Arms Control: SALT I and SALT II

1. Why arms control?
   US aim: put a cap on Soviet strategic weapons
   USSR: now that they reached parity, the question of what to do.
   Soviet nuclear strategy:
      Military doctrine:
      Clausewitz: “War is extension of politics by different means”—class struggle
      Seeking superiority
      Nuclear war is winnable
      **Nuclear strategy:**
      First-strike, counterforce
      Strategic defense
   Kosygin’s visit to US (Grasboro meeting): defended Soviet “defense system”

2. SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks-Treaty) I negotiations (1969-1972)
   (1) ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty
      What is ABM? city defense vs silo defense
      Change in Soviet position on defense
      ABM Treaty
      -- 2 ABM sites allowed (later only 1)
      --100 launchers per one site
      --qualitative limitation on radars (phased array radar prohibited)
      --verification: national technical means
      mutual vulnerability
      no time limit
   (2) Interim Agreement—limitation on offensive weapons
      ICBM—US (1054) USSR (1618)
      SLBM—US (710) USSR (950)
      Bombers and FBS (Forward Base System)
   (3) acceptance of “equal security” “party” “strategic stability”
   (4) MIRV (Multiple Independently targeted Reentry Vehicle):
      US proposal: to ban testing and deployment, but not production
      Soviet proposal: to ban production and deployment, but not testing
   (5) SALT negotiations as learning experience:
      Ogarkov’s talk with Gerald Smith
      Domestic context: Scoop Jackson amendment
   (6) Basic Understanding of US-Soviet Relations

   Overall limit: 2400
   MIRV limit: 1320
   Soviet concessions on FBS
   Remaining issues: cruise missiles (ALCM) and Backfires
4. SALT II

(1) Carter’s comprehensive plan (deep cut)
  - Total: from 2400 to 1800-2000
  - MIRVed: from 1320 to 1100-1200
  - MIRVed ICBM: 550
  - Heavy ICBM: 150
  - Required Soviets to cut 400-600 offensive weapons, and 400-500 MIRVed ICBMs, while US did not have to cut any

(2) Soviet military buildup during the 1970s
  - SS-18 (300); SS-19 (300), SS-17 (100)—“window of vulnerability”
  - US-countervailing strategy: Schlesinger Doctrine: plan to develop MX missile
  - Committee on Present Danger (Paul Nitze, Reagan, Richard Pipes)
  - Soviet strategy moving in direction of accepting MAD
    - Brezhnev’s Tula speech (1997)—rejection of seeking military superiority
    - Rejection of victory in nuclear war
    - Why was the Soviet Union so protective of SS-18?

(3) SALT II
  - Total ceiling: 2400
  - MIRVed: 1320
  - MIRVed BM: 1200
  - MIRVed ICBM: 820 (difference: ALCM)
  - Fractionation banned (SS-18: 10, SLBM: 14)

(4) Opposition to SALT II: US failed to ratify
  - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
  - Marked the end of détente

5. Consequences of Arms Control
  - Why did the SALT process fail?
  - Was it a total loss?