence to prove his point: during the period he is investigating, the FDJ never functioned to the satisfaction of the Communist Party (SED). Rather, youth politics in the GDR, and particularly in the FDJ, faced serious opposition, whether openly political or cultural or expressed in a more general attitude of passivity and resignation. While the latter was probably the most common reaction to FDJ demands, especially outside of historical “crisis points,” the archives reflect more of the outspoken criticism, the visible acts of resistance. There is a certain tendency in McDougall’s book to overestimate the nonconformist energy among youth and to underestimate the more long-term effects of a rationale to avoid all conflicts with the authorities. The FDJ and its functionaries reacted to this situation with a similar attitude of resignation, passivity, and empty ritualization after having successfully repressed the last attempt at political protest in the summer of 1968.

McDougall’s case study shows convincingly how a critique of the totalitarian concept opens up questions that lead us to the central dilemma of dictatorship: it could not do without repression but at the same time could not achieve its goals without offering some freedom and space for people. Youth used such “freedoms” for their own way out; youth politics eventually made peace with youth by being less political.

DOROTHEE WIERLING
Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte, Hamburg


The twenty-month trial in Frankfurt of twenty perpetrators from the Auschwitz concentration camp, which lasted from December 1963 until August 1964, was the largest and best publicized of all West Germany’s trials against Nazi perpetrators. A wealth of information has been available about the trial since 1965, when extensive excerpts from pretrial documents, the indictments, much daily courtroom dialogue, and the judgment were published in the two-volume documentation by Auschwitz survivor Hermann Langbein, Der Auschwitz-Prozess. Additionally, the over 500-page compilation of Bernd Naumann’s trial reports from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was published in English as Auschwitz: A Report on the Proceedings (1966). There were, however, no scholarly assessments until the publication of a collection of essays edited by Ulrich Schneider (Auschwitz: Ein Prozess [1994]) and a monograph by Gerhard Werle and Thomas Wandres (Auschwitz vor Gericht [1995]).

This was the situation when Rebecca Wittmann began her doctoral research on the Frankfurt trial. Four main bodies of source material form the basis of four of the six chapters of Wittmann’s monograph: the voluminous pretrial investigation files, the indictment, 101 audiotapes of the proceedings, and the final judgment. These chapters are bracketed by a background chapter on the evolving legal framework of West German perpetrator trials, and a concluding discussion of press responses to the verdicts. Beyond offering the first scholarly assessment in English, Wittmann’s main contributions to scholarship are her explication of the pretrial investigation and the descriptive analysis of the trial based on the audiotapes and press clippings. Her core argument is the “paradox” that the West German court focused narrowly on specific individual acts that were considered criminal under Nazi law, and did not place more participation in the genocidal enterprise at Auschwitz (pouring cyanide pellets into the gas chamber, for instance) on trial. As Wittmann puts it, “The killing of millions in the gas chambers . . . became a lesser crime, calling for a lighter sentence, than the
murder of one person carried out without orders from superiors” (p. 6).

This phenomenon, attributable to the strong West German rejection of ex post facto law, has been explicated in most scholarly publications on trials of Nazi perpetrators since the 1960s. It had two important consequences. First, in order to obtain a conviction for murder, the courts had to show that the perpetrators were motivated by base intent, such as hatred, greed, or sadism. Thus the trial focused disproportionately on acts of “excessive” zeal or brutality. Second, convictions could only be obtained for specific murders of specific individuals at precise places and times. Thus witnesses were cross-examined about details of crimes they had observed nearly two decades earlier. Such psychologically burdensome treatment gave rise to many unpleasant exchanges in the courtroom. These consequences contributed to the low proportion of convictions and relatively lenient sentences resulting from this and other such trials.

My main criticism of this book is that it so closely follows the trial sources, with little attention to other archival materials (such as the lawyers’ papers) or the results of prior and ancillary scholarship. Since there is much overlap between the pretrial investigation documents, the indictment, and the judgment, there is a tendency toward repetition. For example, the so-called Boger swing is described twice (pp. 90, 120). Other scholarship is often merely listed without discussion (e.g. p. 289, n. 21; p. 290, n. 4; p. 293, n. 22, 23; p. 294, n. 39), and Wittmann’s notes rarely name (or date) individual documents, citing only the archival reference number (particularly egregious: p. 299, n. 16). Finally, a few embarrassing lapses of fact escaped the prepublication readers’ attention: Konrad Adenauer spending much of the Nazi period in hiding (p. 27); Rudolf Höss having written a diary that was banned from publication (pp. 182, 309, n. 72).

Such limitations would be less noticeable if another monograph without such shortcomings had not been published simultaneously: Devin Pendas’s *The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–1965*. I found that I learned and understood more from a cursory examination of Pendas’s monograph than I had from a close reading of Wittmann’s. Not only do Pendas’s footnotes fully cite the documents and include the latest literature, but the cited secondary works are summarized and assessed. Additionally, Pendas has a knack for engaging narrative that contrasts with Wittmann’s close analyses of legal sources. Pendas also draws on material from the East and West German national archives, the Frankfurt city archive, the institutional archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, and the Federal Press Office, which enables him to give a much more comprehensive account of the proceedings and their actors than Wittmann. Surprisingly, neither account offers any biographical details about the defendants, although these were ably summarized by Naumann. Still, Wittmann’s concise narrative contains most essential details, and she discusses some important documents that Pendas omits, such as Peter-Heinz Seraphim’s expert opinion on the superior orders defense. In sum, while Wittmann’s portrayal may better serve an audience seeking basic information and interpretation, specialists will appreciate Pendas’s more comprehensive research and more informative citations.

Harold Marcuse
University of California, Santa Barbara


Edward Timms dedicates this second volume of his Karl Kraus study to the memory of J. P. Stern “and the refugees of the 1930s from whom I have learnt so much.” This magisterial work is a fitting tribute to Timms’s mentors and a significant contribution to Austrian intellectual history during the interwar period. Volume one, which appeared in 1986, is a cultural analysis of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna that portended World War I, the end of the Habsburg Empire, and the collapse of European civilization. Volume two resumes in the early postwar period. Although the apocalypse had been postponed, the rise of fascism threatened to complete the destruction of civilization begun by the war and hurl mankind backward thousands of years. As one dedicated to peace, Kraus could not stand idly by.

One of the most positive aspects of Timms’s book is its demonstration of both the timeliness and the timelessness of Kraus’s polemics, the vehicle for which was his critical periodical with red covers, *Die Fackel* (*The Torch*). Timms refutes those who would dismiss Kraus as merely a Viennese critic of the early twentieth century whose preoccupations were often ephemeral. The 1921 selling of “the horrors of World War I as a tourist attraction” by the newspaper *Baseler Nachrichten* through trips to the Verdun Battlefield—“There will be time for lunching at the best hotel in Verdun with wine and coffee” (p. 81)—anticipated the *Daily Telegraph* marketing of concentration camp tours in 2001: “THE HOLOCAUST Great guides, great company. Full colour brochure from Midas Tours” (p. 83). Timms convincingly argues that although Kraus “did not live to witness the emergence of the media-generated myths of the television age . . . his ideas have been taken up by more recent critics of the nexus between mass communications, global corporations and the military-industrial complex. Thus the spirit of Kraus . . . transcends its own times” (p. 549).

Timms defends Kraus against the charge of “intellectual bankruptcy” (p. 492) in reply to Adolf Hitler’s coming to power. Kraus had responded to that event with *The Third Walpurgis Night*. This work, which was never published during Kraus’s lifetime for fear of reprise against himself and German Jews, “enable[d] Kraus to express not simply his own opinions, but the struggle for the soul of Germany” (p. 496). More than that Kraus realized that with Hitler’s accession to