In the vast historiographical literature on the nazi period, few works have achieved as enduring a reputation or attained as unique a commercial success as William L. Shirer’s *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. First published in October 1960, Shirer’s epic history of the nazi dictatorship has, over the years, acquired a status unparalleled by any prior or subsequent historical work on the subject. In the thirty years since the book’s initial appearance, it has sold millions of copies in the United States and millions more worldwide. Still in print today, Shirer’s work has been translated into numerous European and non-European languages and published in several special editions. It has even been made into a documentary film and recorded as a dramatic cantata. Undoubtedly the best-known book ever published on the nazi era, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* has become more than just another work of history. A singular literary institution, it has acquired a reputation as ‘the bestselling historical work ever written in modern times’.

Certainly the most popular study ever published on the nazi period, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* was arguably the most controversial as well. Although widely acclaimed in the United States and in various European countries, Shirer’s work was bitterly attacked in West Germany. Indeed, the contrast between the initial American and West German reactions to the book could not be more striking. In the US in 1960, it was an undisputed sensation, dominating the bestseller list for over a year, setting publishing records and reaping numerous honours and awards. *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* coupled impressive sales with significant critical acclaim. While some dissenting voices were heard, the praise

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accorded Shirer’s 1,250-page opus was, on the whole, effusive and at times hyperbolic. Not only was it widely hailed in some circles as the definitive account of the nazi period, it was, as the New York Times opined shortly after its appearance, ‘one of the most important works of history of our time’.

The remarkable success of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich in the United States, however, was by no means echoed in West Germany. Following its publication in German translation in October 1961, the book was not only subjected to withering criticism, but gave rise to political controversy. Repeatedly attacked by the West German press, by West German historians and even by the West German government as a fallacious, anti-German diatribe, Shirer’s book was accused of wilfully stirring up anti-German sentiment in America and causing a dramatic deterioration in relations between the United States and the Federal Republic. For months in the West German press, the book was the subject of countless editorials and rebuttals attacking both its arguments and its author. As a result of this constant attention, the German edition of the book, Aufstieg und Fall des dritten Reiches, also achieved quick commercial success, making the best-seller list for several months in West Germany. Despite its initial showing, however, the book’s success was ultimately fleeting, its total sales figures never remotely approaching those reached in the US. In short, then, although The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich created an unqualified sensation in both the United States and West Germany, its status in both countries was of an entirely different order.

What was it about The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich that generated such different reactions? Why, as the historian Martin Broszat laconically put it at the time, could the reaction to the book be summarized as ‘outside of Germany “Bravo!”’, inside Germany “Phooey!”’? To ask these questions is essentially to ask how Shirer’s work was read in the US and West Germany in the years immediately following its publication. While this may seem to be a relatively easy task at first glance, it is one that requires the consideration of several important methodological issues. Indeed, investigating the reception of any text in separate cultural contexts is far from unproblematic. As has frequently been pointed out, the attempt to determine how individuals, let alone how entire societies, approach and experience the act of reading is fraught with difficulties. With this in mind, how can we arrive at an accurate understanding of how Americans and West Germans read The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich in the early 1960s?
It helps to look to reception aesthetics or reception theory as a means of addressing this particular question. As Hans Robert Jauss, among others, has argued, it is possible to understand how literary texts are read by reconstructing what he calls the particular ‘horizon of expectations’ that every reader invariably brings to them. In essence, Jauss’s theory of reception approaches the act of reading diachronically and maintains that the reception of a particular text is largely determined by its relationship to prior texts in the same genre. As he writes, a ‘new text evokes for the reader . . . the horizon of expectations and rules familiar from earlier texts, which are then varied, corrected, changed or just reproduced’. For Jauss, the ultimate significance of a text can be identified by the manner in which it changes or creates new horizons of understanding, in the way it ‘satisfies, surpasses, disappoints or disproves the expectations of its first readers in the historical moment of its appearance’. A text which results in little or no horizon change — one which ‘actually fulfills expectations which are prescribed by a predominant taste, by . . . confirming familiar sentiments’ — is one that Jauss places in the realm of ‘culinary’ or ‘light reading’. Works of greater significance, it follows, are those which ‘negate familiar experience’ and effect a horizon change. In either case, Jauss argues that the ‘aesthetic distance’ between a given work and the readers’ expectations ‘can be measured . . . in the spectrum of the reaction of the audience and the judgment of criticism (spontaneous success, rejection or shock, scattered approval, gradual or later understanding)’.7

Risking the ever-perilous leap from literature to history and assuming that readers bring ‘horizons of expectations’ not only to works of fiction but also to non-fiction, it is possible to examine in detail the ways in which Americans and West Germans read The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich in 1960–62. This can be achieved first by examining the ‘spectrum of reaction’ to the book (the numerous reviews published in the press and in scholarly journals) and by reconstructing the attitudes with which American and West German reviewers read it. To this end, it is helpful first to borrow from Jauss and to situate Shirer’s work in the larger ‘genre’ — the relevant body of literature — of which it is part. This requires an examination of the contemporaneous American as well as West German historiography of the nazi period and an understanding of the substantial differences between them. In so doing, it emerges that the presence of opposing historiographical paradigms for explaining nazism within each country was, to an important extent, responsible for the differences in
the reviews of Shirer’s work. In short, the fact that the underlying paradigm of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* corresponded more closely to the dominant paradigm in the US than that in West Germany accounts for the generally positive reaction in the former and the negative response in the latter.

Examining the differences between American and West German historiography, however, only partially explains the divergent reactions to *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* in the US and the Federal Republic. The book’s critical reception was not solely determined by literary factors. Here, it is important to acknowledge Jauss’s claim that “the reader of a new work has to perceive it not only within the narrow horizon of his literary expectations but also within the wider horizon of his experience of life.” The horizons of expectations with which reviewers read Shirer’s work was, in other words, a compound of literary and non-literary experiences.

Indeed, the attitudes of American and West German readers of Shirer’s work were shaped not only by differing degrees of historiographical knowledge but also by separate national political concerns. At the time of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*’s appearance, West Germany’s Nazi past had become a highly-charged political issue. Between 1959 and 1961, various incidents — from resurgent neo-nazism and anti-semitism in West Germany to the capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann and superpower confrontation over Berlin — placed the Federal Republic not only in the international spotlight, but in an extremely vulnerable political position. For some Americans and many West Germans, the resurrection of the memory of nazism brought with it many potential political dangers. As such, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*’s role in further refocusing attention on the Federal Republic’s Nazi past also became a volatile political issue. It is thus understandable that many reviews of the book were determined by their author’s views on the revival of memory and its potential impact on US–West German relations.

A comparison of the published reviews of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, however, does not fully answer the question of how the book was widely read in the United States and West Germany. While it may be tempting simply to extrapolate from the particular to the general — from the readings of individual reviewers to a general societal reading — it must be recognized that the critical reception of the book cannot be equated with its popular reception. It cannot be assumed that the average American and West German read the book
in the same way as did the journalists and historians who reviewed it — that is, with horizons of expectations informed by a general and, in a good many cases, extensive awareness of the relevant historiography. Their readings of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* were strongly shaped by a different factor — collective memories of the nazi period itself. As crucial components of what Jauss would term American and West German ‘experience of life’, memories of the nazi era were integral parts of both peoples’ horizons of expectations.

Of course, American and West German collective memories of the Third Reich were determined by entirely different factors. For the most part unknown by direct experience of the actual events of the era, the American collective memory, on the whole, was shaped by the wartime discourse on the subject which, if not directly the product of government influence, was influenced by the anti-nazi climate of the time. In contrast, West German collective memory of the Third Reich was shaped by direct experience. Following 1945, these differences were effaced as postwar political realities — Germany’s partnership in the anti-communist Western alliance above all — caused the memory of enmity to fade in both countries. This Cold War-induced correspondence of American and West German memory lasted only until the very end of the 1950s, however, when political events led Americans to rediscover what most West Germans had hoped was forgotten: the ugly history of the Third Reich. For the popular reception of Shirer’s work in both countries, this resurfacing of memory would be of decisive importance.

To summarize, then, it was a mixture of factors that determined the collective critical and popular reactions to *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* in the US and West Germany. Differences in historiographical traditions, political considerations and collective memories of the past all informed the horizons of expectations that Americans and Germans brought to Shirer’s history of the nazi period. It is to these factors that we now turn.

Before proceeding to a comparison of the reception of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* in the United States and West Germany, however, it is useful to discuss briefly the book’s origins and author. One of the best-known and most respected American journalists of the 1930s and 1940s, William Shirer first made a name for himself as a Berlin-based correspondent for the Universal News Service and as a
radio broadcaster for CBS based in Vienna and Berlin during the years 1934–41. Already widely-known for his radio work, Shirer greatly bolstered his reputation with the publication of his best-selling accounts of his experiences in war-torn Europe, *Berlin Diary* (1941) and *End of a Berlin Diary* (1947). His postwar work as a network radio commentator and a syndicated columnist was interrupted in March 1947, however, when he was let go by CBS — apparently blacklisted for his overly-liberal political views. As a result, Shirer wrote and lectured during the conservative 1950s in relative obscurity.

Midway through the decade, however, Shirer seized upon the idea of writing a synthetic history of the Nazi period — a task he had long planned to undertake. For the next five years, Shirer spent nearly all of his time in various archives gathering material for *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. Few encouraged him in his effort. Shirer’s old publisher, Little, Brown, had flatly rejected the idea of a book on the Third Reich twice, in 1954 and 1955. His agent at the time, meanwhile, insisted that there was very little interest in Adolf Hitler or the Third Reich left in America. Finally, through the efforts of one of Shirer’s old journalist friends, Simon & Schuster agreed to publish the book, awarding him a desperately-needed $10,000 advance to complete it within two years. Although requiring an additional three years’ work, Shirer finally finished the book in 1960, doubtful that it would sell. Its length, some 1,250 pages, and the inclusion of footnotes, he was repeatedly told, guaranteed a small sale. Moreover, the price of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* would be ten dollars, out of the price range of many potential buyers in 1960. As it turned out, however, these sour predictions were anything but accurate.

For a work of non-fiction, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* turned out to be a mammoth success for Simon & Schuster. Released in October 1960, Shirer’s book was named the November selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club and immediately shot to the top of the bestseller list. In its first year alone, it sold over one million copies — a figure far exceeding that of any other work on European history of the time. The book attained an incredible level of exposure during its first year in print. Thanks in large part to its serialization in condensed form in the March, April and May issues of the *Reader’s Digest* in 1962 (total circulation over 12 million per month), it was made affordable and available to many more Americans than could have actually purchased it. In addition to this extra publicity, the book’s commercial success was assisted by its critical acclaim. In
March 1961, it won the National Book Award, the most prestigious literary honour after the Pulitzer prize.\textsuperscript{16} One month earlier, in February 1961, the book had been given the Carey-Thomas Award for creative book publishing, a prize coveted by all in the publishing industry.\textsuperscript{17} Within several years, the book had set still further milestones. In 1961, the mass-market oriented publishing house, Fawcett-Crest, bought the paperback reprint rights to Shirer’s work from Simon & Schuster for $400,000 — a record for the time — and produced its own successful paperback edition.\textsuperscript{18} This version (the thickest paperback ever — a bulky two inches — and the first paperback over one dollar, $1.65) quickly sold over one million copies as well.\textsuperscript{19} In short, to the surprise of many, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich} quickly became one of the best-selling works of non-fiction of its time.

In attempting to account for the \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich}'s phenomenal success in the United States in 1960–62, it will be necessary to examine, first, its critical reception and, second, its popular reception. With regard to the former, while most American reviewers commented extremely favourably on Shirer’s work, a vocal minority expressed profound disagreement with it. As noted below, reviewers tended to divide along disciplinary lines; journalists almost unanimously praised Shirer (one of their own), while professional historians and political scientists split, some acknowledging Shirer’s achievement, most expressing outright contempt. Of decisive importance in causing this divide, we shall see, was the acceptance in both groups of different historiographical paradigms for explaining nazism.

Before expanding upon these differences and exploring the reviews in detail, however, it is useful to summarize briefly the book’s basic theses. Although its length makes this a somewhat reductionist enterprise, it is indispensable for understanding the subsequent reaction to Shirer’s work.

For the most part, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich} was a well-written, if conventional, narrative of the origins and eventual demise of the nazi dictatorship. Reflecting Shirer’s own experiences in nazi Germany as well as the sources used in his research, the book was a political history of the Third Reich that focused mostly on Hitler’s foreign policy and his unleashing of war.\textsuperscript{20} This narrative structure, some reviewers were to note, made it unclear whether Shirer had
wanted to write a history of the Third Reich or of the second world war. Yet, despite the book’s imbalanced narrative, it nonetheless marked a milestone in the historiography of the Third Reich. Although not containing many new revelations on the era (and, as would later be pointed out, ignorant of others that had recently been uncovered), it was the first work that synthesized much of the material into a coherent whole.

The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich was not only a study of the nazi period, however, but also a statement of Shirer’s views on the entirety of German history. Strongly influenced by the so-called ‘Luther to Hitler’ view of German history, Shirer’s book was based on the simple, yet controversial, postulate that ‘nazism and the Third Reich . . . were but a logical continuation of German history’. In adhering to this thesis, Shirer was by no means out of the scholarly mainstream. During the 1930s and 1940s, the ‘Luther to Hitler’ view of German history was not only well represented by an extensive body of literature on the subject of nazism in the US and England, but had informed both nations’ propaganda efforts against Germany in the second world war. It was during these years that Shirer embraced this perspective on the German past — a fact clearly demonstrated by his efforts on behalf of the wartime American propaganda effort against Germany. In The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, these ideas were most visible in the pages where Shirer outlined the historical and intellectual roots of the nazi dictatorship. In this section, Shirer traced the divergence of German history from the ‘normal’ course of Western development back to the Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War, focusing special attention on the responsibility of Bismarck and Prussia for later events. As he asserted, from 1871 up until 1945 ‘the course of German history . . . was to run . . . in a straight line and with utter logic’. A fateful product of this deviant national history, Shirer argued, was a particular type of German, submissive, obedient and prone to anti-democratic political ideologies. This, in turn, explained why the nazis rose to power in 1933 ‘with scarcely a ripple of opposition or defiance’. Indeed, although the point would be disputed by many of his critics, for Shirer it was clear that, in the final analysis, the ‘Germans imposed the nazi tyranny on themselves.

Importantly, this thesis would have significant political implications for the post-war world, especially for the relations between the United States and West Germany. Shirer himself made a point of implying that the collapse of the nazi regime did not necessarily exclude the possibility that West Germany would once
more pose a danger to world peace. With the German people, rather than Hitler, to blame for the nazi disaster, Shirer was implicitly arguing that post-war West Germany — composed largely of the same populace as the Third Reich — was not to be trusted. In several passages in *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, this claim was clearly voiced. Discussing the tradition of militarism and authoritarianism that thrived in Germany under Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler, Shirer wrote:

Under such a spell, this nation rose to great heights, fell and rose again, until it was seemingly destroyed with the end of Hitler in the spring of 1945 — it is perhaps too early to speak of that with any certainty.

Similarly, in discussing the intellectual roots of the Third Reich, Shirer wrote that, in contrast to German Enlightenment figures such as Lessing and Kant, ‘who had made unique contributions to the civilization of the West’, other late nineteenth-century German thinkers, such as Wagner, Treitschke and Nietzsche, had ‘succeeded in establishing a spiritual break with the West (which) . . . has not been healed to this day’. In short, Shirer’s view of German history not only posited unbroken and direct lines of continuity to the Third Reich, but to the Federal Republic as well.29

The controversial thesis of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* was the main focus of the reviews published in the press and in scholarly journals. Not surprisingly, those critics whose horizons of expectations were informed by the ‘Luther to Hitler’ view of German history were favourably disposed toward the book. In contrast, the reviewers who were critical of the book had expectations shaped by a different historiographical paradigm — one which explained nazism under the broader phenomenon of totalitarianism, an idea that saw nazism’s roots in the general crisis of interwar Europe rather than solely in the German past. Still, most reviewers’ horizons of expectations were not solely shaped by literary experiences; as noted above, non-literary — in this case, political — factors figured as well. Why this was the case requires a brief look at the tense international political climate of the time.

In the realm of foreign affairs, the beginning of the 1960s saw a notable worsening in diplomatic relations between the US and West German governments. In the 1950s, both nations had united to resist Soviet attempts to undermine the gradual process of Western military and economic integration. By the end of the decade, however, the US
had become increasingly interested in pursuing a policy of détente with the Soviet Union (which included plans for arms control and the recognition of the European territorial status quo); West Germany, meanwhile, continued to adhere to its policy, commonly known as the ‘Hallstein Doctrine’, of territorial non-recognition (especially of the de facto or de jure existence of the German Democratic Republic and its borders with Poland) in order to preserve its chances for future reunification. However, following the relatively weak US response to the tense Berlin crisis at the turn of the decade (beginning with Khrushchev’s ultimatum in November 1958 to the West to accept East German control over the city, and culminating with the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961), it had become clear that the American government, now under Kennedy’s leadership, was willing to go only so far in supporting West Germany’s policy of non-recognition of the territorial status quo if it blocked superpower accommodation. In short, ‘by the summer of 1962 German–American relations had reached their worst condition since the war’.  

This strain in relations, serious in its own right, had been heightened, meanwhile, by several additional events around the same time that revived the American memory of West Germany’s nazi past and implicitly raised the question of the nation’s trustworthiness. At the end of 1959 and beginning of 1960, a wave of neo-nazi and anti-semitic vandalism swept West Germany, inspiring numerous copycat incidents throughout the world. At this time, charges were renewed that former nazis were occupying high government positions in the Bonn government (epitomized by the case of Theodor Oberländer, the Minister for Refugees, who eventually resigned his post). In addition, in May 1960, Adolf Eichmann, the former SS officer involved in implementing the Final Solution in Europe during the second world war, was captured by the Israeli secret police in Argentina and put on trial in Jerusalem. As vivid reminders of West Germany’s nazi past, these incidents were all registered by American public opinion and placed further strains on relations between the US and West Germany. With the Berlin crisis and the possibility of nuclear war between the superpowers looming constantly in the background at this time, many Americans began to wonder if Germany was an ally worth dying for.

Against this background of increased political tension between the US and the Federal Republic, a positive or negative review of Shirer’s book made a political as well as a scholarly statement. A reviewer’s acceptance of Shirer’s argument of continuity throughout German
history, from Luther to Hitler, implicitly included its extension to the Federal Republic and to the conclusion that West Germany might not be a reliable ally after all. In contrast, the paradigm of totalitarianism — attributing nazism to short-term and international, rather than long-term and national causes — implicitly stated that Germany was not inherently deviant, and was thus trustworthy as an American ally. Significantly, in both the positive and negative reviews of Shirer’s work, the final judgements were determined by a mixture of historiographical and political interests.

Not surprisingly, the most favourable reviews of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich that appeared in the United States in 1960–62 tended to share not only Shirer’s views on the origins of, but also the lessons to be learned from, nazism. In his glowing commentary on Shirer’s ‘splendid work of scholarship’ in the New York Times Book Review, the noted British historian Hugh R. Trevor-Roper praised it for directly confronting the issue of the German people’s role in the emergence of the nazi state, agreeing that ‘the nazi government was, as Mr Shirer says, not only the most German but the only true German Government in history’. Other reviewers, in explicitly praising Shirer for showing, as Orville Prescott put it, that ‘Hitler . . . was invited to create his monstrous “thousand-year state”’, likewise demonstrated support for his claim that the Third Reich was a uniquely German creation.

Still other critics went further and demonstrated their approval of Shirer’s account by highlighting its implicit, present-day political message. Writing for The Nation, the British historian Geoffrey Barraclough not only supported Shirer’s basic theses about the Germans’ support of nazism, but also cast strong doubt on their present allegiances to democracy, claiming that they remained ‘brash, bullying, self-pitying, the greatest danger to peace in our time’. Whether or not other reviewers fully shared such an extreme view, it was commonly asserted that Western safety from future German aggression could only be firmly ensured by preserving the increasingly faint memory of the nazi past. The effect of fifteen years of Cold War politics, wrote Barraclough,

[has] wroght a subtle . . . change in our attitude to Nazi Germany. The whole gruesome episode has lost reality. Other events have dulled the shock that stirred our consciences when the Nuremberg trials brought the foulness of the Nazis into full light . . . Meanwhile, time was at work. Those like William Shirer and the present writer . . . are the club bores of the sixties; no one wants to listen to us, and people whisper that we are obsessed, hysterical, and neurotically anti-German. In
any case we are a fast dwindling band in a world that has moved on. For a whole generation . . . Hitler has become a historical figure. As for the Third Reich, it has merged into the past, as real and as relevant as all other empires which rose on the backs of men and perished, but no more real and no more relevant than Babylon or Suleiman the Magnificent or Napoleon. 33

In light of these remarks, it is clear why The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich was seen as performing a needed service in helping to preserve the memory of the past. As William Birmingham concluded:

There are many among us who, for political reasons, advocate repressing all memory of Nazism — NATO depends on West Germany; without von Braun our missile program would lag even farther behind. Therefore it is heartening to see William Shirer’s angry description of Hitler’s Germany at the head of the best-seller lists. 34

Of course, not all positive reviews of Shirer’s book were rooted in a deep agreement with his paradigm or a belief in the need to maintain memory of the past. Certain favourable reviews 35 made little or no explicit reference to Shirer’s more controversial observations, praising his book for its uncontroversial features, such as its lucidity, reliability and compelling narrative. Other positive reviews, however, in echoing Gordon Craig’s comment that Shirer had ‘succeeded admirably’ in his attempt to be ‘severely objective’, implicitly supported his disputed view of German history. 36

Although they did not single out Shirer’s basic thesis for praise, what these and other positive reviews reflect is the fact that Shirer’s view of German history still commanded wide assent in the US in the early 1960s. Even those who were only moderately impressed with the book (such as the historian S. William Halperin who, writing for the Chicago Tribune, noted that ‘the book contains little that is new or original’), observed that Shirer had let ‘the facts speak for themselves’. 37 As we have seen, those who most closely agreed with Shirer’s paradigm, including its political implications, graced the book with the most abundant superlatives. Yet, those who were less effusive in their praise should by no means be viewed as having reservations about it. One did not have to share Shirer’s political convictions, including his wariness of West Germany, in order implicitly to accept his views of German history and to see the book as a distinguished achievement. Thus, Shirer’s book was positively reviewed because it confirmed, rather than challenged, these reviewers’ horizons of expectations.

While the actual level of support for The Rise and Fall of the Third
Rosenfeld: Shirer’s Rise and Fall of the Third Reich

Shirer’s underlying argument was not always explicit in the positive reviews of the book, the same cannot be said in the case of negative reviews. Although there were some exceptions, most of the negative reviews of the book directly attacked Shirer’s paradigm by pointing to its superannuation by the new theoretical model of totalitarianism. Although developed in the 1920s and 1930s, the idea that modern fascist and communist regimes shared important traits — indeed, stemmed from the same sources — increasingly became a popular one for many historians and political scientists in the United States immediately following the second world war. During this period of increasing US-Soviet tensions, the belief that communism was similar to nazism led many academics to resist a new appeasement and to support the policy of containment. Utilizing the concept of totalitarianism was thus a patriotic, political gesture as well as a methodological preference.

It is therefore not surprising that historians were well represented among the reviewers who criticized Shirer’s book for not embracing the new paradigm. Historians in the US generally received the book coolly. It should be noted, in fact, that in many of the leading academic journals Shirer’s book received no attention whatsoever. In the journals that did review his work, however, the most substantive by far was the detailed critique by the historian Klaus Epstein in the political science journal The Review of Politics in 1961. In this scathing review, Epstein accused Shirer of ‘systematic prejudice when dealing with Germany’s cultural heritage’ and concluded that his ‘rewarming of the wartime tale that German history is a one-way road leading from Luther to Hitler’ was fundamentally flawed due to his inability ‘to describe, or adequately comprehend, the nature of a modern totalitarian state’. This fundamental objection was also made by other academic reviewers, who found that Shirer’s exclusive focus on the specifically German aspects of nazism and his failure to make use of the concept of totalitarianism had prevented him from understanding the origins of nazism in the wider European social, economic and political trends of the period. As a result, Shirer’s work did not rise, according to the historian William O. Shanahan, ‘above the most commonplace level of understanding’.

While several negative reviews cited other reasons for the book’s faults, it is instructive to note that most critical reviews of the book highlighted Shirer’s neglect of the totalitarianism paradigm. As we have seen, this was in part due to the fact that many reviewers’
expectations had been shaped by the contemporaneous historiography. Yet, many were also beholden to the idea of totalitarianism for reasons of politics and patriotism. Of course, because the usage of the totalitarianism model implicitly carried with it a political message, it is difficult to say which of the negative reviews of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* were directly motivated by political considerations. It can be asserted with certainty, however, that this was the case with at least some scholars. Although he did not publish a review of Shirer’s book, the historian Karl A. Wittfogel (author of *Oriental Despotism*, an important work in the literature of totalitarianism), wrote to the West German publisher of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* in 1962:

I view the book as very damaging, politically, and as intellectually... contemptible. How, more than fifteen years after the fall of Hitler, does one want to explain National Socialism for us by claiming that there are good and bad peoples — the bad people, this time, not the Jews, but the Germans? The attempt to promote a... rational, scientific, serious analysis of Fascism (as a part of totalitarian power) has been seriously harmed by his pathetic work.48

Undoubtedly no lone example, Wittfogel may be taken as representative of those scholars whose reaction to Shirer’s book was strongly shaped by political as well as methodological interests.49

The problem of identifying political motives in the reviews of Shirer’s work, however, is less difficult in the case of negative reviews published in non-scholarly journals. In several instances, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* was bluntly attacked for an alleged pro-communist slant. In a review of the book published in the *American-German Review*, Marcia L. Kahn explained Shirer’s ‘one-sided style of history’ by claiming that ‘communists were... (his) main contacts... at the end of the war’.50 A similar line of argument was found in the several reviews of Shirer’s book in the conservative journal, *Modern Age*, in 1961-62. One reviewer, Felix Morley, accused Shirer of preferring the communist over the nazi variety of totalitarian dictatorship and pointed out the dangerous political implications of his ‘view’ that the ‘Germans... have a near monopoly on original sin’. As Morley wrote:

If there was truth in this pernicious thesis it would be wise to stop immediately all re-arming of the Federal Republic and to hand West Berlin over to Communist control. It may not have been Mr Shirer’s intention to promote such an outcome, but it is certainly the conclusion promoted by this book...51
It should be noted that *Modern Age* at times objected to the book, as historians did, simply for neglecting to utilize the concept of totalitarianism; on balance, however, such academic objections appeared less often than criticisms of the book’s ‘pro-communist suggestiveness’.\(^{52}\)

To understand why the negative reviews of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* printed in conservative journals like *Modern Age* differed so markedly in tenor from those that appeared in academic journals or the mainstream press, it helps to recall the tense political climate of 1960–62. At a time of increased superpower confrontation over Berlin, many conservative Americans saw a firm US–West German alliance as a political imperative. Believing that ‘the chief beneficiary of hostility and distrust between America and Germany . . . is the Kremlin’, *Modern Age* was seriously concerned with what it perceived to be a revival of ‘anti-Germanism’ led by Shirer’s book and growing popular literature on West Germany’s nazi past.\(^{53}\) Thus, it was to prevent *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* from damaging already weakened US–West German relations that the journal so vehemently attacked the book. In doing so, *Modern Age* hoped to restore a ‘proper’ perspective on the United States’s international position and make Americans realize that while ‘one would not believe it after reading Shirer . . . we are living in 1962, not in 1942, and the threat to our national security does not come from Germany’.\(^{54}\)

Cold War politics, then, were intimately involved, if not always explicitly expressed, in determining the tone of both the positive and negative reviews of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* in the United States. As we have seen, most who praised the book did so because their horizons of expectations had been confirmed by it. Informed by the traditional ‘Luther to Hitler’ explanation of naziism, these reviewers’ literary expectations were confirmed by *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, itself based on the paradigm. Shirer’s book gained additional assent among reviewers whose expectations were influenced by political considerations. For those wary of West Germany, Shirer’s book had a special political importance, since it preserved the memory of the nazi past and thus provided insurance against future German aggression. While not all favourably-disposed reviewers of the book were so motivated, in a highly charged political climate, all positive reviews of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, regardless of intention, made a strong political statement regarding the past and future of the Federal Republic.
In contrast, those reviewers whose horizons of expectations had been deeply informed by a different kind of extensive literary experience — namely, by a general acceptance of the concept of totalitarianism — rejected Shirer’s book for its contrary thesis. Whether or not these negative reviews were politically motivated, they too made a political statement. As the basis of the American counter-ideology in the Cold War, the very use of the paradigm of totalitarianism reflected a measure of solidarity with official US policy and the backing of the anti-communist Western alliance. Other reviewers’ horizons of expectations, as noted above, were shaped more by political interests. Frightened by the potential effect of Shirer’s resurrection of memory on US–West German relations, these reviewers employed the totalitarianism paradigm, but also used classic red-baiting tactics in attempting to discredit the book. In short, in the turbulent political environment of the early 1960s, all negative reviews of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, regardless of intention, carried with them a political message.

In discussing the positive and negative reviews of Shirer’s work in the US, it is striking how few reviewers attempt to account for the book’s tremendous popular appeal and commercial success. In American scholarly journals, the success of the book was registered merely to justify the review in the first place; in fact, many of the critical reviews of the book noted that, were it not for its wide circulation, the ideas contained within it would scarcely need repudiation.33 Especially in light of the great West German interest in the reasons for the book’s success, the lack of attention given the question by American reviewers seems puzzling.

It is revealing, though, that the reviewers most concerned with, and eager to explain, the book’s popular success were those associated with the conservative journal, Modern Age. According to these reviewers’ reasoning, the wave of ‘anti-German’ literature led by Shirer’s book was largely the result of ‘crude commercialism’ — of sales-hungry and ‘left-wing, anti-anti-communist’ publishers cashing in on burgeoning trends. Why the initial trend of ‘anti-Germanism’ itself should have arisen, however, Modern Age was unable to explain satisfactorily. The journal’s oblique reference to ‘existing prejudices of influential sections of the American reading public’ as the reason for the best-seller success of the ‘anti-German’ literature could not fully account for the tremendous success of Shirer’s book and that of his epigones. Whether referring to American Jews, pro-Soviet leftists or simply to inveterate German-haters, the idea that a ‘hard core of
irreconcilables’ was ‘the organizing driving force behind the anti-German campaign (as well as) . . . a good deal of its mass audience’, was a dramatic oversimplification.26 What Modern Age seems to have had great difficulty in accepting was what the historian, Henry Cord Meyer, described in 1960 as persisting American ‘uneasiness’ with ‘modern Germans’, a people whose ‘spectacular economic successes’ could not be separated from the memory of ‘SS-men and death camps’.27 In short, Modern Age’s explanation of Shirer’s success (as part of an organized anti-German campaign) was limited by political blinkers — by its Cold War-induced inability to admit that average Americans might still harbour suspicions of West Germany not even a generation after the end of the second world war.

And yet, if, contrary to Modern Age’s claims, the tremendous resonance found by The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich in the US was not an orchestrated affair, what accounts for its tremendous popularity? Especially since, as noted earlier, the book’s mixed critical reception does not explain its tremendously favourable popular reception, it is crucial to consider this question carefully.

Undoubtedly, much of the success of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich was a matter of timing. Shirer’s book, five and a half years in the making, appeared precisely at a time when the Berlin crisis, resurgent anti-semitic activity in West Germany and the capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann all served to direct the attention of many Americans to the Federal Republic. When one looks at the pattern of Simon & Schuster’s sales, it is clear that the book profited greatly from the political turmoil of the time.28 Would the book have received as enthusiastic a response in the absence of such a context of international tension? In part, the fact that Shirer’s work was truly the first attempt at a comprehensive synthesis of the events of the nazi period might, in itself, have been reason enough for many Americans to take note. This, however, presupposes an active interest in the nazi period within American society prior to 1960 — unlikely given the preoccupation with the Soviet Union. It appears, then, that Shirer’s book owed much of its success to the fact that the collective American memory of the nazi period, long dormant, had been revived by contemporary events.

Even more important than the revival of memory, however, was that fact that a strong consonance existed between Shirer’s account of the nazi period and the view of it preserved in the American collective memory. Indeed, there is significant evidence that the latter, in 1960, was remarkably similar to the widely-held views of nazism that had
been formed in the US twenty years earlier during the second world war. In light of the fact that the vast majority of Americans possessed no direct experience of events in nazi Germany or nazi-occupied Europe during the second world war, it is likely that the general memory of the period was significantly shaped by the wartime press and literature in which simplistic (and often propagandistic) interpretations of the historical origins of the Third Reich were widely propagated. Contained in both the popular and scholarly literature of the time, the ‘Luther to Hitler’ view of German history seems to have gained significant attention and acceptance among Americans — a fact demonstrated by the negative shift in popular attitudes towards Germany over the course of the war.\textsuperscript{99} That this view of German history also influenced official US government policy towards Germany during the war — especially in official American plans for a punitive or ‘hard’ peace settlement — further attests to its prominence.\textsuperscript{99} In short, as most Americans had little firsthand experience of any aspects of nazism, their views of it were shaped by the wartime discourse on the subject. Of course, with the swift realignment of former allies and enemies in the late 1940s, this view of the German past was rendered politically obsolete and generally faded from public view. Yet, although the Soviets had replaced the nazis as the enemies of the day, the old wartime views of the nazi period were not erased, but instead maintained a dormant existence within the American collective memory.

Further evidence of this continuity is provided by the failure of the new concept of totalitarianism to find much popular acceptance during the 1950s, a period in which old wartime views might have been overturned. Although many historians after the second world war had adopted the new paradigm to explain nazism, the new model was, by and large, restricted to the academic world. Writing in 1964, Christine Totten noted that ‘only a small circle of Americans’ accepted the thesis that nazism’s roots lay in larger European factors; ‘the majority’, she observed, ‘still adhere to a... “from Luther to Hitler” view’.\textsuperscript{61} Totten’s claims are supported by the reviews of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, which also demonstrate that the new concept of totalitarianism attracted few adherents outside the academic world. The near total absence of references to the paradigm in reviews of Shirer’s book (both positive and negative) by non-academics in the press, points not only to the fact that few outside academia availed themselves of the new concept, but leads one to surmise that most Americans (widely exposed to the popular press)
received little exposure to the idea. Had it gained acceptance in areas outside academia, one would expect the concept of totalitarianism to have been utilized in the press reviews of the book. Of course, there may well have been little reason for the paradigm to have gained attention in the mainstream. Most Americans, solidly anti-communist during the 1950s, scarcely needed the aid of scholarly paradigms such as totalitarianism to support their fears of Soviet expansionism. As such, it seems understandable that the theory would remain consigned to academics and to activist, conservative political circles. Finally, in light of its gradual abandonment in the mid-1960s by most academics, the likelihood that it had gained any resonance or staying power within society as a whole seems doubtful.

The positive and negative reviews of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* in the United States — written by individuals informed, for the most part, on the topic — thus give a distorted view of the general American reaction to the book. Indeed, it is likely that far less disagreement about Shirer’s work actually existed within American society at large than is indicated by its reviews. In other words, the published reviews of the book (informed by two separate historiographical paradigms) represented a wider horizon of expectations than existed within American society. For the most part, the reviewers of Shirer’s work read it with attitudes shaped by extensive literary and non-literary (or political) experience. Most Americans, however, distant from academia and thus unexposed to the newest historiographical paradigm, read Shirer’s work with a horizon of expectations shaped by the memory of the nazi era (itself influenced by the wartime ‘Luther to Hitler’ view of German history) resurrected by the political events of 1960–62. True, as noted above, the views of some conservative Americans were shaped more by Cold War political considerations than by this older memory of the nazi period. Yet, for most Americans, recent political events seemed to confirm the old view of the past: nazism was a German affair.

It can be surmised, therefore, that the underlying paradigm of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* found wide assent in American society. Moreover, the widespread popular acceptance of the ‘Luther to Hitler’ explanation would help to account for the incredible popularity of Shirer’s book in the US. Shirer’s account of the nazi period had a dual function: it not only offered many Americans an explanation of the contemporary events of 1960, it did so in a manner which confirmed the horizon of expectations they brought to it, thus giving them the idea that they had understood nazism all along.
Arguing counterfactually, it can be asserted that, had the paradigm of totalitarianism actually gained wider acceptance within American society in the years before 1960, Shirer’s book would have challenged many more average Americans’ horizons of expectations — something that would have certainly been reflected in the ‘spectrum of reaction’ to the book. In all probability, there would have been far more negative reaction (and probably poorer sales) than was the case. Shirer’s argument would simply have not been compelling. In short, the phenomenal commercial success of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich indicates that the book confirmed rather than challenged the horizon of expectations of most Americans.

As was the case in the US, West German readers approached The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich with attitudes shaped by the contemporaneous historiographical literature, specific political concerns and a more general, collective memory of the nazi period. As we shall see, however, for a variety of reasons, the West German response to Shirer’s book was far more univocal than the American reaction. Unlike the case in the US, there were few noticeable differences between the reviews published in the West German press and academic journals. Indeed, the horizons of expectations of West German journalists as well as historians were informed by the same literary and non-literary experiences. Both shared a common historiographical paradigm for explaining nazism; in contrast to the US where two views competed for dominance, in West Germany a strong societal consensus — rooted in the collective desire to repress the memory of the Third Reich — unequivocally supported an approach to the past using the model of totalitarianism. The general unanimity of the West German reaction was furthermore a product of political concerns — of a defensiveness sparked by the perception that The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich had generated a new wave of ‘anti-Germanism’ in the US. The combination of Shirer’s general thesis of the origins of nazism and the assumption of its widespread acceptance by the American public (as indicated by the strong sales of the book) led not only to a high degree of unanimity among West German reviewers but to a highly polemical tone in their criticisms. It is safe to say, in fact, that the West German reception of Shirer’s book was as much determined by concern over the American reaction to it as by the disagreement with its theses. In short, unlike the case in the
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US where reviewers and average readers of Shirer’s work approached it with different horizons of expectations, all West Germans seem to have read the book with attitudes informed by extremely similar factors.

Appearing in October 1961, exactly one year after its American début, the German edition of Shirer’s book, Aufstieg und Fall des dritten Reiches, achieved an initially strong, but ultimately fleeting, commercial success. Published with a special critical introduction by the German historian Golo Mann, one-third of the first 30,000 copies printed were sold in the first month. As reported in the Bücherspiegel section (a listing of the current best-selling books in the country) of the weekly German magazine Der Spiegel, Shirer’s work reached the fifth highest place and remained among the top ten best-selling books in West Germany for approximately six months in 1961–62. Thereafter, it faded from view, its total sales figures far lower than in the US.

Also different from the American case was the unrelenting criticism directed towards the book. In reviews of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich published in both the popular press and in academic journals before and after its appearance in German translation, Shirer was censured for a whole host of failures and shortcomings. Among the most simplistic but direct criticisms of the book were those that employed the *ad hominem* strategy of attacking Shirer as a German-hater. Explicitly accused by some reviewers of ‘hiding the fact that he still hates (Germans)’, Shirer was perceived to have, at best, approached his subject ‘with two souls in his breast (one being) . . . that of a historian . . . , the other . . . that of a Nuremberg prosecutor’. It followed, then, that Shirer’s alleged biases disqualified his book as wholly unobjective. As Walter Görlich, the editor of the weekly newspaper Die Welt, and author of numerous historical works, wrote of Shirer: ‘Of course, anyone is free to view the Germans as a dangerous race. However, he who does so is poorly-equipped to write history.’

Nearly all the reviews of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich pointed out, moreover, that Shirer’s conception of German history was simplistic and inadequate. As Görlich wrote, ‘Shirer is no authority on German history. What he has to say about it resembles the clichés employed by allied propaganda in the first and second world wars.’ Along these lines, the historian Arnulf Baring wrote that ‘Shirer has crudely simplistic notions of German history before
1933 as an inevitable preparation of National Socialism'.

As many of these reviewers maintained, Shirer’s simplistic view of German history was largely the result of his failure to consult the recent research on the nazi era that had appeared in West German publications, in particular the respected Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. As Walter Görlitz summed up, ‘Shirer’s work is . . . based on the state of knowledge (of the nazi period) of 1950’. Moreover, West German critics claimed that Shirer’s lack of familiarity with recent research had prevented him from utilizing the latest theories on totalitarianism. As Broszat observed, a ‘history of National Socialism that is worthy of the name . . . cannot . . . be written by someone who completely passes over the core of the problem—totalitarianism in its specifically National Socialist form’. Similarly, the future West German chancellor, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, faulted Shirer for overlooking the fact that ‘the social sickness that one has called naziism was contained in the type of society, and in those political institutions that dominated Western Europe prior to the second world war’. In short, for these reviewers, Shirer’s failure to make use of the totalitarianism paradigm—his inability to see that naziism’s roots were not solely German—was yet another symptom of his alleged long-held biases and a cause of his second-rate scholarship.

Significantly, there were some exceptions to the overwhelmingly negative reaction to Shirer’s book in West Germany. Conceding that ‘we allow the great subject of our current history . . . to be taken away from us by foreigners’, the Süddeutsche Zeitung noted that, since the war, no West German historians had produced anything of comparable scope or ambition that could be used to refute Shirer. Others, like Broszat, made an effort to acquit Shirer from the charge of being a German-hater, writing that his crude conception of Germany history was less a product of hatred than of intellectual laziness. Furthermore, in one of the more balanced reviews of the book, the historian Joachim Leuschner pointed out that Shirer himself was aware of his prejudices and had done an admirable job in trying to restrain them in his narrative. At best, however, these scattered remarks merely amounted to backhanded compliments. For the most part, the reaction to the book was sharply negative.

One reason for the generally unified German criticism of Shirer’s book was the absence of any competing historiographical paradigms
for explaining nazism such as existed in the US. As Georg Iggers has observed, up until the mid-1960s, a strong consensus on the question of the origins of the Third Reich prevailed within West German historiography. As reflected in several early attempts to understand exactly where Germany went wrong in 1933, the extremely conservative West German historical profession was unwilling to look inward and identify nazism’s roots in the German past. Instead, historians such as Hans Rothfels and Gerhard Ritter explained the Third Reich as ‘the final summit of an extreme consequence of the secularization movement of the nineteenth century’ or as ‘the product of “modern industrial society with its uniform mass humanity”’. With nazism seen as a European rather than a German phenomenon, then, Hitler and the Third Reich were regarded not as the logical culminations of, but as aberrations in, German history.

Moreover, in the early 1950s, this wide range of interpretations was subsumed under the general paradigm of totalitarianism, which had recently been borrowed from the US. This, of course, was not surprising, given the concept’s political utility. The belief in the similarities of nazism and communism served first to direct the focus away from the specifically German causes of nazism and assisted West Germans in marginalizing or repressing the memory of the Third Reich. Moreover, in singling out communism as the primary threat to the West, the idea of totalitarianism provided apologies for previous German anti-communist campaigns and legitimated current West German foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. As long as the Cold War raged, moreover, this theory maintained its absolute dominance in the political, academic and journalistic realms in West Germany. While this unanimity would be shattered in the later 1960s with the Fischer controversy and the student movement, the societal consensus on the paradigm of totalitarianism was still in place when The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich appeared. Not surprisingly, as Shirer’s work was based on a paradigm that was anathema in West Germany, its appearance there challenged many Germans’ horizons of expectations and was thus roundly rejected.

The unified nature of the West German criticism also had political sources. The perception that Shirer’s book was partly responsible for the increasing American attention to the Federal Republic’s nazi past and, thus, for contributing to a worsening of already tense US-West German relations, inevitably sharpened the invective directed against it. This was explicitly demonstrated by the Bonn government’s official
condemnation of, and organized effort to refute, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. As Shirer notes in his autobiography, Konrad Adenauer was particularly worried about the success of the book.

Chancellor Adenauer made no bones about his position. He attacked me on television... [Once] when he was in New York, he called Mike Cowles [of *Look* magazine], angrily denounced him for publishing pieces from the book, and demanded that *Look* cease publishing further extracts. Cowles, who could be hard as nails, was not intimidated by the angry German chancellor. He told me afterward that he had said to the German:

‘Sir, are you telling me that the Shirer book is not truthful? If so, *Look* will print a retraction.’

‘Mr Cowles’, Mike swore the chancellor answered, ‘you do not get the point. The point is not whether it’s truthful or not. The point is that it is turning out to be extremely harmful to German–American relations. It is stirring up in America hatred of the Germans. Mr Shirer is a German-hater, a Deuschhasser! You must not publish any more of his trash.’

Following this encounter, the Bonn government launched a press campaign against Shirer’s book, attacking it in its weekly, English-language news-digest, *The Bulletin*, as well as in a special, twenty-four page compilation of the negative American and West German reviews of the book sent ‘to thousands of American newspaper editors and book reviewers’. The effectiveness of these rebuttals in changing American attitudes was undoubtedly minor. Indeed, the runaway success of the book in the US was already established when the Bonn government attempted to arrest it. The official government attacks are significant, however, in demonstrating the high degree of concern raised by Shirer’s book.

Underlying the overall West German reaction to *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* was anger at its enormous popular success. Unlike the case in the US, every review that appeared in the West German press and academic journals noted the great popularity of the book among the American public. Claiming that ‘one million buyers, that means three or four million readers, have already discovered the book’, Paul Sethe noted ominously that ‘[a] large, perhaps decisive, segment of the American population is forming its opinion of National Socialism and of the German people according to Shirer’s account’. Somewhat more agitated, Egon Vacek and Arnim von Manikowsky, writing in *Stern*, feared that the book had found its way ‘to every last shack in Tennessee’ and was being widely read as an objective source about contemporary Germany. The most disturbing implication of Shirer’s success, however, was stated by Jan
Reifenberg who noted ‘the book should make clear that a good many people, even in allied states, have not forgotten’.

Indeed, the prevailing concern of many West German reviewers was that American memory of the nazi past had, in large part, been revived by *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. To be sure, many reviews pointed out that the general constellation of events of 1958–61 had also served to heighten American concerns about the Federal Republic. However, according to Paul Sethe and others, Shirer’s book was instrumental in producing ‘the scepticism that has recently arisen in America with regard to the Germans’.

As Vacek and Manikowsky wrote:

> After the war, the Americans heaved a sigh of relief and turned back to their daily routines. What had happened couldn’t be undone, but it could be forgotten. And the Germans . . . had become new allied partners. But as the cold war grew warmer, when Berlin and the Germans reappeared in the headlines . . . around one million Americans reached for the only allegedly objective . . . analysis of these restless Germans.

Shirer’s analysis, in short, had proved extremely dangerous; not only had it ‘raped’ German history, it had also ‘fanned the flames of a new wave of anti-German sentiment in America and England.’

The assumption that Shirer’s success and American ‘anti-Germanism’ were interrelated led some West German writers to speculate on other possible causes of the latter phenomenon aside from the tense political climate. Disturbing, despite their infrequency, were thinly-cloaked references in the German press to American Jews as responsible for rising anti-German sentiment in the US. Indicative of this trend was a *Der Spiegel* article which, after identifying the chief source of ‘anti-German tendencies’ as ‘that narrow communications-clique . . . that forms public opinion’ located on ‘the east coast and New York City’, went on to imply that ‘Jewish predominance as shapers of public opinion’ had prevented, and would continue to prevent, Americans forgetting ‘the last war as quickly or as thoroughly as the citizens of the Federal Republic’. No doubt for many Germans, the wildly presumptuous idea that American Jews were responsible for deliberately reviving the memory of the Third Reich in the US (a claim, incidentally, that would resurface during the Bitburg Affair in 1985) was both easier and more reassuring to accept than the possibility that Americans had actually grown distrustful of the Federal Republic of their own volition. Indeed, the appeal of this strategy of denial was further demonstrated in press
articles which used classic red-baiting tactics to attack *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* and American ‘anti-Germanism’. Whether described as ‘Ulbricht propaganda’ or likened to ‘East Berlin propaganda brochures’, Shirer’s success and the general revival of American memory of the Third Reich were not carefully analysed as complex phenomena, but simply condemned for allegedly directing Western attention away from the Soviet communist threat.91

This preference for smearing and condemnation rather than explanation reveals a great deal about the psychological needs of many West Germans at the time. During a period of international tension over Berlin in which the Federal Republic was more than ever dependent upon its allies, the idea that average Americans (or Britons or French) might have had reservations about the country was too disturbing for some to face. Instead, it was far easier (as *Modern Age* had discovered in the US) to insinuate that Jews and communists, groups whose hostility towards the Federal Republic was already assumed, were behind the alleged new wave of ‘anti-Germanism’. And yet, few in West Germany could have been unaware of the scope of European anxiety towards it at the time. The neo-nazi incidents of late 1959 had likewise sparked great fear of resurgent German nationalism in England where, in response, movements to boycott West German goods arose along with statements by the Macmillan government voicing increasing reluctance to outfit the Federal Republic with nuclear weapons.92 The West German impulse to seek scapegoats for increasing ‘anti-Germanism’ can thus only be explained as part of a larger inability to accept the hard fact that while many in the Federal Republic had successfully repressed the memory of the Third Reich, others in America and Europe had not.

**The differences between** the American and West German reactions towards the book should now be evident. As we have seen, a strong consonance existed between Shirer’s account of the nazi period and the view of it widely held in the American collective memory. Although this memory had been suppressed during the Cold War for political reasons, it had persisted unnoticed until political events revived it once more around 1960. Much of the controversy surrounding the book, as we have seen, involved the political implications of this resurrection of memory. While many in West Germany had arrived at an acceptable vision of the past in the early years of the Cold War with the aid of the totalitarianism paradigm,
the appearance and success of Shirer’s book challenged it and alerted West Germans that American memory of the past itself had been revived. This is what accounts for the more unified reaction to the book in the Federal Republic than in the US. While only some Americans were concerned about the potential political implications of *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, nearly all West Germans were. Vulnerable and especially dependent on the US during the Berlin crisis, the Federal Republic was hardly the place in 1961 to harbour competing (and potentially divisive) memories of the past. Already in a defensive posture, West Germany’s reaction to Shirer’s book was thus understandably univocal. In contrast, while negative reactions to the book did appear in the US they were, in most cases, not explicitly political; the ones that were, such as those that appeared in *Modern Age*, owed their tenor to the same political concerns that sharpened many West Germans’ reactions to the book. In this case, politics made natural bedfellows. These negative American responses towards *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, of course, were overshadowed by the book’s tremendous commercial success and critical acclaim. Unlike in West Germany, the multiplicity of responses to Shirer’s work seems to indicate that there was room for more than one memory of the nazi past in the United States. In the end, while US–West German relations would soon resume their former cordiality, the uproar over the book revealed the latent political resonance of memory.

**Notes**


2. Mayer, 7. Besides German, the book has been translated into French (1961), Hebrew (1962), Italian (1962), Spanish (1962), Portuguese (1963), Greek (1965), Persian (1983) and Chinese (1985). Among the recent American special editions, the


7. Hans Robert Jauss, ‘Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory’ in New Literary History, vol. II, no. 1, 1970–71, 13–15. Other scholars, such as Wolfgang Iser, have also written on the subject of reception theory. Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore 1978). Less historically-oriented than Jauss, Iser is more interested in the ways in which texts themselves organize the responses of readers. See, for example, 34–8, 96–9. Iser himself notes that his theory of response (oriented more towards the role of texts) is distinct from theories of reception (which are focused more on readers), x.


10. Shirer was recruited for the CBS post by Edward R. Murrow. See Berlin Diary: 1934–1944 (London 1941), 67–70.


12. Ibid., 93–126, 183, n.

13. Ibid., 212–14, 228, 236–40.

14. ‘German Edition of Shirer Book is Scored by Hamburg Reviewer’, The New York Times, 13 October 1961, 8. Two-thirds of the one million copies sold in the first year were through the Book-of-the-Month Club (which advertised the book to its members as ‘especially recommended’ and offered it for nearly half the retail price, an affordable $5.95. This, undoubtedly, was an important factor in boosting the book’s sales). See Book-of-the-Month Club News, October 1960. For trial members, the book could be had even cheaper for $1.00. See BOM’s full-page advertisement in The Atlantic, December 1960, 4–5. The remaining third of the one million copies (some 370,000) were sold directly by Simon & Schuster (which put the book through 14 printings in the first year). Letter to the author from Stuart Gottesman, assistant editor at Simon & Schuster, 24 March 1992.

15. This total circulation figure is an estimate based on the 1959 figures of The Reader’s Digest’s total circulation. See Magazine Circulation and Rate Trends, 1940–1959, published in 1960 by the Association of National Advertisers, Inc., 49. Some sources claim that the total circulation of The Reader’s Digest at the time in the US was over 17 million copies per month. See James Physted Wood, Of Lasting Interest: The Story of The Reader’s Digest (New York 1967), 2.

20. Shirer spent the first 279 pages of the book discussing the rise of Hitler, the nazis‘ seizure of power and life in the Third Reich. Most of the remaining 866 pages were devoted to diplomacy and war (exceptions include nazi racial policy, the Final Solution and the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life).
21. See, for example, George Lichtheim’s review, ‘Shirer as Historian’ in *Commentary*, May 1961, 446–9.
22. Although important studies of the nazi period had been written in the 1950s and before, most had either been biographies of Hitler or more detailed monographs on specific features of the Third Reich. These included Hugh R. Trevor-Roper’s, *The Last Days of Hitler* (New York 1947), Alan Bullock’s, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (London 1952), and Gerald Reitlinger’s, *The SS: Alibi of a Nation* (New York 1957).
24. Strongly influenced by British works such as Rohan D’O. Butler’s *The Roots of National Socialism: 1783–1933* (London 1941), Lord Robert Vansittart’s *Black Record: Germans Past and Present* (London 1941), and Lewis Namier’s *Conflicts: Studies in Contemporary History* (London 1943), numerous studies appeared in the US during the war, advocating the claim that naziism was more or less the inevitable outcome of German history. The best known American example in the genre was William Montgomery McGovern’s *From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy* (Boston 1941), the thesis of which was repeated in less scholarly books by writers such as Louis Nizer, Emil Ludwig, T.H. Tetens and Sigrid Schultz. See Christine M. Totten, *Deutschland — Soll und Haben: Amerikas Deutschlandbild* (Munich 1964), 117.
25. Many of these studies served the interests of (and, in some cases, were produced by) organizations active in the wartime propaganda effort against Germany, such as the Writers’ War Board and its successor, the Society for the Prevention of World War III. The Writers’ War Board (originally called the Writers’ War Committee), was closely tied to the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) for the duration of the war. See John McAleer’s biography of the head of the Society for the Prevention of World War III, Rex Stout. John McAleer, *Rex Stout: A Biography* (Boston 1977), 300, 312–13. For more on the wartime propaganda scene in the US see Joachim Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA: Ihr Einfluss auf die amerikanische Europapolitik, 1933–1945* (Düsseldorf 1971).
26. Importantly, Shirer (like thousands of other American journalists), had been active in the American wartime propaganda effort, and had been a member of the Writers’ War Board as well as a member of the Society for the Prevention of World War III.
27. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, 95.
28. Ibid., 201, 200.
29. Ibid., 94, 97.

31. Following the first incident, in which swastikas were painted on the Cologne synagogue, other cases of anti-Semitic vandalism were reported in the cities of Brunswick, Offenbach, Seligenstadt, Rheydt and Gelsenkirchen. See The New York Times, 31 December 1959, 1. 27 December 1959, 3, and 28 December 1959, 2. Panic spread, in turn, as other cases of anti-Semitic vandalism were reported in additional German cities as well as in London, Paris, Oslo, Vienna, Athens, Melbourne, Bogota, Buenos Aires and New York City. See The New York Times, 3 January 1960, 4. 5 January 1960, 2, and 7 January 1960, 2.


42. ‘Shirer Crowns His Career with Superb History’, Chicago Sunday Tribune, Magazine of Books, 16 October 1960, 1.

43. As Peter Novick has observed, ‘the construct served both as the principal theoretical underpinning of scholarly studies of nazism and communism in the United States, and as the foundation of American counter-ideology in the cold war’. Peter

44. *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* was not reviewed, for example, either in *The Journal of Modern History* or in most of the major political science journals of the time. This snub also undoubtedly reflected the prevailing view within the increasingly autonomous and academic profession that journalists, indeed any untrained amateurs, were unsuited to writing history. With regard to this disciplinary snobbery, it is noteworthy that Novick includes Shirer’s name (along with others, such as Barbara Tuchman and John Toland) in the list of those postwar amateur historians whom most professional historians in the 1950s regarded, ‘justly or unjustly . . . as the equivalent of chiropractors and naturopaths’, Novick, 372.


53. William Henry Chamberlain, ‘The Revival of Anti-Germanism’, *Modern Age*, Summer 1962, 283. Other books such as T.H. Teten’s *The New Germany and the Old Nazis*, John Dornberg’s *Schizophrenic Germany*, and novels such as Katherine Anne Porter’s *Ship of Fools*, Alson J. Smith’s *A View of the Spree*, and Frederick Mayer’s *Web of Hate* all focused either on the continued existence of unrepentant nazis in power positions in the West German state or the general ‘schizophrenic’ character of postwar West German society. Others, such as the seven works on Adolf Eichmann that appeared during 1960–1 (bearing titles such as *Man of Slaughter* and *Minister of
Death) also revived what were seen as negative images of the German past. 'The US Image of Germany, 1962, As Reflected in American Books', Modern Age, 418–24.
58. From October 1960 until March 1962, the print runs of the hardcover edition of the book averaged approximately 25,000 copies. After that date (once the political tensions had eased), the print runs fell to approximately 5,000 copies. Letter to author from Stuart Gottesman, assistant editor at Simon & Schuster, 24 March 1992.
59. Gauging the influence of this propaganda on American views of Germany is very difficult. Despite Deborah Lipstadt's study of the American press and the Holocaust which points to widespread public scepticism about press reports during the war and despite the efforts of pro-German propaganda groups—such as Paul Tillich's 'Council for a Democratic Germany'—to influence American public opinion, other evidence demonstrates that Allied propaganda was quite effective, especially towards the end of the war, in spreading 'stereotypical' views of Germans. Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933–1945 (New York 1986). See Ferdinand Hermens, 'The Danger of Stereotypes in Viewing Germany', The Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter 1945–46, 419. Over time, it seems, Allied propaganda, spread by groups like the Writers' War Board and the Society for the Prevention of World War III, may well have led many Americans to adjust their views on Germany and the Germans. Public opinion polls (taken in March 1945) revealed that the Germans' image in the United States had sunk to an extremely low level; only 22 per cent of the respondents believed that Germany could once again become a 'good nation' in twenty years; 37 per cent believed it would take longer and 31 per cent felt that Germany would never again become a 'good nation'. Klaus Jonas, Kurt H. Staf and Wolfgang Stroebel, Amerikaner über Deutschland und die Deutschen (Opladen 1986), 42–3.
60. The basis of US occupation policy until 1947, Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (JCS 1067), had been influenced by the infamous Morgenthau Plan, drawn up by 'Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau Jr in April 1944, which itself had been shaped by the 'Luther to Hitler' view of German history.
63. As reported in Der Spiegel's weekly Bücherspiegel (based on a weekly poll of 100 West German book dealers in 50 cities and university towns, conducted by the Allensbacher Institut für Demoskopie), Shirer's book was in the top ten from 8 November 1961 to 4 April 1962. See p. 94 and p. 90 respectively of these two issues of Der Spiegel.
64. While the exact figures are difficult to come by, a general sense of the book's sales can be achieved by taking its first month's total of 10,000 copies (at the height of public
interest in the controversy) and extending it for the length of time the book was on the
best-seller list. By any estimation, this figure (around 60,000) was far lower than the US
total.
65. Egon Vacek and Arnim von Manikowsky, ‘G’schichte aus dem Dritten Reich’,
Stern, 30 January 1962, 36; Paul Sethe, ‘William Shirers halbe Wahrheiten’, Die Zeit,
13 October 1961, 10. Similarly, Der Spiegel referred to the ‘love-hate relationship that
binds (Shirer) to Germany’, ‘Von Luther bis Hitler’, Der Spiegel, 4 October 1961, 78.
66. ‘Fragwürdiger “Historiker”’, Die Welt, 3 November 1961. Similarly, Jürgen
R.H. Deutsch noted in Das Parlament, ‘Shirer is, without a doubt, a man that views
the Germans with nothing but a deep, burning hatred mixed with contempt . . . One
must therefore not expect a clear account from him.’ The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich, Das Parlament, 7 June 1961.
68. ‘Das Dritte Reich in Ausländischer Sicht’, Neue Politische Literatur, 1055.
69. Graml and Henke, 176.
70. See ‘Von Luther bis Hitler’, 78. See also the reviews by Broszat, Görlitz, Baring,
Vacek and Manikowsky, and Joachim Leuschner, ‘William L. Shirer, das “Dritte
Reich” und die Deutschen’, Neue Politische Literatur, August 1963, 4–5. It should be
noted that Shirer did not consider the journal to be very objective. Shirer, 20th Century
Journey, 245.
72. Graml and Henke, 184–5. See also ‘G’schichte aus dem Dritten Reich’, Stern, 30
January 1962, 42.
73. ‘Das Dritte Reich’, Aussenpolitik: Zeitschrift für Internationale Fragen,
February 1961, 142.
74. Shirer, 20th Century Journey, 258. See also ‘Germans Don’t Always Like What
75. Graml and Henke, 178.
76. Leuschner, 22.
77. See Georg Iggers’s introduction in Georg Iggers (ed.), The Social History of
Politics: Critical Perspectives in West German Historical Writing since 1945
(Leamington Spa 1985), 20. Georg Iggers, The German Conception of History: The
National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present, Revised Edition
79. Reinhard Kühn, ‘Zur politischen Funktion der Totalitarismustheorien in
der BRD’, in Martin Greiffenhagen, Reinhard Kühn and Johann Baptist Müller
(eds), Totalitarismus: Zur Problematik eines politischen Begriffs (Munich 1972),
13.
80. Ibid., 14.
81. Greiffenhagen, et al., 14. According to an East German account of the time, the
theory even found an institutional home in the West German school system by order of
the Minister of Culture in 1962–63. See Gerhard Lozek and Horst Syrbe, Geschichts-
schreibung Contra Geschichte: Über die antinationale Geschichtskonzeption führender
westdeutscher Historiker (East Berlin 1964), 104. Significantly, it came to serve as the
basis for what Iggers calls ‘the remarkable consensus (that) dominated the historical
profession of the Federal Republic at the end of the 1950s’, Iggers, The Social History
of Politics, 22.
90. During the Bitburg Affair, some West German journals, notably Quick, raised charges of Jewish influence in the US as the source of the controversy. See Geoffrey Hartman (ed.), Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington, Indiana 1986), 78 n.

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